

ON DIVINE PHILANTHROPY
FROM PLATO TO JOHN CHRYSOSTOM

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PROLOGUE

As far as theological methodology in general is concerned, Paul Tillich sheds some light, incidentally, on the entire past of Christian thinking, the patristic period included. In contradistinction to philosophy, which is mainly «structuralist» because preoccupied with being in itself,¹ Tillich underlines the existential character of Christian theology in its dealing with the very meaning that being has for us.² He stressed also the fact that the only ideal verification open to the theologian is an active mystical participation and not a scientific experience of detached observation.³

Much closer to our family of Church historians, Georges Florovsky, in his turn, emphatically teaches that the ultimate purpose of a historical inquiry «is not in the establishment of certain facts... but in the encounter with living beings.»⁴ And like a sobering momento, we hear the implacable witticism of Henri-Irénée Marrou that «historical truth is only valid for those who desire that truth.»⁵ One can even publicly confess the presence of a corrosive irony in the work of a historian who perceives well the rational meaning of the historical process, yet is never fully able to grasp it.⁶

1. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, I (Westminster, Maryland, 1963), 290.

2. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, I (Chicago, 1951), 23.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

4. Georges Florovsky, «The Predicament of the Christian Historian,» *Religion in Culture; Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich*, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New York, 1959), pp. 140-56, especially p. 149.

5. Henri-Irénée Marrou, *The Meaning of History* (Baltimore-Dublin, 1966), p. 151.

6. James H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture* (New York, 1966), p. 590.

All this does not minimize in the least the exhilarating possibility of a dutifully elaborated exercise of critical objectivity. After having paid due consideration to the warning of Pokrovasky's dictum («History is politics backward»),⁷ Rudolph Bultmann nonetheless seems to us quite reassuring when he asserts that historical study without presupposition is indeed possible if «without presupposition» is taken to mean that the results of exegesis are not presupposed.⁸ For this purpose, however, a lively empathy is almost indispensable to any creative historian. As the Rabbinic scholar Herbert Loewe has put it bluntly, «only an insider can be objective.»⁹

Gathering facts produces problems but does not solve them. Challenged to try a promising procedure of Peter Nemeshegy, who found in Origen's insistence on the paternity of God «la clef d'un système»¹⁰ I had my modest «eureka» experience when discovering that the frequent recurrence of the term Philanthropia in Chrysostom is important not only because it creates an atmosphere of peculiar serenity, but because unexpectedly it takes on the proportion of a greatest argument for the whole of Chrysostom's theodicy.

My task is to make a contribution to the study of Chrysostom by pointing out the peculiar place of the Antiochene saint in the wider perspective of Christian theology and pagan philosophy, stressing the concept of *φιλανθρωπία*.

Since the publication of *Χρυσόστομικά* in 1907, a festive volume offered for the occasion of the sixteenth centennial anniversary of Chrysostom's death, only the magisterial work of C. Baur¹¹ represents a lasting contribution in the field of Chrysostomic studies. But he limited his inquiry mainly to biographical data,¹² as did also Anatole Moulard. The latter was even unable to understand the rigorous apophaticism of Chrysostom.¹³

The principal methodological procedure of my examination of

7. Cited by Woodford D. McClellan, «Svetozar Markovic and the Origin of Balkan Socialism» (unpublished dissertation, University of California, 1963), p. 4.

8. Rudolph Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen* (1960), cited in Stephen Neill, *The Interpretation of the New Testament 1861-1961* (London, 1964), p. 231, n. 1.

9. C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, *A Rabbinic Anthology* (London, 1938), pp. iv-cvi. esp. p. lvi.

10. Peter Nemeshegy, *La Paternité de Dieu chez Origène* (Tournai, 1960), pp. 1-3.

11. C. Baur, *John Chrysostom and his Time*, trans. Šr. M. Gonzaga (2 vols; Westminster, Maryland, 1959). The German original appeared in 1929-1930.

12. *Ibid.*, I, 356.

13. Anatole Moulard, *Saint Jean Chrysostome* (Paris, 1941), p. 92.

Chrysostom will be, of course, the philological analysis of his works in order to grasp all semantic shades of the concept of philanthropia throughout his huge literary output. Dubia and, needless to say, spuria, will both enter into the scope of my inquiry.¹⁴ The text of Migne is still reliable, although I shall use recent critically edited texts whenever available.

Secondly I will try to present the synthetic functioning of divine philanthropy in Chrysostom's theological «system», establishing its central dogmatic position.

The third and concluding procedure will be the comparative method, leading to a final evaluation of Chrysostom as theologian by relating him to his predecessors, especially the Cappadocian Fathers. Comparison with his colleague Theodore of Mopsuestia will be limited only to the «philanthropic» implication of his Christology.

If we accept Bailey's distinction¹⁵ between «dogma» («a rational statement of a mystery») and «doctrine» («an attempt to enter into an understanding of a dogma...in however small degree»), then we can say that φιλανθρωπία τοῦ Θεοῦ, as well as χάρις are not merely doctrinal but potentially dogmatic notions since they are found in the scriptures.¹⁶ There were, of course different shades in the charitology and, if I may coin a new term, in the «philanthropology» among the Fathers and other ancient writers.

We have two lines of observable development of the concept of philanthropia: (1) the classical development from Aeschylus via Plutarch down to Libanius, Themistius of Byzantium and the Emperor Julian; and (2) the biblical development, especially from Philo and the New Testament through Origen and the Cappadocians to Chrysostom.

Only in the guise of a proper introduction to the use of the concept of philanthropy in the patristic Fourth Century will a survey of its previous history be offered.

14. In this respect the recent work of Jesuit father de Aldama is very helpful for discerning the pseudo-Chrysostomic interpolations. See J. A. de Aldama, *Repertorium Pseudochrysostomicum* (Paris, 1965), especially pp. 228-38.

15. Charles J. N. Bailey, *Groundwork for Comparative Metatheology—A Roadmap for Ecumenical Analytics* (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 26.

16. Heinrich Petri has recently dealt with this major problem; «Darüber, ob eine Wahrheit, die nur virtuell im Depositum enthalten ist, als Dogma verkündet werden kann, herrscht noch keine Einigkeit unter den Theologen. Rahner ist der Meinung, dass das grundsätzlich möglich ist, da Gott alle Implikationen seines Wortes übersehen und somit auch als geoffenbarte Wahrheiten bezeugen kann». *Exegese und Dogmatik in der Sicht der Katholischen Theologie* (Paderborn, 1966), p. 234.

Louis Meyer has already stressed «le primat de l'amour» in Chrysostom.¹⁷ More recently Auguste Luneau in a detailed study comes to the conclusion that among all the Fathers Chrysostom is the one who most emphasizes divine love as the meaning of human history.¹⁸ Neither of these two authors, however, identified a peculiarly Chrysostomic use of philanthropia.

The whole of patristic literature (Chrysostom included) could be put under the caption of «the theology of incompleteness.»¹⁹ The Fathers, being truly apophatic thinkers, seem to have known the incompatibility that exists between kerygmatic theology and any «system.»²⁰ This by no means excludes an eventual «idée-maitresse» in each of these Fathers. As I have discovered, for Chrysostom it is the concept of divine philanthropy.

While endowing this already prestigious term with a high theological value, Chrysostom is not only apologetically attempting to surpass Themistius' «preaching» on philanthropy, but, in fact, was about to sum up the long effort of preceding Christian «philanthropologists».

By so doing, he was, from the height of the old Antiochene pulpit and, later on, from the patriarchal throne of Byzantium, in a manner paying homage even to his pagan rivals and teachers, Libanius and Themistius, who obliged him to rethink for the Christian community the meaning of divine philanthropy. Ever since Chrysostom, God in Eastern Christendom is known primarily as «Friend of men» Θεός φιλόθρωπος.

The present Motiv-Forschung in Chrysostom's theology must be necessarily meager, since it can contain only the highlights and must dispense with exuberant illustrative and probative material. Such a summary, nonetheless, must almost inevitably lead to greater condensation of thought, and this will help, I hope, to reveal the present study as a coherent and self-explanatory whole.

17. Louis Meyer, *Saint Jean Chrysostome* (Paris, 1933), p. 64.

18. Auguste Luneau, *L' Histoire du salut chez les Pères de l' Eglise* (Paris, 1964), pp. 193-94.

19. George Huntson Williams, «Georges Vasilievich Florovsky: His American Career (1948-1965),» *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, XI, No. 1 (1965), 7-107, especially p. 106.

20. Kenneth Hamilton, *The System and the Gospel* (New York, 1963), especially p. 106.

I. INTRODUCTION

Classical Period

As the philosophers distinguish between the «thing» and the «label»,¹ one has, from the beginning, to be aware of the difference between the Greek word of «φιλανθρωπία», on one side, and the very reality of benevolence on the other side.

Since all the attributes of God are, by definition, eternal, the divine philanthropy was therefore a reality even before man came into existence, just as the practice of humaneness was to be known among men and, more particularly, among the Homeric Greek even before the fortunate word «φιλανθρωπία» was invented.²

Luggage and labels are not synonymous, and, despite the undisputed importance of theological labels, the latter in themselves should not be mistaken for the religious reality they indicate.³ This is the preliminary apophatic ablution that every theologian is supposed to undergo before entering the sacred precincts of the oldest of sciences. I am limiting the scope of my inquiry strictly to the theological career of the concept of *philanthropia*.⁴

A chronological study proves to be the only fruitful one, since the concrete meaning of the concept may constantly shift with different accretions in time.⁵ For the classical period we have three exhaus-

1. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 374, n. 4.

2. *Iliad* vi. 14: *Odyssey* viii, 546. See Roger LeDéaut, «φιλανθρωπία dans la littérature grecque jusqu'au Nouveau Testament (Tite III, 4), *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant*, I (Citta del Vaticano, 1964), 255-94, especially p. 256, n. 3. And also the practice of «φιλοξενία», LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 279.

3. Montefiore and Loewe, *op. cit.*, especially p. lix.

4. Independently from each other, Fr. Demetrios J. Constantelos and I have worked on a similar subject—that of philanthropy—but our respective studies differ in scope and methodology. Mine is centered on Chrysostom and theologically oriented, while Fr. Constantelos' thesis mainly stresses the sociological aspect of philanthropy. See his «Philanthropy and Philanthropic Institutions in the Byzantine Empire A. D. 330-1204» (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1965).

5. Ceslas Spicq, «La Philanthropie Hellénistique, vertu divine et royale (à propos de Tit. III, 4), *Studia Theologica* XII (1958), 166-91 especially p. 169.

tive studies dealing with the usage of φιλάνθρωπία.⁶ First to win the title of φιλόανθρωπος in Greek literature was the divine Prometheus.⁷ Aeschylus felt the rich evocative power in the word and used it unforgettably.⁸ Even when Prometheus, in open rebellion against his fellow-gods, dares to love men, he remains, nonetheless, different in kind. And his love has the character of a metaphysical bridge.⁹ This initial patronizing attitude imprinted itself so strongly on the term that even much later, when *philanthropia* has been transplanted on Latin soil in the guise of its approximative copy of *humanitas*, it still retained a strong admixture of condescension.¹⁰

Subsequently, we find in Aristophanes' «Peace» the god Mercury being addressed very solemnly:

... φιλάνθρωπότετε καὶ μεγαλοδωρότατε δαιμόνων

(*Pax.* v. 392)¹¹

In the context of a comedy the word, even though in the superlative, has naturally weaker religious magnetism than under a tragic Promethean spell.¹² Plato, in his turn, gave the same superlative title, but with much subtler discernment, to the god Eros.¹³ One should not be too astonished to find out that Plato, who rejected the all-pervading ancient poetry as a dangerous obstacle to intellectual progress,¹⁴ still used the old mythological language for his philosophical goals.¹⁵ His

6. Siegfried Lorenz, «De progressu notions φιλάνθρωπίας» (dissertation inauguralis, Lipsiae, 1914); S. Tromp de Ruiter, «De vocis quae est φιλάνθρωπία significatione atque usu» *Mnemosyne*, N. S. 59 (1932), 271-306; LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, 255-94.

7. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 8; Tromp de Ruiter, *loc. cit.*, p. 272; Le Déaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 256.

8. Aeschylus *Prom. Desm.* vs. 8 ff.

9. LeDéaut writes that «la philanthropie' est le sentiment qui incline à partager les intérêts du groupe opposé,» *loc. cit.*, p. 257.

10. Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 252.

11. Tromp de Ruiter, *loc. cit.*, p. 274; LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 258.

12. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 259.

13. Plato *Banquet* 189 D. See LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*

14. Eric A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 97.

15. That these goals are never explicitly stated one can see from Plato's astounding statement in the Seventh Letter (341c) according to which he has never written about the object of his aspirations and will never do so in the future. Albin Lesky argues that «the nature of these dialogues explains largely... why the borders between logos and myth become vague.» *A History of Greek Literature* (New York, 1966), p. 514.

all-out war against poetry is, according to Hevelock, the inevitable climax to the systematic doctrine of the Republic.¹⁶ It seems that for Plato as long as one surrenders to the poetic spell of the Homeric oral tradition one is bound to be «a two-aspect man» or a «many-aspect man», by way of identification.¹⁷ And the pupil of Socrates wanted a unified personality, an autonomous psyche¹⁸ capable of dialectic abstract thinking.¹⁹ Therefore, when we find such a phrase as ὁ Θεὸς... Φιλάνθρωπος ὦν in Book Four of *The Republic*,²⁰ we are entitled to see in it a somewhat refined abstract theological statement in spite of its immediate narrower context referring to the mythical Cronos.²¹

The happy combination of these two words (Θεὸς φιλάνθρωπος) had a rare destiny, notwithstanding all later semantic changes, never to be divorced in this happy language destined to become—through Christianity—the vehicle of perennial theology.

As an abstract noun φιλανθρωπία first appeared almost simultaneously in Plato (*Euthyphron* 3d) and in Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. 3, 7) around 390-395.²² M. Croiset translated it, in the first instance of its Platonic usage, as «humeur sociable».²³ Xenophon (*Mem.* i. 2,60) explicitly ascribes the previously exclusive divine prerogative of philanthropy to Socrates, in the sense of benevolence between men.²⁴ The new enrichment of the word can be observed in the application it had in Xenophon's idealized description of King Cyrus.²⁵ This kind of Xenophontic extolled *virtus regia*,²⁶ however, does not go beyond the circle of the king's own friends.²⁷ Nonetheless, once put on the horizontal line of interhuman relations, the virtues of benevolence and generosity, which the word *philanthropos* was supposed to indicate, started to be acknowl-

16. Havelock, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

20. Plato *Republic* iv. 713d; Tromp, *loc. cit.*

21. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 260.

22. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 261.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, p. 262. Tromp, *loc. cit.*, p. 278, states that with Xenophon «humanitas illa deorum immortalium transiit ad mortales... hominum principes».

26. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Lorenz underlines also the importance of Isocrates who contributed much in shaping the ideal picture of an ideal king, in *op. cit.*, p. 17; cf. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 267.

27. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 263.

edged among common citizens also.²⁸ Athenians, especially, gloried in their philanthropic way of life, the more so since they considered themselves, through their sovereign democracy, collectively «king».²⁹

A peculiar application of the term is to be found in Ischomachus' praise of agriculture: «ἡ γεωργία οὕτω φιλόανθρωπος ἐστὶ καὶ πραεῖα τέχνη» (*Oeconom.* xix. 17).³⁰ This farmer's usage of philanthropy together with that ascribed to the animals is peripheral and finally destined to disappear.³¹

Both the prince Evagoras, on account of his philanthropic rule, and the city of Athens for its philanthropic regime, were offered as examples to be imitated since they managed everything in a way which gods loved and out of love for men, θεοφιλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως.³² It was, however, to be expected that the term «philanthropy», once it became a fashionable catchword, was likely to be abused for the purpose of propaganda. Indeed, very soon a conqueror like Philip of Macedon adroitly manipulated it in his imperial stratagems, for which cause he was immediately and vehemently criticized by Demosthenes.³³ The word could be in some cases rapidly vulgarized to such a point as to mean nothing more than shallow politeness,³⁴ or even as an euphemism covering unholy sensual attachment,³⁵ but in the most frequent acception — as witnessed by Demosthenes — it acquired new shades of meaning by mirroring also the virtues of good judges and magistrates, namely mercifulness and pity.³⁶ It could also mean the popular affection of citizenry toward their meritorious leaders.³⁷

The main achievement of the golden Fourth Century concerning the word *philanthropia* was, on the whole, its semantic broadening and partial change: after the gods it encompassed princes and, finally, all citizens. Thus, the patronizing aspect of condescension was gradually

28. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

29. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 19; LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, pp. 276-77.

30. Tromp de Ruiter, *loc. cit.*, p. 281. Le Déaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 265, added a more extensive translation; «L' agriculture est la plus noble des arts parce qu' il développe la noblesse d' âme chez ceux qui s' y adonnent» (*Oeconom.* xv. 12).

31. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 13; LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 267.

32. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 268.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

reduced in the same proportion as it stood for the social virtues of kindness and friendliness which were to adorn each and every citizen of the Hellenic city-state.³⁸ Quite revealing for this new mentality is the fact that φιλόθρωπος is often knit together with φιλόπολις.³⁹

Actually, classical heathendom did not include the poor in its philanthropy:

«VOLKSfreundlich» ist φιλόθρωπος, nicht ARMENfreundlich.⁴⁰ Not only had the aristocratic Plato accepted the institution of slavery⁴¹ but he showed himself severer than contemporary Athenian laws regarding slavery.⁴² Aristotle was not much better, either, in this respect.⁴³ Even theologically, the apparently generous Plato is at least ambiguous: after having proclaimed God as the Artificer and Father of the universe (*Timaeus* 27e ff.),⁴⁴ together with the dogmatic assertion that «God is good»,⁴⁵ nevertheless his pregnant conception of the goodness of God loses its meaning since the phenomenal and the real are separated from each other.⁴⁶ Consequently, his intuitive approach to God as to a Philanthropic Being (*Republic* iv. 713D) is vitiated by its vaguely speculative bearing since the fundamental dualistic tendency in his anthropology⁴⁷ evacuates the Platonic conception of human immortality from any unique individual content.⁴⁸ Thus, Plato's God⁴⁹

38. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

39. LeDéaut, *ibid.*, p. 268.

40. Hendrik Bolkestein, *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum* (Utrecht, 1939), p. 110.

41. Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

44. Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, I (Glasgow, 1923), 229.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 245; cf., Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 180 on χωρισμός

47. Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 186; cf. also pp. 202-203, 209, 377.

48. Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 247; cf. Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

49. It is outside the scope of my inquiry to go into details of this problem. However, it is noteworthy that Fr. Copleston implies that «the Demiurge of *Timaeus* is an *hypothesis* and that Plato's 'theism' is not to be overstressed.» The same author argues also about Plato's distinction in *Ep.* 6, 323 d 2-6 between the Demiurge («God who is captain of all things present and to come») and the One («the Father of that captain and cause.») But even if we grant that «the One, the Good and the essential Beauty are the same for Plato, and that the intelligible world of Forms owes its being... to the One», still it is not at all clear how concretely these ideas are related to the One and, much less, how particular beings, the artifacts of the Demi-

finally turns out to be without real objects upon whom to exercise his alleged philanthropic inclination. At best, this Platonic God could be called relatively φιλόψυχος only, not really φιλόανθρωπος, and even in that respect it seems more cautious to maintain that there is no personal God in Plato's philosophy,⁵⁰ as well as that there is no obvious immortality for the individual soul as such.⁵¹

The happy inconsistency of Plato's system is crowned with his maturer approximations in the *Laws* wherein the aging philosopher showed a deeper insight into the deity by stamping out as heresy the teaching that gods are indifferent to man.⁵² Also of undying importance will be Plato's doctrine of ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ.⁵³ Not only because he united it with the supreme «dogma» of his theistic humanism, according to which «God will be the measure of all things,»⁵⁴ but also because Plato made friendship with God dependent upon the likeness to God: Θεῷ φίλος, ὁμοιος γάρ.⁵⁵

urge, can have any real relation to the One. Moreover, it is inferred that «the phenomenon... stands half-way between being and not-being, and to make things even more desperate, only a few elect are capable of hearing about God—from those even fewer in number who succeed in finding «the maker and the father of the universe» (*Tim.* 28c, 3-5). *Op. cit.*, pp. 176-78.

Aristotle's God who knows only himself is the very opposite of the Biblical conception of God. Even if the Aristotelian First Mover be granted, philosophically, the personal character, as Fr. Copleston advocates nonetheless, it is out of the question for men to attempt any personal intercourse with him, since in the *Magna Moralia* (1208h 26-32) Aristotle squarely excluded the possibility of friendship toward God, for «God could not return our love, and we could not in any case be said to love God». *Op. cit.*, pp. 316-17.

50. Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

51. Even though Copleston may seem favorable to the opinion that Plato's mythical illustrations imply his eventual belief in «real, personal immortality», he finally agrees with C. Ritter: «It cannot be maintained with certainty that Plato was convinced of the immortality of the soul, as that is taught in the Myths of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*». pp. 212-15.

52. *Laws* 899d5-905d3. Cf. Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

53. See Hubert Merki, ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕῷ: *Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa* (Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1952). Apropos he writes (pp. 1-2) that even the ancient commentators have seen in this doctrine «einen Kernpunkt der Ethik Platon». Cf. Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

54. Plato, *Laws*, text and trans. R. G. Bury, I (London, 1926), 295.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 296 (Bk. iv. 716d). Merki, *op. cit.*, p. 5, said apropos; «Der Gedanke der Gottesfreundschaft ... in Leg. IV 716A-D... mit der Homoiosis-Lehre verbunden wird».

