

THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT IN GEORGE SANTAYANA AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE IDEA OF CHRIST*

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CONCLUSION

(The Existence of God, the Divinity of Christ,
and the Value of Matter)

Christ as a divine person who assumes a human soul and body and enacts an earthly life of his free accord (his will being intrinsically identical with that of his Father), cannot hate or despise matter. Like his Father who found matter an indispensable medium for the creation, he does not come to destroy matter but to reanimate it (ICG, 74).

George Santayana's symbolic or poetic interpretation of the moral life of spirit by the idea of Christ, in the sense that «Christ was a supreme spirit incarnate in a human creature» (RS, 203), derives from his philosophy of the dualistic portion of the spirit. Spirit depends on matter for its existence, but not for its essence (RS, 79). Essence, according to him, only *is*, but does not exist (RS, 292). It is a «static being», «something ideal» (ICG, 230) for which spirit looks out. Thus, if in its origin spirit springs from matter, in its outlook it rests in essences (RS, 49), endeavoring for the attainment of its intrinsic ideal which is represented by the idea of Christ (ICG, 253), that is, the Good in its *supreme* and *absolute* form (ICG, 282).

A basic distinction in Santayana's ontology is that between essence and existence. Essence, according to him, merely *is*; it is «inner and non-existent» (RM, 84), while «existence involves external rela-

* Continuation from *Theologia*, Vol. 49, April-June 1978, p. 376.

tions and actual (not merely specious) flux» (SAF, 34), which «flux is itself absolute and the soul of existence» (RM, 85). Santayana, being a materialist (SAF, vii), believes that spirit (consciousness, and especially intellect), «though immaterial» (RS, 6), derives in its relation to the human body from matter (RS, 49, 79) through what he calls «psyche» (RS, 64). And, since matter is the principle of existence (RM, v), spirit *exists*, too.

In his distinction between essence and existence Santayana follows the Scholastics who, making it for the first time in the history of philosophy, opposed to the opinion of the Greek philosophers (Parmenides, Heraclitus, etc.) it about the identity of essence and existence¹. Thus, the most representative of the Scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, distinguishing between the form itself and the existence of that form, explains that the form or essence of «man», for example, is different from the existence of a particular man existing in place and time. The essence of «man» does not involve existence. Only «in God essence or quiddity is not distinct from his existence» because «essence and existence in God are the same»². So, though the distinction between essence and existence is valid for everything, is not for God. In God essence and existence are the same. In this sense, God is an exception to the general rule because in his nature *essentia involvit existentiam*.

Considering this principle of the nature of God, Kierkegaard remarks that «between God and his works there exists an absolute relationship» in opposition to man in whom there exists no such a relationship³. I can not prove, for example, Napoleon's existence from Napoleon's deeds, for Napoleon is an individual; some other person might have performed the same deeds⁴. But the works of God are such that only God can perform them⁵. «Just so», Kierkegaard assures⁶. And he asks in the sequel:

1. Being, according to Parmenides, for example, «is universal existing alone» (*Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by N.C. Nahm, Concerning Truth, 60, p. 115).

2. Th. Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* (See *Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*; edited by the Rev. Father M.C.D' Arcy, New York, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1950, p. 119).

3. S. Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 32.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

But where then are the works of God? The works from which I would deduce his existence are not immediately given. The wisdom of God in nature, his goodness, his wisdom in the governance of the world — are all these manifest, perhaps, upon the very face of things? Are we not here confronted with the most terrible temptations to doubt, and is it not impossible finally to dispose of all these doubts? But from such an order of things I will surely not attempt to prove God's existence... So also with the proof for God's existence. As long as I keep my hold on the proof, i.e., continue to demonstrate, the existence does not come out if for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving it; but when I let the proof go, the existence is there⁷.