Endre von Ivánka, *Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter* (Einsiedeln, 1964), p. 482, gave a general evaluation of

Hellenistic Age

Albin Lesky argues that strictly speaking the Hellenistic age ends in 30 B.C.⁵⁶ with the incorporation into the Roman Empire of the last kingdom of Alexander's successors, namely, Egypt of the Lagides.⁵⁷ But on the other hand, he recognizes that the culture of the Empire also forms part of this period.⁵⁸ Its beginning is usually fixed at the rise of Alexander the Great.⁵⁹ The Atticist reaction is a literary sign of break with the Hellenistic Age.⁶⁰

M. Détienne reminds us how already the Pythagoreans called the «demons of the golden race» δαίμονες φιλανθρωπάτατοι.⁶¹ The explicit doctrine of the unity of mankind, however, was elaborated in the Peripatos.⁶² The late compilation of Stobaeus echoes the ancient code of rules concerning the mutual aid among man.⁶³ A special place is allotted in it to friendship and *philanthropia*: φιλία πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κοινή τις ἡμῶν ὑπάρχει φιλανθρωπία (ii. 7,13).⁶⁴

We have divided opinions on the problem of who first started to propagate the word *philanthropia* on the large scale of popular use between the competitive schools of thought. Max Mühl⁶⁵ ascribes the

the impact that the two classical philosophical systems had, respectively in the East and the West: «Nicht zur analysierenden religiösen Durchdringung, wie der Aristotelismus, sondern zur Meditierenden Entfaltung seiner innern Zusammenhänge ist der Platonismus wie geschaffen. Das alles erklärt... wieso die östliche Theologie immer die Verbindung mit der Mystik zu bewahren wusste...»

56. Lesky, *op. cit.*, p. 778.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 695.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*, p. 694.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 694.

61. M. Détienne, *La Notion de DAIMON dans le pythagorisme ancien* (Paris, 1963), p. 102.

62. Bolkestein, *op. cit.*, p. 124; Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Lesky, *op. cit.*, p. 653.

63. This list of duties was transmitted through the schools down to Cicero (*De Off. i.*, 16, 51-52) and to Seneca (*Ep.* 95, 51). LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 281, n. 51.

64. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 281. A. J. Festugière aptly emphasized in his book *Epicurus and His Gods* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 39-42, that Epicurus, through his doctrine of *ataraxia*, wanted to make himself the saviour of mankind. According to the same writer Epicureanism was a spirit much more than a doctrine... a cult of friendship... Friendship was not only, as it had been in other schools, a stimulus in the course of research, it became the primary pursuit of the elect.

65. Max Mühl, *Die antike Menschheitsidee in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1928), p. 91.

spreading of the notion to the Stoics, and, even Philo, according to his view, could have been influenced by this allegedly Stoic «philanthropy».

T. A. Sinclair similarly argues that the emergence of *philanthropia* as a political idea is not due to Jewish influence, but to that of Panaetius of Rhodes, and he is willing to add only the Cynics.⁶⁶ On the opposite side, against the exclusively Stoic merit of promoting the concept of philanthropy, stand R. Hirzel,⁶⁷ Tromp de Ruiter,⁶⁸ and recently Jürgen Kabiersch, who has noticed that even Marcus Aurelius never used the word *philanthropia* when describing interhuman relationships.⁶⁹ Bolkestein,⁷⁰ Lorenz,⁷¹ and LeDéaut⁷² specifically indicate the Peripatetic School as the seed-bed of the idea of the natural unity of mankind. Nonetheless, the most eager disseminators of that idea, as well as of the notion of *philanthropia*, proved to be the Stoics.⁷³ Theirs is also the classical definition of the term: φιλική χοῆσις ἀνθρώπων.⁷⁴ Stoicism was not merely the ethical ideal for the Graeco-Roman élite of the last centuries before Christ, but tended to become a pragmatic ideology of Hellenistic princes⁷⁵ emerging from the «melting pot» created by Alexander the Great. The ideal of the «divine monarchy» as represented by the Διάδοχοι was intended to stimulate among its subjects the desire to imitate god, by following the example of their king who supposedly was the embodiment of the virtues of the gods.⁷⁶ H. I. Bell sees in the *philanthropia* of the later inscriptions of the Roman chancelleries, understood as one of the virtue of kindliness and consideration for others, an heritage of the Ptolemaic age.⁷⁷ He strongly emphasizes that it is the quality of a king to be φιλόθρωπος.⁷⁸

66. T. A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (London, 1951), p. 291. Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, II (Cambridge Mass., 1962), 220.

67. Rudolf Hirzel, *Plutarch* (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 28, 45.

68. Tromp de Ruiter, *loc. cit.*, p. 303.

69. Jürgen Kabiersch, *Untersuchungen zum Begriff der Philanthropia bei dem Kaiser Julian* (Wisbaden, 1960), p. 33.

70. Bolkestein, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

71. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

72. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 280.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

74. Hans von Arnim, *Stoicorum Vetera Fragmenta*, III, 292 (Leipzig, 1903) 72.

75. A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*. II (Paris, 1949), 298.

76. Spicq, *loc. cit.*, pp. 183-84.

77. H. I. Bell, «Philanthropia in the Papyri of the Roman period», *Hommages à Joseph Bidez et à Franz Cumont* (Bruxelles, 1938), pp. 31-37.

78. *Ibid.*

Thus, the initial connotation of a descending bestowal still remained clearly discernible in the term.⁷⁹ But if the royal *philanthropia* is mainly rooted in the mild character of the prince, familiarity with the *paideia*, however, is not less important for the formation of a good Hellenistic ruler: «Der Herrscherberuf fordert ἤθος χρηστὸν καὶ Παιδείας κεκοινωνηκὸς und dieses ἤθος χρηστὸν stellt sich heraus als ἐπιεικεία und φιλανθρωπία.»⁸⁰

Festugière also cautiously denies the Stoics the exclusive credit for the introduction in the official idiom of the sophisticated concept of *philanthropia*.⁸¹ Very frequently the historian Polybius (ca. 201-120) in his time used the word *philanthropia*, but without adding the new semantic strata to its meaning, except in one instance only: Φιλανθρωπία could mean for him the renewal of the treaty of friendship between states.⁸² Thus, during the Hellenistic period the term of *philanthropia* became widely popular chiefly under the influence of the Stoics, but its semantic content was not automatically enriched by that popularization; only its range was extended as to embrace all men.⁸³

«Τὸ φιλόανθρωπον in the solemn language of royal scribes indicates some gift of the sovereign,⁸⁴ but abused by officialdom, it came

79. Spicq. *loc. cit.*, pp. 185-86, writes apropos that: «La philanthropie, à l' époque hellénistique... comporte formellement une nuance de bonté divine et royale, une générosité descendante».

80. W. Schubart, «Das Hellenistische königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri», *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, XII (1936), pp. 1-26, especially p. 5. The same writer deduces the ἔλεος from φιλανθρωπία *loc. cit.*, p. 12.

81. Festugière, *Hermès Trismégiste*, II, 305 ff. The same writer argues about some hellenistic inscriptions which were displaying the word *philanthropia*: «II ne ne s' agit, en aucun cas, d' amour de l' humanité, mais de la simple *bienveillance* bien connue des Grece eavant toute influence de la philosophie.» Cf. Le Déaut; p. 285. In the concrete implementation of philanthropy he considers the Buddhist king Asoka far above the hellenistic rulers. Festugière, «Les Inscriptions d' Asoka et l' idéal du Roi hellenistiques», *Mélanges J. Lebreton* (Paris, 1951) pp. 13, 31-46.

It is noteworthy that already Zarathustra addressed his Wise Lord (Ahura Mazda) with a moving boldness: «Speak to me as friend to friend», Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, *The Hymns of Zarathustra* (Boston, 1963), p. 7. However according to this author, his doctrine remains different from that of Christianity. «Far from enjoining forgiveness of trespasses, Zoroaster preaches that it is important, to illtreat the wicked as it is to be good to the good».

82. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 281.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

84. Cf. Marie-Thérèse Lenger, «La Notion de 'bienfait' (philanthropon) royal et les ordonnances den rois lagides», *Studi in onore di Vincenzo Arangio Ruz* (Naples, 1953), pp. 483-99.

merely to designate state taxation, and by this euphemistic debasing of the term we can measure the long distance between Aeschylus' prophetic seriousness and the deliberate ornamentation of the court *littérateurs* cultivating Alexandrian Rococo.⁸⁵

Φιλανθρωπία as Used in the Biblical Trend

Old Testament

At this junction we have to deal with a body of literature strikingly different in spirit from that I have hereto surveyed. We turn, namely, to the Old Testament, to Philo the Jew and to the New Testament.

Professor von Campenhausen is right in underlining the common ties that the Church had with Judaism for about a hundred years in sharing the Old Testament as a common source of authority.¹ However, not to lose historical perspective one has immediately to add a clarifying statement, that the most important achievement of the Alexandrian age was the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint.² This monumental work started under the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (285-246), for all practical purposes was the Bible of the Hellenistic Judaism, not only in Egypt and Palestine, but throughout Western Asia and Europe.³ It created immediately a peculiar language of religion which lent itself to the service of the nascent church providing her with an authorized version of the Old Testament.⁴ Of the trans-

85. Lesky, *op. cit.*, p. 701.

1. «So hat die Kirche mehr als 100 Jahre lang mit dem Judentum ein und denselben 'Kanon' besessen; das Alte Testament ist ihre früheste völlig ausgeprägte 'Norm'». Hans von Campenhausen, «Das Alte Testament als Bibel der Kirche vom Ausgang des Urschiententums bis zur Entstehung des Neuen Testaments», *Studien zur Kirchengeschichte des ersten und zweiten Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen, 1963), pp. 152-96, especially p. 156.

2. Robert C. Dentan, *The Apocrypha, Bridge of the Testaments* (Greenwich, Connecticut, 1954), p. 8.

3. Henry Barclay Swete, *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* (Cambridge, 1902), p. 433. Krister Stendahl pointed out that the discoveries and research of the past half century have generally confirmed Swete's position concerning the agreements between the New Testament and LXX A in *The School of St. Matthew* (Lund, 1954), p. 172, cited by Albert C. Sundberg, Jr., *The Old Testament of the Early Church* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964), p. 93.

4. Swete, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

lations, the Septuagint alone is actually earlier than the received Masoretic text and therefore its witness to the pluritiry of the Hebrew archetypes is indeed invaluable⁵. H.J. Cadbury, for example, has found one case where both Sirach and Septuagint agree against the Masoretic text.⁶ Moreover, the aptness of Swete's argument concerning the state of fluidity in Palestinian Judaism, as well as in the Diaspora, seems to be substantiated by the study of Albert C. Sundberg, Jr. who suggests that there was no such thing as an «Alexandrian canon» of Hellenistic Judaism that was distinct from a «Palestinian canon.»⁷ Rather, in addition to closed collections of Law and Prophets, a wide religious literature circulated throughout Judaism as holy scripture before Jamnia. It was while such a condition existed in Judaism that Christianity received and carried over the scriptures from Judaism.⁸ But when the Septuagint became the Christian Bible Jewish feelings completely changed regarding it.⁹

In the scope of my inquiry there come only the so-called Apocrypha¹⁰ in which the noun *philanthropia* and its derivatives are to be found. After the temporary depreciation of the Septuagint and especially of its «apocryphal» books in some quarters of Protestant scholarship¹¹ our century has witnessed a reaction to it by very nearly reaching the practical consensus that «a Bible without an Apocrypha is an incomplete Bible».¹² Augustine, by postulating an equal and identical divine inspiration for both the Hebrew and the Septuagint Greek texts, did not envisage them as competitive but as complementary in authority.¹³ In this respect he is in full accordance with the practice of Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus in the East.¹⁴

5. *Ibid.*, op. 440-441. Already Elias Levita contended that the vowel-points were added to the text by the Masorettes as late as A. D. 500. Cf. Sundberg, *op. cit.*, 13-14.

6. Sundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

9. Dentan, *op. cit.*, p. 14; cf. Sundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

10. Dentan, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

11. Swete, *op. cit.*, pp. 436, 438; Dentan, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

12. Dentan, *op. cit.*, p. 2. Sundberg has argued, *op. cit.*, p. 8, that if the canon is to be determined entirely by subjective judgment, as Luther insinuated it, then Howorth has appropriately made a pungent remark: «Everybody must, in fact, either become an infallible Pope to himself or else accept Luther as an infallible Pope».

13. Sundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Among the «Apocrypha», I Esdras is the earliest. It was translated approximately between 246-198 from the Hebrew originals written shortly before this time.¹⁵ We find in it (8:10) the expression «καὶ τὰ φιλόανθρωπα ἐγὼ κρίνας» («In accordance with my gracious decision»—R.S.V.) stemming from the usage of the Hellenistic chancelleries. A cliché, without any theological consequence.

In the enlarged Greek version of Esther¹⁶ we find only once the term of φιλανθρωπία, again in the context of royal decree, but this time accompanied by the notion of χρηστότης (Esther 8:121).¹⁷

Of similar tenor is «τὰ... φιλόανθρωπα βασιλικὰ» in II Maccabees 4:11, as well as καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐφιλανθρώπησεν (13:23: «and showed generosity to the holy place» (R.S.V.)). The three other instances of the word used in the same book (6:22; 9:27; 14:9) do not offer any new connotation or meaning.¹⁸

The Wisdom of Solomon, sometimes dated as late as the early first century A.D.,¹⁹ represents the first great attempt to make a synthesis between the discoveries of Greek philosophy and the great truths of Biblical revelation.²⁰ R.C. Dentan argues that it is «one of the great theological books of the Bible»²¹ while H. Kraft, on the contrary accuses the pseudonymous author of ontologizing the functional Hokhma of the Hebrew Old Testament.²² I am inclined to agree with Dentan's general evaluation, when he dares conclude that few would care to defend the formalistic opinion that *Ecclesiastes* in the canonical Old Testament, with its essentially sceptical view of life, is directly inspired by God, whereas *Ecclesiasticus* and the *Wisdom of Solomon*, full as they are of fine ethical teaching and God-centered understanding of human life, are not.²³

The writer, who, for the first time in the Old Testament litera-

15. Dentan, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

16. 134-104 B.C., *Ibid.*, p. 117.

17. *Septuaginta*, ed. Alfred Rahlfs (editio quinta; Stuttgart, 1952), I, 968. The combination of these two words will be not forgotten by the author of Titus 3:4.

18. I-II Maccabees may have been written 104-63 B.C. But even a relative date for these books is pure conjecture. Cf. Dentan. *op. cit.*, p. 118.

19. Dentan, *loc. cit.*,

20. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

21. *Ibid.*

22. H. Kraft, *Early Christian Thinkers* (London, 1964), p. 13.

23. Dentan, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

ture, conceives of God as Author of life and peace beyond the grave for the righteous souls (Wisdom 3:1-3)²⁴ could have spontaneously called him «philanthropic»; «φιλόανθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα σοφία (Wisdom 1:6).²⁵

Here for the first time in the Biblical literature the term φιλόανθρωπον rises above the ethical level into the sphere of theology. On account of its incipient theological application the term has no sentimental overtones whatsoever, enveloped as it by the unexpected idea of judgment:

For wisdom is a kindly (Φιλόανθρωπον)
spirit and will not free a blasphemer from
the guilt of his words. (Wisdom 1:6a-R.S.V.).²⁶

Before one goes deeper into the comparison between the pagan and the Biblical worlds it would be good to question the appropriateness of comparative methodology.

Richard D. Lambert argues that there are three types of scholars.²⁷ First, the contrastists, emphasizing the differences in the cultures compared.²⁸ The second type comprises the comparativists who deal with a limited number of variables and try to determine whether there are uniformities or regularities in the distribution of the variables.²⁹ The third group is made up of uniuquists, who, persuaded of the uniqueness of a given culture, are suspicious of any comparativist's work.³⁰

It is no small comfort to read the conclusion given by Lambert, according to which «comparativists' concepts can be... useful as organizing principles.»³¹ Otherwise the criticism of the comparativists by the uniuquists is only too often justified... Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint...

24. *Ibid.*, p. 86. The idea of resurrection, however, begins to appear sporadically in post-exilic Biblical literature, and by the Second Century was a well-established belief. Cf. John Bright, *A History of Israel*, (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 438.

25. The problem of identification of σοφία with the Divine Spirit will be dealt with later on in this chapter.

26. We shall find a similar non-sentimental approach to philanthropy in Chrysostom (Mt. Hom. XXXIII. P.G. 57, 391, 406 et passim).

27. Richard D. Lambert, «Comparativists and uniuquists,» *Approaches to Asian Civilizations*, ed. W. Theodore de Bary and Ainslie T. Embree (New York, 1964), pp. 240-45.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

Philo (ca. 20 B.C.—50 A.D).

Whether Philo was actually able to create a philosophically coherent system of thought, as Wolfson contends,³² or was not able to, as the latest inquiry of Sowers declares,³³ is not of primary concern for my study. What really matters is the undisputable fact that he was a living link between Judaism and Hellenistic culture. He manages to interpret the Book of Genesis, for example, in terms of the story of creation in *Timaeus*.³⁴ Völker has argued that Philo was, «trotz aller Unselbständigkeit,» an important link between the antiquity and Christendom, too.³⁵

Philo, it seems, inherited a tradition of Jewish allegorical exegesis in Alexandria which tried to elaborate a rational defense of the Scriptures using allegory to show the harmony between Scripture and philosophy.³⁶ In fact, Philo's continual use of the technical terminology used by the Greek allegorists links him unequivocally with the same method of secular philosophy and rhetoric.³⁷

While in the Palestine of his day faith in the resurrection of the flesh was prominent, in Philo's Alexandria «l'accent fut mis sur l'immortalité de l'âme.»³⁸ It is of interest in this connection to notice how Philo handles the key notion of Biblical anthropology, namely, the εἰκὼν

32. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, I, 114.

33. Sidney C. Sowers, *The Hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews: A Comparison of the Interpretation of the Old Testament in Philo Judaeus and the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Richmond, Virginia, 1965), pp. 25-26, n. 46.

34. Harry A. Wolfson, «Extrabiblical and Intrabiblical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXII, No. 1 (1961), 3-32, especially p. 6.

35. Welter Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandriens: Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit* (Leipzig, 1938), p. 350.

36. Sowers, *op. cit.*, p. 18. According to Wolfson the term allegory as an exegetical term was introduced by Philo. Before him it was used only as a rhetorical term. Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 71.

As far as the allegorism of the pagan philosophers is concerned, Henri de Lubac, *Catholicism* (New York, 1958), p. 84, stresses its absolute disregard for history: «It does not mean that these things ever happened», said Sallust, Julian the Apostate's friend.»

37. Sowers, *op. cit.*, p. 20. Because of his fondness for allegory Philo is rather cavalierly dismissed, together with Barnabas, by R. H. Snape, «Rabbinical and Early Christian Ethics,» *A Rabbinic Anthology*, ed. C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe (London, 1938), pp. 617-30, especially p. 619.

38. J. Giblet, *L'Homme image de Dieu dans les commentaires littéraires de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Louvain, 1948), p. 106.

τοῦ Θεοῦ. First, he excludes the possibility of «image of God» ever becoming God Himself.³⁹ Second, he couples it with the notion of ὁμοιωσις which, as it were opposed to the static εἰκὼν stands for a dynamic aspiration towards a greater likeness of God.⁴⁰ If Philo is perfectly right in restricting any coarse idea of anthropomorphic confusion by saying that:

οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ὁ Θεός,
οὔτε θεοειδὲς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα. (*Opif.* 69),⁴¹

he is, however, too easily seduced by the pagan dis-incarnational point of view in which the soul is ultimately divested from the body, in order to achieve its own «perfect image.»⁴²

This kind of bodiless eschatology is, no doubt, what undermines Philo's otherwise strongly developed «philanthropology».

Robert M. Grant has found a few remarkable similarities between the exegetical work of Paul and that of his contemporary Philo of Alexandria.⁴³ If both are dependent on the hermeneutical tradition of the synagogue, nonetheless both differ from the rabbinic exegesis in their outlook, as being both apostles to the gentiles.⁴⁴ Yet, according to Grant, «Paul cannot be explained merely in terms of his Jewish and Greek sources. His whole personality was changed by his experience of conversion.»⁴⁵

The difference in the vision of God between these two famous

39. *Ibid.*, p. 114. Sowers argues in *op. cit.*, p. 104, that the Greek eikon sometimes carried the meaning of «form» in the sense of a diminution of the real thing, a «likeness,» and sometimes «form» designated the very «pattern» or «archtype». Here, obviously, Philo used it in the first, weaker, sense of a «copy», although one can occasionally find in Philo the «Neo-Platonic» usage, also, wherein the eikon became a synonym for ἰδέα and took on the meaning of «model.» Wolfson established in *Philo*, I, 238-39, that Philo still applied the term image to things in the visible world, but, unlike, Plato, Philo describes the ideas as well as the Logos also by the term image. This double use of the term image reappears in the writings of the Church Fathers.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 114, n. 3. Cf. Irenaeus *Adv. haeres.* I, V, 5 (P.G. 7, 500).

41. *Philo*, ed. P. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (10 vols.; Cambridge, Mass., 1962), I, 54.

42. Giblet, *op. cit.*, p. 118. «δερματικὸς χιτῶν» of Gen. 3:21 is often interpreted in this manner; *Leg. Alleg.* II. 56; *Det.* 159.

43. Robert M. Grant, *A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible* (London, 1965), p. 28.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

Jews will also determine the different connotations of their respective uses of *φιλανθρωπία*. To this comparison I shall turn after a brief exposition of Philo's and the neotestamental uses of the term we are examining.

Richard A. Norris points out traces of a Hellenization of Judaism and the Old Testament Scriptures, for example in the Book of Wisdom, but he adds that: «its most typical and successful expression is to be found in the writings of Philo of Alexandria...a contemporary of Christ.»⁴⁶ W. Richardson, for his part, describes the curious parallelism between Jewish history and Greek philosophy.⁴⁷ Much as in Jewish history there had grown up a fervent expectation and quest for a Messiah, there was also in Greek thought, at least since Plato and Aristotle, an «equally searching quest for the perfectly wise man, the sage or philosopher-king... The educated Jew, Philo, knew and used it.»⁴⁸ Henceforth, he lavishly displayed his art in depicting Moses as a perfect king and an insuperable Sage and Lawgiver.⁴⁹ L. E. Elliott-Binns has tried to establish Philo's source of inspiration, and wrote the following: «Plato had held that the 'creation' was an expression of God's goodness, a thought taken up by Philo (*Cher.* 35).»⁵⁰ This statement even though formally credible is utterly one-sided, since, according to Wolfson, Philo could have known from the native Jewish tradition that God is said to deal with the world in two ways: by exercising His Goodness or by enforcing His law or punishment.⁵¹ Philo goes even further, when as if polemicizing with Plato, he says that God is «superior to knowledge, superior to the good itself and the beautiful itself.»⁵² On the contrary, neither Plato nor Aristotle, despite their belief in the immateriality and simplicity of God, had any conception of the unknowability of

46. Richard A. Norris, *God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen* (New York, 1965), p. 9.

47. W. Richardson. «A Motif of Greek Philosophy in Luke-Acts», *Studia Evangelica*, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin, 1964), II, 628-34, especially p. 629.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 629.

49. *De vita Mosis* i. 148 (Colson-Whitaker, VI, 352). Similarly Abraham was presented also: *De Abrahamo* 261 (VI, 126), Cf. *De virtut.* 216-217 (VIII, 296).

50. L. E. Elliott-Binns, «James 1:18: Creation or Redemption?» *New Testament Studies*, III (1957), 148-61, especially p. 149.

51. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 223-24. Also he specifies in *Spec.* ii. 32, 196 (Colson-Whitaker, VII, 428) that God, through his «gracious nature ... sets forgiveness before chastisement».

52. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 201.

God's essence.⁵³ When Philo posited a formal distinction between the knowability of God's existence and the unknowability of His essence, he must have intended either to present a new interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, or himself as opposed to them.⁵⁴ Elliott-Binns, obviously, must have overlooked the fact that in the same treatise *de Cherubim*, which he quoted in support of his thesis, Philo speaks, very unplatonicly, of the intimacy of God's goodness as of a visitation of One who is the Creator and

Who, in His tender mercy and lovingkindness
(δι' ἡμερότητα καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν)
has deigned to visit created being and
come down from the boundaries of heaven
to the utmost ends of earth,
to show His goodness to our race.⁵⁵

As Philo's belief in providence «ultimately rests upon creation,»⁵⁶ I would extend the impact of the idea of creation to his understanding of *philanthropia*, also. Thus, in spite of all the «concordist» efforts devoted by Philo to harmonize the Book of Genesis with Plato's *Timaeus*,⁵⁷ the Rabbi in Philo seems stronger than the Hellenistic philosopher since he makes the option for a God who is «not only a Demiurge, but also a Creator (κτίστης).»⁵⁸ Consequently, when we hear someone say that virtue for Philo is of the order of Idea, that it has an ontological value,⁵⁹ we should immediately adduce as an apophatic corrective to this assertion, that for the same Philo God is «superior to virtue» (*Opif.* 2,8).⁶⁰ Henceforth, when he states in his treatise «On the Virtues» that God is θεὸς φιλάνθρωπος,⁶¹ he applies this anthropomorphic epithet to God only on the grounds of its pedagogical value,⁶² without, at his best, losing sight

53. *Ibid.*, II, 449.

54. *Ibid.*, II, 117. Elmer O'Brien, *The Essential Plotinus* (New York, 1964), p. 15, is of the similar opinion.

55. *Philo*, ed. Colson-Whitaker, II, 69.

56. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 300.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, p. 301.

59. R. Arnaldez (ed.), *Philon; de Mutatione Nominum* (Paris, 1964), p. 11: «La Vertu, pour Philon, est une réalité de l'ordre de l'Idée, elle est une valeur ontologique.»

60. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 201.

61. *De virtut.* 77 (Colson-Whitaker, VIII, 208).

62. Wolfson, *Philo*, II, 128.

of the apophatic perspective of everything pertaining to God, His powers such as *philanthropia* included.⁶³

This apophatic framework of Philo's thinking gives a new savor to the whole of his aretology, as if rejuvenating the somewhat too pompous or antiquated vocabulary of the Hellenistic élite of his time. For example, when Philo intimates that it all depends whether or not men will practice the virtues in order to obtain good things from God who is «the Lover of virtue and the Lover of what is good and beautiful and also the Lover of man (φιλόανθρωπος),»⁶⁴ he introduces into Hellenistic philosophy a new approach to the mystery of free will by teaching that «the human soul is endowed by God with part of his own power of freedom, to work miracles in man as He himself works miracles in the world.»⁶⁵ And for the Greek philosophers, on the other hand, there is no such thing as a will free and independent of the competitive forces of reason and the emotions.⁶⁶

After an acquaintance with Philo's uses of the term *philanthropia* I can classify them as follows: the first use, in the age-long sense of the attribute of kings,⁶⁷ or covering philanthropic legislation.⁶⁸ Philanthropy could stand for natural kindness to men,⁶⁹ or for the ascetically cultivated attitude of the Essenes.⁷⁰ We see *philanthropia* still used as a rather abstract label for virtue,⁷¹ or, on the contrary, conveying the social concrete concern, such as gifts of charity,⁷² liberation of the slaves,⁷³ municipal help,⁷⁴ or as a virtue opposed to niggardliness.⁷⁵ The exhortation against revenge would fall into the same category.⁷⁶

63.; *Ibid.*, p. 138: «The powers of God in the sense of the property of God to act... are not distinct from the essence of God., and if the essence of God... is unknowable, then the powers of God are also unknowable.»

64. *De Opif.* 81 (ed. Colson-Whitaker, I, 66). (Further references to Philo will be to this same edition unless otherwise stated).

65. Wolfson, *Philo*, II. 453.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 452.

67. III 258: X, 34, 36.

68. VII, 370; VIII, 138; IX, 336.

69. II, 414; VII, 366, 570, 572.

70. IX. 58.

71. II, 112; VI, 454; VII, 270, 288, 372; VIII, 18,22,66.

72. VII, 170.

73. VIII, 16.

74. X, 80.

75. VII, 228.

76. VI, 404.

Once I have found a derogatory connotation to it translated as «untimely generosity.»⁷⁷

In a few but important instances *philanthropia* has a theological bearing on a property of God; going together with *ἐπιεικεία*,⁷⁸ or together with the unsentimental punishment of the Sodomites.⁷⁹ Once it is even personified, together with *ἀρετή*, as one of the two «attendants» of the «gracious nature» of God.⁸⁰

Because of its relative importance I have deliberately left for the end of my survey the treatise «On the Virtues». In its four chapters four virtues are consecutively treated: courage, philanthropy, repentance and nobility. The virtue of philanthropy is more extensively dealt with than the other three.⁸¹ And this seems not to be adventitious in Philo, the Hellenized Jew.

In the chapter on courage⁸² we find the term *φιλόθρωπος* attached only once to the law.⁸³ The term is to be found twice in the chapter on repentance: first as a virtue of Moses⁸⁴ and then as an adornment of proselytes.⁸⁵ Only in the chapter on nobility⁸⁶ is *philanthropia* put in a theological context: it is the source of God's gift of «reasoning faculty» (*λογισμὸς*) to men.⁸⁷

In the chapter entitled «Περὶ φιλοθροπίας» we again find the customary meaning of the term indicating the virtue of a lawgiver prohibiting usury,⁸⁸ or delay in paying wages to the poor.⁸⁹ There is *philanthropia* going with *φιλοξενία*,⁹⁰ as a protection of the slaves⁹¹ or as the reconciling justice of the sabbatic year and of the Jubilee. Once it is shown that the word philanthropy may, also, be hypocritically abused.⁹²

77. VII, 168.

78. VI, 378.

79. VI, 70.

80. IX, 460-62.

81. VIII, 194-270.

82. VIII, 162-94.

83. VIII, 178.

84. VIII, 270.

85. VIII, 274.

86. VIII, 278-304.

87. VIII, 278.

88. VIII, 210.

89. VIII, 214.

90. VIII, 226.

91. VIII, 234.

92. VIII, 228.

At the very beginning of the chapter, however, φιλανθρωπία is significantly coupled with ἀσέβεια.⁹³ Later on as εὐσέβεια is opposed to ἀσέβεια in the same way φιλανθρωπία is said to be the opposite of μισανθρωπία.⁹⁴ Similarly it is united with δσιότης⁹⁵ and with ἐπεικεία.⁹⁶ And if for Philo φιλοσοφία has already acquired the meaning of Judaic piety⁹⁷ how much more has *philanthropia*, since God is explicitly called φιλόανθρωπος,⁹⁸ but, to my knowledge, not once φιλόσοφος.

If Philo somewhat rhetorically says that «piety» and «philanthropy» are queens among virtues,⁹⁹ he is more down to earth when trying to establish that God is «philanthropic» because He is concretely involved by loving Moses who is, therefore, θεοφιλής.¹⁰⁰ By this minimum of historical sobriety Philo, in my opinion, merits to be accounted among the writers of the Biblical trend.¹⁰¹

Let me add that as in Esther 8-12,¹ we find in Philo, also, the combination of φιλανθρωπία with χρηστότης or χρηστός¹⁰² which is not to be forgotten by the author of Titus 3:4. Philo is also the first to coin the expression χάριτος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας¹⁰³ which will be so characteristic, later on, of Chrysostom.

After all has been said, I cannot but show, for the sake of a balanced presentation, some of Philo's weak points which bear heavily on his «philanthropology». These weak points may be summarized by the word «contradictions» in Philo.

Thus, if Ceslas Spicq is right to insist on the classical Athenian philanthropy as being a «synonyme d'esprit démocratique, opposé au μισάνθρωπος et à l' ὑπερήφανος»¹⁰⁴ then Philo is too self-conscious of his excellence in Greek *paideia*¹⁰⁵ and even haughtily undemocratic

93. VIII, 194.

94. VIII, 220.

95. VIII, 208.

96. VIII, 248.

97. *De vita Mosis* 216 (VI, 556); *De Cherub.* 129 (II, 84).

98. VIII, 208.

99. VIII, 220.

100. VIII, 208.

101. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 184, argues that there is «no ground for the view that Philo did not believe in the revelation of the Law as a historical event.»

102. VII, 354, 392, 356.

103. VI, 508.

104. Spicq. *loc. cit.*, especially p. 171.

105. *De Legatione ad Gaium* 182 (X. 94).

as to call unclean all those who have never tasted of the fruits of education (*paideia*).¹⁰⁶

Also Max Mühl seems to be either inexact or merely contradicted by a «wavering» Philo, because, after he has stated that in Philo philanthropy does not know any national boundaries,¹⁰⁷ we find in him quite an enormous chauvinistic metaphor, sounding like a trumpet that «just as heaven holds kingship in the universe and is superior to earth, so this (Jewish) nation should be victorious over its opponents in war.»¹⁰⁸ But all this is of minor consequence for his «synthetic» view of theology,¹⁰⁹ wherein lies, in my opinion, the real contradiction. To that terminal remark I shall turn very soon.

Problem of feeling

Before we start to deal with *philanthropia* in the New Testament we must open a small parenthesis for the ancient problem of feeling or affect in God.

In contradistinction to the latin *humanitas*, which rapidly acquired the solemn and even pedantic meaning of «culture»,¹¹⁰ the classical Greek *philanthropia* was rather approaching «une attitude effective, un sentiment.»¹¹¹ Logically, then — without, however, impairing the qualified simplicity and impassibility of the divine nature,¹¹² one should say that God by being Φιλάνθρωπος must also be able to «feel.» Of course, Philo and Justin Martyr had strictured already any coarse understanding of Biblical anthropomorphism.¹¹³

Clement of Alexandria,¹¹⁴ in the East, and Lactantius, in the West, were the first to attack the Stoic ideal of insensitivity as extended even to God Himself.¹¹⁵ The most anthropomorphic of all the manifestations

106. *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 3 (IX, 12).

107. Mühl, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

108. *De vita Mosis* 1. 217 (VI, 389).