Thus Kierkegaard does not accept that we can prove by reason God's existence from his works though he believes that between God and his works there exists an absolute relationship in the sense that God is not a name but a concept which perhaps is, according to him, the reason that his *essentia involvit existentiam*⁸. Commenting on this principle from Spinoza's point of view, that is essence, i.e., logical content involves existence⁹, and using the distinction of the Scholastics by his own terms between «ideal being» (essence) and «factual being» (existence)¹⁰, Kierkegaard finds that «the difficult is to lay hold to God's factual existence and to introduce God's ideal essence dialectically into the sphere of factual existence»¹¹.

Every dialectical approach to God or what concerns the so-called logical proofs of his existence is not valid for Kierkegaard. All these proofs, as for example, Aquinas' cosmological proof of God's existence, whose result is the identity of essence and existence in God¹², led

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

9. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Def. I, Prop. 7, 11.

10. S. Kierkegaard, *op. cit.*, p. 32n.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 33n.

12. Every being exists because of some other being which is its cause; and that being exists also because of some other one, and so forth. In this chain of existing beings which are related to each other as the cause to its effect there exists the first being, God, who is the cause of all things and who derives his existence from his own self, for his essence involves his existence. In this sense, God, as Nik. Nissiotis remarks in the case of the Scholastic theology, «can be known simply by the human reason which by the search of the logical cause of every intelligible object refers to the first Principle (Cause) of all beings» (Nik. A. Nissiotis, *Introduction to the Epistemology of God; The Incomprehensibility of God and the Possibility of the Knowledge of Him*, Athens 1965, p. 177, in Greek). This knowledge of God is arbitrary because it puts *a priori* what it wants to prove (*Ibid.*, p. 180).

Western thought in later times to «the death of God»¹³. For this reason, it would be better, instead of this identity, to adopt the distinction which was made for the first time by Philo Judaeus¹⁴, and afterwards by St. Basil of Cappadocia who distinguished between the inaccessible essence of God and his existence, that is, his energies which descend to us¹⁵. The posterior theologies, the so-called mystical theologies (Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, etc.), relied on this distinction, and it seems that Martin Heidegger in our times was influenced by these theologies in his acceptance of God.

In his essay about Nietzsche, Heidegger remarks that his preaching of God's death (*Gott ist tot*) sums up the historical evolution of European Metaphysics¹⁶ which finally vanished¹⁷. This means that «for the philosopher he [the God of Metaphysics] is dead; philosophy can not have theology»¹⁸. In other words, classic Metaphysics which is identified with theology must be distinguished from real philosophy. This distinction between philosophy and theology or Metaphysics, analogous to the distinction between *Existentialphilosophie*

13. In the European Metaphysics the death of God is the logical conclusion of Western Rationalism; for though this Metaphysics is based on the presupposition of God as the logical First Cause of the Cosmology, in the passing of the years it excludes Him, it denies the super-rational as product of the rational. In this sense, «because Metaphysics offers the rational affirmation of God, it prepares also the possibility of his rational refutation» (Chr. Giannaras, *The Theology of Agnosia and of the Absence of God*, Athens, «Dodoni», 1967, p. 14, in Greek).

14. According to Philo Judaeus, we can know only the existence of God, but not his essence (Chr. Androustos, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Athens 1929, p. 361, in Greek).

15. *Αἱ μὲν ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Θεοῦ] πρὸς ἡμᾶς καταβαλνουσιν, ἡ δὲ οὐσία αὐτοῦ μένει ἀπρόσιτος* (God's energies descend to us, but his essence remains inaccessible) (St. Basil of Cappadocia, Letter 234; see *Patrologia Graeca*, edited by J. - P. Migne, Vol. 32, 869B). Thus, «the Orthodox tradition of the Church Fathers», as Kon. Papapetrou remarks, «taught that God is (as 'essence') absolutely transcendent, while man participates by his existence in His saving energies» (K. E. Papapetrou, *Apologetics and the Historical Search from the Beginning of Christianity*, Thessaloniki 1971, p. 15; see also p. 22, in Greek).

16. Chr. Giannaras, *op. cit.*, p. 14; cmp. M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Pfullingen 1961, Vol. 1, p. 13; see also of the same writer, «Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'» in his book *Holzwege*, Frankfurt 1963, pp. 193ff.

17. See Nik. A. Nissiotis, *Existentialism and Christian Faith* in Sören Kierkegaard and the contemporary existentialists, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Athens 1956, p. 234, in Greek.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

and *Existentiellphilosophie*¹⁹, is very basic in Heidegger and it can explain sufficiently, we think, his teaching of *Nothing*. The meaning of *Nothing* (*Nichts*) for him is epistemological; it is like the Non-being of Pseudo-Dionysius or the *Gottheit* of Eckart and the *Urgrund* of Böhme in the mystical theology; it expresses the impossibility of «metaphysical knowledge of God» as lying above every definition²⁰. But at the same time its meaning is also ontological; for the *Nothing* is not the opposite of *Being* as classic philosophy thought, but it belongs in its way from the beginning to its nature. It is not something non-existent, but it exists for man not in a theoretical manner, that is, by logical proofs, but in an existential manner of living.

In his understanding of God Heidegger seems to follow Kierkegaard who characterized God as Unknown, «something with which the Reason collides when inspired by its paradoxical passion»²¹. «The paradoxical passion of Reason thus comes repeatedly into collision with the Unknown, which does indeed exist, but is unknown, and insofar does not exist. Reason cannot advance beyond this point, and yet it cannot refrain in its paradoxicalness from arriving at this limit and occupying itself therewith»²². Therefore, one can be persuaded for the existence of God, according to Kierkegaard, only in an existential manner of living the Unknown by man's personal contact with Him through love²³, and its consequences in an acting - virtuous life.

The above survey of the concept of God does not aim at proving his existence, for such a thing is impossible. As Kierkegaard remarks, «if God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it; and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it»²⁴. This shows that the existence of God remains always a problem for the human reason. Thus, since the problem exists and it is impossible to prove the existence or non-existence of God by reason, Santayana's arguments for the rejection of God as a non-existent being can not be serious. Other philosophers, for different reasons, would accept the existence of God. William James, for example, Santayana's colleague in the Harvard University, based on his pragmatic principle that a theory is true if it

19. Of this distinction see *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 238.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

21. S. Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 32.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

works in human experience, concluded that the hypothesis of God is true because it is satisfactory for the individual²⁵.

In opposition to this conclusion of James' Pragmatism, Santayana believes that God or pure Being as «the common character of all essences» (PSL, 263) does not exist since essence merely is and does not exist. Unlike the Scholastics, he accepts the distinction between essence and existence in God; and not in a mystical but in a materialistic sense. Even spirit for him though immaterial depends on matter for its existence. And only pure Spirit as quite independent from matter does not exist. His atheism, therefore, is based on a surpassed theory: on materialism. For him the source of everything is not the spirit but matter. However, in his attitude towards the First Cause he recognizes that he is out-of-date. In the introduction to his philosophical system he says: «In natural philosophy I am a decided materialist — apparently the only one living» (SAF, vii). In God's place he puts *Matter* since «matter», in his view, «is the principle of existence» (RM, v). It is «properly a name for the actual substance of the natural world, whatever that substance may be» (RM, 140). In other words, «God», for him, «conceived merely as a power, would become *identical with matter*, the omnificent substance and force of everything» (RS, 284). Matter, therefore, «is symbolized under the name of God» (RM, 205) since God is «a mythological name for the universal power and operation of matter» (RM, 171).

If Santayana rejects God, he even more rejects the divinity of Christ, not accepting him as the Son of God. As God is for Santayana, according to his words above (RM, 171), «a mythological name» for matter, so the person of Christ expresses «in myth» his philosophical naturalism²⁶. Santayana himself talks again and again about «the legend of Christ» (RS, 203; ICG, 13, 14, 21, 104, 134). Thus, what David F. Strauss said about the interpreters of his time applies to Santayana as well; for D. Strauss, who himself understood the divinity of Christ

25. W. J. McGill, «Pragmatism» in *Dictionary of Philosophy*; edited by D. D. Runes, p. 246; see also Richard H. Popkin - Avrum Stroll, *Philosophy Made Simple*, 5th Printing, New York City, Made Simple Books, Inc., 1958, pp. 173, 175.