109. Wolfson, *Philo* II, 453-57.

110. LeDéaut, *loc. cit.*, p. 283.

111. *Ibid.*

112. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 172-73.

113. Jules Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, II (Paris, 1928), 668, n. 3. Chrysostom, also, in *de consubstant.* VII. 4 (P.G. 48, 761), voiced himself very emphatically against any crude analogy since all Biblical language must be understood as a manner of divine condensation: οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως, ἀλλὰ θεοσπεπῶς.

114. Clement of Alexandria, *Le pédagogue*, Livre I, 74, 3-4, ed. Henri-Irénéé Marrou and Marguerite Harl (Paris, 1960), 242, Cf. p. 243, n. 2.

115. *Div. int.* VI. 10, cited by Hans von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum Frag-*

of God was no doubt His wrath. While in the Old Testament the arousing of his divine «passion» developed on the line of νόμος — παράβασις— ὀργή, in the New Testament it comes from a very different predisposition, namely, ἐπαγγελία — ἀπιστία — ὀργή.¹¹⁶ The denial of the divine holy anger by so many philosophers, according to W. Krause, amounted, in Lactantius' view, to a practical atheism.¹¹⁷ And H. Kleinknecht, as a Biblical scholar, writes that the fire of the divine wrath is not otherwise kindled except after «contempt of his holy love in the Gospel» (Rom. 2:4).¹¹⁸ C. Spicq in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus makes clear that «ce sont les sentiments et la conduite de Dieu qui sont un exemple pour les croyants.»¹¹⁹ Indeed, the unanimous witness of the classical mystics of Christianity is one «of the consciousness of grace, of divine sensibility.»¹²⁰ According to H. Wheeler Robinson the mystery of the cross in the everyday life is minimized by «those who imagine the Atonement simply as declaratory effusion of the forgiving love of God.»¹²¹

In guise of an apophatic conclusion I should quote the insight of Virginia Corwin, who wrote that «love is deeper than feeling and seems to imply a transformation of the self-centered individual.»¹²² I would only add, for my part, that we human beings can hardly separate love from feelings. And Wheeler Robinson calls our attention to the impen-

menta, III (Leipzig, 1903), 109. A propos F. Sierksma writes in *Tibet's Terrifying Deities* (The Hague, 1966), p. 36, that except the «nirvanized» Buddhists «mystics are always confronted with something or someone, and it is this relation which affords scope for the sublimated affect of love».

116. H. Kleinknecht, et al., *Wrath, Bible Key Words*, ed. Gerhard Kittel (London, 1964), p. 124.

117. Wilhelm Krause, *Die Stellung der frühchristlichen Autoren zur heidnischen Literatur* (Vienna, 1958), p. 248.

118. Kleinknecht, *op. cit.*, p. 124. Leon Shestov wrote, ironically, on the same subject in Athens and Jerusalem (Ohio University Press, 1966), p. 309; «But, of course, one cannot demand of a learned man that he believe all these stories, just as one cannot demand of him that he accept the God of the Bible who rejoices, becomes angry, regrets... transforms water into wine, multiplies loaves of bread, leads the Jews across the Red Sea, etc. All this must be understood allegorically or metaphorically.»

119. Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul: Les Epîtres pastorales* (Paris, 1947), p. 275.

120. Vladimir Lossky, *The Vision of God* (London, 1963), p. 92.

121. H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Cross in the Old Testament* (London, 1960), p. 191.

122. Virginia Corwin, *St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch* (New Haven, 1960), p. 266.

ettable feelings of the God Incarnate at which «we can but reverently look when His own hand lifts (the veil) for a moment... in the prayer of Gethsemane, in the cry of the Cross.»¹²³

At this point of my study I would advance as a working hypothesis the traditional insight that it is the Incarnation of One of the Divine Trinity, His work and His feelings which have replenished the Biblical language with new power and perfected, among other words, *philanthropia*, also.

New Testament

Theologically used, φιλανθρωπία... τοῦ... Θεοῦ is a *hapax legomenon* in the New Testament, found in Titus 3:4. The first problem to be faced, therefore, is that of the authenticity of the Epistle to Titus. Before I approach this thorny problem I should finish with the two other cases in which *philanthropia* has no theological implications.

Thus, in Acts 28:2 Conzelmann translates this ancient noun with «Gästlichkeit,»¹²⁴ while J. B. Smith prefers to anglicize it with «kindness.»¹²⁵ The adverbial form φιλανθρώπως (Acts 27:3) is translated by the same author with «courteously.»¹²⁶ One is not in the least astonished that it was someone of Hellenic stock among evangelists who naturally used the already common word *philanthropia*, as Luke did twice—the man «who wished to commend Christianity both to educated Greek or Roman and to the proletariat.»¹²⁷ But he did not place the term in a theological context as did the author of Titus 3:4.

Concerning the problem of the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles as a whole, and the Epistle to Titus in particular, opinions greatly differ. If we needed proof that the cold intellect is not the highest capacity in man, we could find it, once more, in the case of the two rival schools of hermeneutics, both using tools of the modern method of Biblical criticism, and nonetheless reaching opposite conclusions. The best labels for these two schools of interpretation, in my opinion any-

123. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

124. D. Hans Conzelmann, *die Apostelgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1963), p. 146.

125. J. B. Smith, *Greek-English Concordance to the New Testament* (Scottsdale, Pa., 1955), p. 366.

126. *Ibid.* Conzelmann added, *op. cit.*, p. 141, a short notice: φιλανθρώπως χράσθαι und ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει sind geläufige Wendungen.»

127. Richardson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 628-34, esp. p. 630,

way, would be the «traditionalist» and the «anti-traditionalist» schools.¹²⁸ Taking in consideration the main authorities in the field I would venture to say that, independently of the problem of authorship, as far as my intuition goes, there is a special kind of self-authenticating ring about all the New Testament writings, the Pastoral Epistles included. Of course, this intuitional argument may be derided as so subjective as to almost ask for the *sacrificium mentis*.¹²⁹ Therefore, I would propose the psychological reason of plain common sense that St. Paul, genius as he obviously was, indeed could have developed his vocabulary and frame

128. The point of view of the latter has recently been elegantly presented by Professor H. Köster, «Pastoral Epistles,» *Encyclopedia Britanica*, XVII (1966). 444-46. Fr. Schleiermacher was the first to deny the authenticity of the I Timothy, mainly by adducing the prevalence of non-Pauline terminology (p. 444, col. 1). Friedrich Christian Baur extended this doubt to all the Pastoral Epistles, arguing that since they are involved in anti-gnostic controversy, they must be of post-Apostolic age (p. 444, col. 2). Professor Köster concluded that critical scholarship, endorsing the hypothesis of Schleiermacher and Baur, «has established their non-Pauline authorship almost beyond doubt.»

I will now quote a few authorities of the opposite conviction. Martin Dibelius, *die Pastoralbriefe*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, 13 (Tübingen, 1955), p. 110, for example, was inclined to believe that «Paulus müsste sich seiner originalen Art zu reden im Alter entäussert und weltförmigere Ausdrücke angenommen haben.»

The late Bishop Cassian (Bezobrazoff). *Christ and the First Christian Generation* (Paris, 1950), p. 248, in Russian, stood for the authenticity of all the Pastoral Epistles. Cf. Ceslas Spicq. *Saint Paul: Les Épîtres pastorales*, p. xxv. He argues (p. 261), that with the Church's advancement into the milieu of the Gentiles, St. Paul put aside the typically Jewish style of expression and tried to communicate in a language more easily accessible to the new converts.

The most recent commentary on Titus 3 tries to explain the influx of new terms of Hellenistic royal style, such as *φιλανθρωπία* and *ἐπιφάνεια*, by way of citation. Joachim Jeremias and Herman Strathmann, *Die Briefe an Timotheus und Titus: Der Brief an die Hebraer* (Göttingen, 1963), pp. 66-67. The official standpoint of the Roman Pontifical Bible Commission is quoted by Alfred Wikenhauser in *New Testament Introduction* (New York, 1963), p. 438.

129. «In morals and religion no purely objective evidence is obtainable,» says C. H. Dodd in his book *The Authority of the Bible* (New York, 1958), p. 297, n. 1. Leaving completely aside the general Christian claim of participation into the divine infallibility («We have the mind of Christ.» I Cor. 2:16; cf. John 16:13), I should quote here, rather approvingly, L. C. Knights' conclusion to his *Explorations*, p. 111, cited by E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1963), p. 269, n. 108; «We need... not to abandon reason, but simply to recognize that reason in the last three centuries has worked within a field which is not the whole of experience, that it has mistaken the part for the whole, and imposed arbitrary limits on its own workings».

of mind up to his last years. Of the same psychological provenience is my last remark on authenticity: Should there be any «pseudo-Paul», he would have to copy rather slavishly at least the vocabulary of the author he was supposed to plagiarize, which is not the case. Therefore I am in agreement rather with the arguments of traditionalist erudition which considers St. Paul as the author of the Epistle to Titus.

But even if it be proven in the future by an eventual discovery of documents that St. Paul was not the author of it, my research bearing on the notion of *philanthropia* would not be impaired at all, because whoever wrote the «philanthropic» Epistle was recognized as an authority equal to St. Paul by the very fact that his writings received the universal endorsement of the Apostolic Church. And that is what, finally, matters for my study. Namely, that the old term *φιλανθρωπία* once transplanted into the New Testament acquired in this new Biblical soil a new semantic power: We now have to look more closely at this contextual change.

N.N. Glubokovsky saw in the terminological inventiveness of St. Paul a proof of his more than average versatility in the Greek *paideia*,¹³⁰ although he did not care to display a high Attic style, completely incongruous with his purpose.¹³¹

The «traditionalist» scholar C. Spicq acknowledges that the catalogues of duties and virtues in the Pastoral Epistles were borrowed from Hellenism,¹³² but in a special book on St. Paul he came to the conclusion that «la morale paulinienne est de structure trinitaire».¹³³

G. Holtz calls attention to the fact that in the next verse (Tit. 3:5) baptism is looked at uni-personally: «Darauf blickend konnte wohl von der *φιλανθρωπία* Jesu gesprochen....werden.»¹³⁴ Still, in my opinion, Spicq is closer to the truth when he sees in Tit. 3:4-7 «un résumé de l'Évangile»¹³⁵ not only because the salvation therein is a pure mercy and grace received through baptism,¹³⁶ but, what is of paramount theological importance, that this salvation is brought about by the Three

130. N. N. Glubokovsky, *The Message of St. Paul, its Origin and Essence*, in Russian, II (St. Petersburg, 1910) 966-67, 974, 980.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 969.

132. Spicq, *Pastorales*, p. 260.

133. Spicq, *Vie morale et Trinité Sinte selon Saint Paul* (Paris, 1962), p. 70.

134. Gottfried Holtz, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 13 *Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament* (Berlin, 1965), p. 233.

135. Spicq, *Pastorales*, p. 281.

136. *Ibid.*

Divine Persons.¹³⁷ And the very motivation and cause of that salvation is «l' amour de Dieu»,¹³⁸ namely, the divine philanthropy.