26. R. Buttler, *The Mind of Santayana*, p. 126.

as a fable only²⁷, talks of those who interpret the Biblical history in general from «the mythical point of view»²⁸.

We can see then that the divinity of Christ is considerable for Santayana in a poetic and symbolic sense, that is, «as a symbol for the high moral and ontological mysteries». In this sense, the image of Christ «essentially represents a mystery, the mystery of God-in-man» (ICG, 17) which is the subject of Santayana's book, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* treating only of «the idea of the divine in man, as exemplified in the Person of Jesus Christ»²⁹. For this reason, the above book bears the supplementary title *God in Man*, explaining the two natures of Christ, the divine (the Son of God) and the human (the Son of Man), which are remarkable for Santayana only as symbolizing the two natures of the soul, the «divine spirit» and the «human psyche». This distinction between spirit and psyche, which is very important in order to understand the moral struggle between spirit and flesh within man in a real sense and the union of God with man in a symbolic sense, constitutes the basis of Santayana's interpretation of the idea of Christ as God-in-Man.

In opposition to the common opinion that man consists of two components, mind (spirit) and body (flesh), Santayana accepts a third component as a mediating link between them. To this component he gives a Greek name. He calls it «psyche» (*ψυχή*). Though psyche means in Greek soul, Santayana distinguishes between psyche and soul. «The same thing that looked at from the outside or biologically is called the psyche, looked at morally from within is called the soul» (RS, 16). And, since «spirit is in fact involved in feeling and knowing life from the inside» (RS, 16), we can understand that «a psyche, when spirit awakes in it, is turned into a soul» (RS, 16). «Spirit is an awareness natural to animals, revealing the world and themselves in it. Other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total inner difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead» (RS, 18). It is evident then that «the place of spirit is in a psyche» (RS, 43), as well on the other hand, the place of psyche is in a body for which Santayana uses also the term «organism». «A body», he says, «is an organism only by virtue of its vital power of nutrition and reproduction» (RS, 15). And it is exactly this power, «the self-main-

27. D. F. Strauss, *The Life of Jesus*, p. 776.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

29. R. Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

taining and reproducing pattern or structure of an organism», that he calls *psyche* (RS, 15). Thus, Santayana distinguishes «sharply two levels of life in the human body», one of which he calls «*the spirit* and the other *the psyche*» (RM, 139). Spirit, therefore, is «a form of life» (RS, 49), as also *psyche* is another form of life, «a way of living» (SE, 222).

The above brief exposition of Santayana's doctrine of the threefold nature of man (spirit, *psyche*, and body) reminds us of the trichotomists of the ancient Church, as for example, Tatian, Valentine, and the Gnostics in general. However, there is between the American philosopher and those heretics an essential difference. The real trichotomists by the three components of man understand different substances, while Santayana's view of the trichotomy is monistic. According to him, «the *Psyche* is not a substance absolutely, since its own substance is matter in a certain arrangement — in other words, body» (SE, 221n.). So, «in calling *psyche* material», Santayana explains, «she is a *mode* of substance, a trope of habit established in matter» (RM, 140). Even spirit though «immaterial» (RS, 6) «springs in its origin from matter» (RE, 49). So, matter is not only the substance of the body, but also of the *psyche* through which the spirit springs (SE, 221n.); for «the animal roots of the spirit» are «in the *psyche*» (RS, 59; also 42), and in this sense «*psyche* has given birth to spirit» (RM, 162). This means that matter is the origin of both *psyche* and spirit.

In opposition to Santayana's monistic view of the threefold nature of man, the real trichotomists accept that spirit is quite independent from matter and as a substance differs not only from the material body but even from the soul (*psyche*), something material and immaterial. But, in spite of this difference as concerns the substance of the three components of man, Santayana presents in general many similarities with the followers of trichotomy, and especially in the application of their doctrine to the person of Christ, a doctrine which in its relation to the union of the two natures of Christ, the divine and the human, helps us to understand better the meaning of Santayana's conception of God in man.

According to Santayana, «Christ is a supreme spirit incarnate in a human creature» (PS, 203). For «Christ, being God, positively chose to assume a human body and a human *psyche*. Spirit could not otherwise have had a history» (ICG, 253). From the above quotations we can see that in the case of Christ, a supreme spirit, his divine nature, was united with a human creature, his human nature, that is, with a

human body and a human psyche. Thus Christ, like every man, consists by his humanity of three components: spirit, psyche, and body.

By his trichotomic view of Christ, whose person he saw as the union of a divine spirit with a human psyche and body, Santayana resembles Valentine's followers who taught that the spirit of Christ, that is, the divine nature, was united with the psychical Messiah, that is, the human nature, when the Soter descended as a spirit in the form of a dove and entered into union with Jesus of Nazareth at his baptism in the Jordan³⁰. Similar to this gnostic teaching of Christ as God-Man is also Apollinaris' teaching that the Logos, that is, the divine spirit of Christ, was united with his human body and soul (*ψυχή*)³¹. However, between Valentine and Apollinaris there is the difference that for the former the divinity of Christ, his spirit, was united with a complete human nature consisted of spirit, soul and body, while for Apollinaris the divine Logos replaced the spirit in Christ's humanity so that his divinity was united with an imperfect humanity consisting only of soul and body and not of spirit, too. In this sense, therefore, Apollinaris' trichotomic view of Christ is in closer relation to that of Santayana who teaches that Christ is a spirit incarnate in a human body and a human psyche.

This relation, of course, does not concern so much Christ's divinity as his humanity; for Santayana believes that Christ is an incarnation not of the Logos *by* the Holy Spirit, but an incarnation of the Holy Spirit *itself*, that is, not of the Second but of the Third Person of the Trinity. On this point, he resembles rather Valentine's followers. His similarity, therefore, with Apollinaris concerns especially Christ's humanity.

Certainly, this does not mean that Santayana agrees with Apollinaris' opinion that Christ's humanity is not perfect. On the contrary, he considers Christ as a whole, a complete man; for he sees his divine nature, his spirit, not in a literal sense as Apollinaris, but in a symbolical sense; not as a real nature of God, but as the god-like component of man. In this sense, every human spirit is divine; it is what Santayana characterizes as «God-in-man». For this reason, unlike Apollinaris and

30. Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses*, I, vii, 2 (See *Patrologia Graeca*, edited by J.-P. Migne, Vol. 7, 513A); cmp. Hippolytus, *Philosophumena*, VI, 35 (*Ibid.*, Vol. 16, 3250A).

31. Athanasius, *Contra Apollinarium*, I, 2 (*Ibid.*, Vol. 26, 1096B).

Valentine who emphasize Christ's divinity, Santayana puts his emphasis on Christ's humanity.

The main reason that forced Apollinaris to accept an imperfect human nature for Christ was the idea that a perfect man involves the idea of the sin. And because sin, according to him, has its seat in the human spirit, it was necessary that a divine Spirit, the Logos, should replace it, entering into union with the two other components of the human nature, the animal soul and the body. Valentine, like Apollinaris, emphasizes also the sinfulness of the human nature though he puts the seat of sin not in the spirit but in the body, believing by the influence of Neo-Platonism that the source of the evil is matter. For this reason, he thinks that Christ by his humanity received a heavenly and aetherial body³².

In opposition to both of them, Santayana who does not believe in the corruption of the human nature by the original sin (ICG, 78), accepts in the case of Christ that he was «a true man» (ICG, 71-72). He understands the true humanity of Christ as the human nature is now, and as it was from the beginning, from the appearance of the first man on the earth. For Christ was «the Word made flesh in all flesh» (ICG, 73), which means that he «accepted flesh for himself in all its humble accidents» (ICG, 75). In reference to Christ's human body and his attitude towards matter in general, Santayana says:

A divine person who assumes a human soul and body and enacts an earthly life of his free accord (his will being intrinsically identical with that of his Father), cannot hate or despise matter. Like his Father who found matter an indispensable medium for the creation, he does not come to destroy matter but to re-animate it» (ICG, 74).