Almost without any particular guidance from a specialist one can easily recognize in the «God the Saviour» of verse 4 the Father, and in «Jesus Christ the Saviour» (vs. 6), the Son,¹³⁹ as well as the Third Person in the Holy Spirit of verse 5.¹⁴⁰

If this exegesis is right, then we are entitled to speak not only of Jesus' philanthropy, like G. Holtz,¹⁴¹ but of the Trinity's philanthropy, as well.

The baptismal trinitarian context of the pericope is enlarged by the two richly evocative words *παλιγγενεσία* and *ἀνακαίνωσις* (vs. 5). According to Bishop Cassian's interpretation *παλιγγενεσία* is an eschatological notion.¹⁴² Spicq, in his turn, explained them as follows: «La palingénésie était... statique... l'ἀνακαίνωσις est dynamique. C' est une croissance dans la vie surnaturelle.»¹⁴³ In the same passage (3:4-7) we can see also that *φιλανθρωπία* (vs. 4), as an attribute of God, goes together with the divine *ἔλεος* (vs. 5) and His *χάρις* (vs. 7). Also we can deduce from the main data of the passage that moral renewal depends on the sacrament of baptism (*διὰ λουτροῦ*), which is, in its turn, dependent on the philanthropic «epiphany» of the Trinity.¹⁴⁴

137. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 284.

139. A propos of *σωτήρ* ascribed to both Persons, Spicq wrote in *Pastorales*, p. 283, that «Paul a coutume d' appliquer au Fils tout ce qui appartient au Père et réciproquement.»

140. The only help we needed, and I think that Spicq has offered us correctly (*Pastorales*, p. 280), is the elucidation of the relative pronoun *οὗ* which «ne se rapporte pas à *λουτροῦ*, mais à *πνεύματος ἁγίου* par attraction, au lieu *deo*.»

141. Holtz, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

142. Cassian Bezobrazoff, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

143. Spicq., *Pastorales*, p. 287; cf. p. 278.

144. It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to investigate the important theme of *ἀνακαίνωσις* or *καινή κτίσις* as having an immediate effect on salvation, especially obvious in the sacramental life of the Church. See Heinrich Schlier *Der Brief an die Galater* (Göttingen, 1951), p. 208, n. 2: «Wie es auch mit der Herkunft des Begriffes *καινή κτίσις* **בְּרִיָה הַחֲדָשָׁה** (Strack-Billerbeck III 519; II 421 f.) sein mag... diese messianische Neuschöpfung hat für Paulus mit Christus und dem Pneuma begonnen». Bernard Rey, in his book entitled *Créés dans Christ Jésus; La Nouvelle création selon Saint Paul*, (Paris, 1966), p. 234, argues that «l' Apotre voit dans le corps ressuscité du Christ un être nouveau... devenu étranger à l' ancienne création.» I will only occasionally indicate the impact of this great theme on the thinking of Chrysostom.

Cultural differences in the Biblical trend.

Only now, after having given a survey of the three different theological uses of the term *philanthropia*, may I try to show their specific meaning as conditioned by the different idea of God, peculiar to each of the three authors in question.

Indeed, we must expect religious language to be appropriately odd, and to have a distinctive logical behaviour.¹⁴⁵ J. Schrijnen believes in the existence of a Christian «Sondernsprache»¹⁴⁶ in which is reflected the opposition between the old and the new conception of life.¹⁴⁷

Some may doubt that there has been any renewal of the Biblical language accomplished in the New Testament, but no one can deny the unique view of God, animating the neotestamental literature. My contention is that only this new vision of God fills the term *divine philanthropy* with a particular soteriological meaning. From the idea of God the concrete understanding of the divine attributes, of which the *philanthropia* is one, depends also. Therefore, it is time to present my insight concerning the three different experiences of God, by merely sketching the essential lines: while the Platonic God is impersonal, God in the Wisdom of Solomon is, as in all the Old Testament, unipersonal. God in Philo is both unipersonal and impersonal, while God in Titus 3:4-7 is one but Tri-Personal.

The juxtaposition speaks for itself, nonetheless I should briefly develop the corresponding conclusions.

I have already presented the debate on the impersonal character of the Platonic deity.¹⁴⁷ In Menander's self-exaltation as confessed in

145. Ian T. Ramsey, *Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases* (New York, 1963), p. 56.

146. Professor Kai Nielsen, committed to linguistic analysis as he is, categorically asserts in «Can Faith Validate God-Talk?» *New Theology*, No. 1, ed. Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (New York, 1964), pp. 131-49, especially p. 133: «There is, of course, no special Christian language.»

J. Schrijnen, *Charakteristik des altkirchlichen Latein*, p. 8, quoted by Hélène Pétré, *Caritas: Etude sur Vocabulaire latin de la charité chrétienne* (Louvain, 1948, pp. 5-6.

147. Above, pp. 17-18. Festugière argues in *Epicurus*, p. 8, that in the Hellenistic age there are two opposed forces: the civic religion, more and more losing its hold over the élite, and the personal religion, that is the Platonic religion of a cosmic God which Alexander the Great helped disseminate. The «personalness» of this Platonic religion is only a human phenomenon — and valid only by comparison with the previous collective character of the civic religion — but without any idea

his verse: Βροτοῖς ἅπασιν ἡ συνείδησις θεὸς (*Monostichoi* 654) C. H. Dodd saw only «the anarchic individualism of the Hellenistic Aufklärung.»¹⁴⁸ Indeed, personalism is theologically and ethically thinkable only in the framework of a revealed personal God.¹⁴⁹ One can hardly love or imitate the impersonal *Fatum*;¹⁵⁰ therefore, according to Festugière, the Greco-Roman élite of the two first centuries of the Christian era, out of boredom (*ennui*), could have looked only to magic and mystery religions for an escape from implacable Fate.¹⁵¹

The philanthropic character of the Platonic deity is therefore as vague as its personal character might be.

The author of the Wisdom of Solomon, even though influenced by the language of his time, nonetheless, according to Verbeke: «expose des idées qui ne sont pas empruntées à la philosophie hellénistique, mais qui constituent l'âme de sa pensée religieuse.»¹⁵² One could too easily imagine that the parallelism between the Temple of Zion and the «holy tent which thou didst prepare from the beginning» (9:8), would be a proof of his enslavement to Plato, but, according to Wolfson «it was rather an old Semitic belief.»¹⁵³ The same writer argues that σοφία in the Wisdom of Solomon has three stages of existence: (1) as a property of God, (2) as a being created by God prior to the creation of the world, and (3) as a being immanent in the world.¹⁵⁴ This means that the oneness

of a transcendent divine person, as its justification and a point of reference. Cf. G. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* (London, 1964), p. 7.

148. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks*, p. 6.

149. Vinzenz Hüfner, «Der Personalismus: Kritik und Überwindung des Existentialismus», *Moral zwischen Anspruch und Verantwortung: Festschrift für Werner Schollgen*, ed. Franz Böckle and Franz Gorner (Düsseldorf, 1964), pp. 404-27; «Nimmt man den Begriff (Personalismus) im weiteren Sinne, so haben schon Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus die hohe Bedeutung des Personenseins.» I think one should look even beyond Augustin in this matter, Cf. Lossky, *The Vision of God*, p. 167.

150. E. R. Dodds, in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 246, explains the famous *amor fati* by describing the Hellenistic individual as afraid of his own intellectual freedom and ready to say to himself «better the rigid determinism of the astrological Fate than that terrifying burden of daily responsibility.»

151. A. J. Festugière, *L'Enfant d'Agrigente* (Paris, 1950), p. 119.

152. G. Verbeke, *L'Evolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoïcisme à St. Augustin* (Paris, 1945), p. 238.

153. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 184.

154. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 287-88. A. Feuillet writes, in *Le Christ Sage de Dieu d'après les épîtres pauliniennes* (Paris, 1966), p. 35: «Dans l'Ancien Testament la personification de la Sagesse est poussée très loin, si bien que nombre d'auteurs...

of God and His vetero-testamental character of One Person remained traditional in the Wisdom of Solomon.¹⁵⁵ And all that, despite the fact of *sophia's* being called «a breath of the power of God» (7:25), or «an initiate in the knowledge of God and an associate in his works» (8:4 R. S.V.).

If the divine Wisdom is «philanthropic» (Wisdom 1:6), one is not astonished to find thereafter its normal anthropological corollary, also: «Thou hast taught thy people that the righteous man must be kind (φι-λάνθρωπος) (Wisdom 12:19). This mimetic connection is based, in my view, on the fundamental commandment of the Old Testament: «You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy» (Lev. 19:2 R.S.V.).

One can also gather that this philanthropic character of both God and His righteous man is, indeed, rooted in the Old Testament, simply by visualizing the notions surrounding *philanthropia*, namely, *ἔλεος* (12:22), which is a usual rendering of חַסְדִּים ,¹⁵⁶ and *δικαιοσύνη* (12:16), standing for the Hebrew term SEDAKAH, i.e., «justice and Philanthropy».¹⁵⁷

It remains to make a final comparison between Philo and St. Paul. A short preliminary remark on the general distinction between cult and culture should illustrate the distinct character of the creativity of these two men. Vladimir Weidle strongly opposes religion and culture, by emphasizing the self-sufficiency of religion,¹⁵⁸ as well as the dependency of culture vis-à-vis religion.¹⁵⁹ I think it is better, for the sake of clarity, to replace the vague concept «religion» with the more concrete concept «cult», since in that way one can more easily perceive the derivative character of culture as being a «secretion of the cult»¹⁶⁰ and the revelational, unconditional provenience of the Mosaic or Christian cult.

ne craignent pas de parler d' hypostase proprement dite». I do not feel competent to go into this intricate problem.

155. See especially 9:1-4.

156. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks*, p. 61.

157. Wolfson, *Philo*, II, 220. Both C. H. Dodd and Nelson Glueck agree in translating חַסְדִּים the first as: «kindness of men towards men» in *The Bible and the Greeks*, p. 59, *das wort Hesed im alltamentlichen Sprachgebrauche als mensch,iche und gott,iche Gemeinschaftgemasse Verhaltungswesse* (Berlin, 1961), p. 34.

158. Vladimir Weidle, «Religion and Culture», *Le Messenger* no. 79 (1965), pp. 14-21, especially p. 14. (In Russian.)

159. Weidle, *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

160. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

No doubt, cult is something more than the visible ritual, namely, the Passover, for the Old Israel and Easter Day, for the new Israel.¹⁶¹ I understand by cult, essentially, the coming in touch with the divine reality and responding to it, «the contemplation of the divine light.»¹⁶² Now, if that difference is conceded, we can grasp the opposition between cult and culture as an opposition between the creativity depending, predominantly, on the uncreated energies of God, and the creativity relying mainly on the natural resources of men. Roughly speaking, then, achievement on the cultural level of creativity is recognized by a «canonization», and fruitfulness on the level of culture is crowned by an undying fame.

In practice, however, it is almost impossible to draw a borderline between cult and culture.¹⁶³ But one can immediately recognize the difference, in our case, just by comparing the historical facts: the literary creations of both the author of the Wisdom of Solomon and of St. Paul were deemed worthy of the supreme canonization in the New Testament Church. Totally different is the place of Philo's literary output: his own kindred silently disavowed him¹⁶⁴ and as far as Christians were concerned, Philo was readable, but not canonizable. The reason is, in my opinion, that Philo was not simply a witness of «intertestamental» piety,¹⁶⁵ but, above all, «intercultural», and, as such, heavily syncretistic.

I should now adduce my proofs.

According to H. Kraft, Philo loses himself in contradictions when trying to «make a compromise between the mutually excluding views.»¹⁶⁶ I am ready to accept Wolfson's evaluation of Philo's orthodox use of Greek mythology,¹⁶⁷ but I do not see sufficient grounds for making out of

161. Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (London, 1957), p. 247.

162. *Ibid.*

163. Weidle, *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

164. Montefiore and Loewe, *op. cit.*, pp. 617-39, especially p. 619.

165. He wrote for example, in *Leg. ad Gaium* 118, X. 59. such a quasi-Christian statement: «Sooner could God change into a man than a man into God.» He tries, also, in *Leg. Alleg.* III 176, I, 418, to interpret the famous saying «Not on bread only shall men live, but on every utterance that goeth through the mouth of God.»

166. Exactly, according to H. Kraft, *Early Christian Thinkers* (London, 1964), p. 22, «he cannot unhesitatingly affirm that the created world is good.»

167. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 38, 41-43. Although, for a Jew, Philo is somewhat too accommodating with Hermes and Apollo. Cf. *Leg. ad Gaium* 100-103, X, 50.

Philo, by implication, a synthetic thinker. This is, nevertheless, the main conclusion to which Professor Wolfson has come.¹⁶⁸

The first contradiction of great theological consequence is his failure to be thoroughly apophatic. The unknowability of the divine essence is finally denied by such a statement as this; «The mind of God in which the ideas...were conceived...(is) identical with the essence of God.»¹⁶⁹ Such an equation makes indeed, his usual apophatic allegations sound like mere lip-service.

The notion of «synthesis» may sometimes mean mere «syncretism.»¹⁷⁰ Therefore, to escape all ambiguity, I have chosen to characterize Philo rather as a syncretistic thinker. The latter epithet has a less laudatory connotation.

The second instance of Philonic oscillation one can see in Philo's contradictory assertions: on the one hand, that the body is the «temple de l' image sacrée et divine»¹⁷¹ and on the other, that the same body «doit être dépouillé lorsque viendra l' état de la plénitude.»¹⁷² Paul, on the contrary, eschatologically self-conscious,¹⁷³ centered his vision of salvation on the Resurrected Messiah¹⁷⁴ and on the general resurrection of the body.¹⁷⁵ This expectation gives a concrete meaning to his «hope of the eternal life,» which is the «transformation and glorification of the body from baptism onwards.»¹⁷⁶

The main contradiction in Philo's idea of God was pointed out by C. H. Dodd, who noticed that, on the one hand, Philo's writings gave evidence of a personal piety which was true to the Jewish heritage,¹⁷⁷ but that on the other, he did not escape the philosophic tendency to a depersonalizing of the God of the Old Testament; hence, «in very many passages θεός is used interchangeably with neuter expressions like

168. Wolfson, *Philo*, II, 457, 453-54.

169. *Ibid.*, I, 232.

170. C. H. Dodd uses it in such a negative sense in *The Bible and the Greeks*, p. 248.

171. J. Giblet, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

172. *Ibid.*, p. 118; cf. *De Virt.* 78, VIII, 208.

173. Anton Fridrichen, *The Apostle and his Message* (Uppsala, 1947), p. 3.

174. N. Glubokovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 844.

175. John A. T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology* (London, 1964), p. 80.

Titus 3:6 («κατ' ἐλπίδα ζωῆς αἰωνίου»).

176. John A. T. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 81; cf. p. 75, n. 1.

177. C. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks*, p. 7; cf. Wolfson, *Philo*, II, 120.

τὸ ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν.»¹⁷⁸ The same writer argues further that St. Paul enriched the bald and abstract monotheism of Hellenistic philosophy with expressions about God closely similar to those of Hellenistic philosophy, and yet he cleaves his reader in no doubt that he thinks of God always in vividly personal terms.»¹⁷⁹

The main dividing line between these two Jews is, no doubt, their different faith-commitment related to the personal aspect of God: for Philo «Being-Alone is identical with God»¹⁸⁰ and for St. Paul God is Tri-Personal.¹⁸¹ If Christian anthropology is linked with Christology¹⁸² it should also be inseparable from triadology, since «finally, God makes Himself known in the fulness of His Being—the Holy Trinity.»¹⁸³ This Tri-Personal revelation of God¹⁸⁴ has—through the doctrine of the *imago Dei*—a direct social, more exactly ecclesiological relevancy: «God who is personal and...is not a person confined in his own self»¹⁸⁵ is a mysterious «model» for the plurality of co-equal and unique human persons, as well as for their consubstantial Adamic unity of nature. Since there is a perfect love between the Three Divine Persons, there should, ideally, reign among man also, by way of the imitation of God, the same perfect love.¹⁸⁶ All that is summed up by Vladimir Lossky's definition: «The Church is an image of the Holy Trinity.»¹⁸⁷

Philo has a different perspective with his experience of an im-

178. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks*, p. 7.

179. *Ibid.*

180. *De legum allegoria* 2:2-3, trans. H. Kraft, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

181. II Corè 13:13; Tlt. 3:4-7. C. Spicq, *Vie morale et Trinité Sainte selon Saint Paul* (Paris, 1962), p. 71. G. Verbeke contends in *op. cit.*, p. 427, that the terms Logos and Pneuma are not exactly differentiated as the Second and the Third Person of the Trinity even as late as Justin Martyr. Nonetheless, Verbeke agrees with Jules Lebreton's opinion, *op. cit.*, II, 471-80, that the primitive Christian community lived in a trinitarian frame of piety. Cited by G. Verbeke, *loc. cit.*

182. Karl Rahner, «Theology and Anthropology», *The Word in History*, The St. Xavier Symposium, ed. T. Patrick Burke (New York, 1966), pp. 1-23, especially p. 2.

183. Lossky, *Theology*, p. 246.

184. René Latourelle, *Theologie de la révélation* (Bruges, 1963), p. 79.

185. Lossky, *Theology*, p. 48.

186. «L' Agapé n' est pas moins active dans les relations avec Dieu qu' entre les frères. Enfin, le chrétien est introduit vitalemment dans l' unité de la Trinité Sainte». Spicq, *Agapé dans le Nouveau Testament Analyse des textes III* (Paris, 1959), p. 268.

187. Lossky, *Theology*, p. 176.

personal or «lonely» God. Such a view of God, according to Henri de Lubac, leads to an «individualistic mysticism.»¹⁸⁸

After this brief comparison we are now in a position to measure the distance between Philo and St. Paul even as far as their understanding of the divine philanthropy is concerned. Paul's God in contradistinction to the God of Philo, offered universal salvation concretely as «la philanthropie de Dieu à l' Incarnation.»¹⁸⁹ Still, as the «new creation is not a fresh start, but the old made new,»¹⁹⁰ so, in the same manner, through contextual immersion, the old Hellenic and Septuagintal and Philonic *philanthropia* was «baptized» by St. Paul into the new trinitarian transsignification.¹⁹¹ It logically follows that the human language, as a part of human nature, had to be changed, «crucified and glorified» by the sole impact of the «Hominisation» of the Divine Logos. This renewal is accomplished, as there is no need to stress, only on the level of the Christian cult. The classical Greek and the later Philonic uses of *philanthropia* have their proper place and value on the level of the culture in which they grew and developed. Philonic *philanthropia* has even acquired a new accent as a result of the cross-fertilisation between the Hellenistic and Judaic cultures.¹⁹² Indeed Philo reaches greatness when pointing to the holiness of the vetero-testamental cult.¹⁹³

The cultural renewal of the words in the New Testament¹⁹⁴ which

188. Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

189. Spicq, *Pastorales*, p. 277. This universal character of Christianity is underlined by Karl Kundsín, «Primitive Christianity in the Light of Gospel Research,» *Form Criticism: Two Essays on New Testament Research by Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Kundsín* (New York, 1966), pp. 79-161, especially p. 133.

The distance between Philo and St. Paul is seen also in their respective uses of the classical fable which describes an imaginary discussion between the members of the body. Cf. Philo *De praem. et Poen.* 19 (114), 29 (125); *de Virt.* 20 (103) and St. Paul I Cor. 12:12 f. John A. T. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 59, n. 1.

190. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

191. Titus 3:4-7.

192. Philo, who believed that the best of the Hellenic philosophy was copied from Moses anyway (E. Zeller, *die Philosophie der Griechen*, Leipzig, 1908, III 2,2, 344) easily linked the ὁμολωσας Θεῷ theme with the commandment of holiness in Lev. 19:2. Cf. Hubert Morki, *op. cit.*, p. 35. According to Bolkestein, *op. cit.*, p. 427, it was Philo who started to shift φιλανθρωπια toward the meaning of *caritas*.

193. Philo, *De Decalogo* 67-74 (VII, 40-42); *De Cherubim* 105-12 (II, 72-74); *Leg. ad. Gaium* 360-71 (X. 178-84).

194. Thomas J. J. Altizer, in his article «Nirvana and Kingdom of God,» *New Theology* No. 1, pp. 150-68, especially p. 166, speaks of the «reversal» effected by the appearance of the Kingdom.

I have put forward as a working hypothesis is, of course, not provable to «outsiders,» yet it is, supposedly, perceivable to those who believe¹⁹⁵ that there is such a thing as the New Covenant in the God-Man Jesus¹⁹⁶ and that the very teaching of the Messiah is couched in the canonical writings of the New Testament.¹⁹⁷ Once this faith is granted one can conclude that the supra-mundane light enveloping Christ's declarations as a new semantic «halo», falls even on such trivial phrases as «I am thirsty», since He said it on the Cross;¹⁹⁸ or «you are my friends», since He said φίλοι μου ἐστέ;¹⁹⁹ or «so and so is of philanthropic inclination,» since φιλανθρωπία par excellence was ascribed to the Trinity.²⁰⁰

The last but not the least neo-testamental argument for the renewal of all the languages—Greek language included—is their pentecostal elevation into the Eschaton of the Messianic liturgy. Implicitly, this transformation of all the tongues of the earth is postulated by A. Schmemmann's description of the Eucharist, which was traditionally always multilingual, «pentecostal.»²⁰¹

In my judgment, this rapid «flight» over the borderline between Church history, Biblical exegesis and theology was more than necessary in order to comprehend the later patristic approach to the same ground of faith.

Christopher Dawson advised us to go back to St. Paul if we would to understand patristic thought.²⁰²

(To be continued)

195. Amos N. Wilder, *New Testament Faith for Today* (New York, 1955), p. 180.

196. C. H. Dodd, *Authority of the Bible*, p. 221. Cf. Bishop Gore's opinion in Kenneth Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21. Oscar Cullmann, against Bultmann's thesis, refuses to dismiss the extraordinary revelational events in the life of Jesus. D. H. Wallace, «Historicism and Biblical Theology,» *Studia Evangelica*, III, 223-27, especially p. 227.

197. Dodd, *Authority of the Bible*, pp. 240-41.

198. John 19:28.

199. John 15-14.

200. Titus 3:4-7.

201. Alexander Schmemmann, «The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church,» *The Eucharist and Liturgical Renewal*, ed. Massey Hamilton Shepherd, Jr. (New York, 1960), pp. 115-32, especially p. 130.

202. Christopher Dawson, *Progress and Religion: An Historical Enquiry* (London, 1929), p. 159.