This sympathy towards matter is evident in all his earthly life, from his Incarnation to his Crucifixion, and especially in his Resurrection.

The Resurrection is of great importance from the point of view of the Christian faith in general (ICG, 160). And not only from the Christian point of view in a real sense, but also from Santayana's point of view in a symbolic sense Resurrection is «of the greatest importance»

32. About Valentine and Apollinaris, and the comparison in general of Santayana with them on their doctrine of the threefold nature of man and its application to the person of Christ, see the Appendix at the end of this dissertation.

(ICG, 156). For, though this miracle, the greatest one of Christ (ICG, 159), puts the stress on his divinity, it also concerns his humanity in the sense that it expresses «true sympathy and tenderness towards his assumed human body» by raising it «from the grave» (ICG, 241). Thus, «when the risen Christ appears, the urgent test is to prove that he is not a 'spirit', that is a ghost, but a material body that can be touched (or ought not yet to be touched) and that can eat and drink» (ICG, 69; also 159). Such are all the appearances of Christ after his Resurrection, as for example, those in Emmaus and by the Lake of Galilee where the risen Christ sat at meat with his disciples and gave bread to them (ICG, 161-165). This behavior of the risen Christ appearing to his disciples with a real body capable of eating and drinking, shows a respect toward his own body, that human body which he raised from the dead.

The Resurrection of Christ is the beginning (*ἀπαρχή*) of the resurrection of the human bodies in general in another life (1 Corin. 15:20). «And it is», according to Santayana, «the resurrection of the body, not the immortality of the soul, that figures in the Christian creed» (ICG, 69). The dogma of the resurrection of the body possesses one of the first places in Christianity. And it sounds very strange that though this religion is the most spiritual one, it so greatly emphasizes the human body, characterizing it by Saint Paul, not as a «grave» as Plato does, but as a «temple of the Holy Spirit» (1 Corin. 6: 19). This emphasis is indicative of the value that Christianity gives to matter, accepting it as God's creature in opposition to Plato and the Neo-Platonists who viewed it as a source of evil.

From this point of view Santayana considers the Resurrection as an event of the greatest importance; for Christ in resurrecting his human body from the dead, had sanctified matter of which his body consisted. This sanctification, realized by the Resurrection, is the purification of the earthly life. Santayana, therefore, understands the Resurrection in a symbolic sense. He can not see it as a real event, as the resurrection of the bodies in another life. Thus, he limits the value of matter to the earth only, without extending it to an eternal life in heaven, also. For this reason, he rejects the Ascension, though he might consider it as the greatest glorification of matter; that matter which Christ brought to heaven by his human body. According to Santayana, the Resurrection, having to do with the appearances of the risen Christ *on earth* is real and existential, while the Ascension of Christ who disappeared *in heaven*, is unreal and non-existential. The Ascension, as he

remarks, «is tragic: a second farewell, almost a second death, rather than a second Resurrection and triumph» (ICG, 165).

However, though Santayana does not extend the Resurrection to the Ascension, in order to see it as a resurrection of all human bodies in general, he respects this Resurrection as something «of the greatest importance» (ICG, 156), as «the crown of the ecclesiastical year» (ICG, 167), even in a symbolical sense. From this point of view, therefore, Santayana's book, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels or God in Man*, ending with the Resurrection, differs from Ernest Renan's book and all other books which end with Christ's death. Possibly, among them, N. Kazantzakis' book, *The Last Temptation of Christ* presents a similarity with Santayana's book; for both writers understand spirit in their books in a symbolic sense, that is, as the spark of the divinity within us, the god-like element in man. Like Santayana who sees in the idea of Christ a symbolism of the spirit as God in man, Kazantzakis says: «Every man is god-man, spirit and flesh; that is why the mystery of Christ is not simply a mystery for a particular religion; it is universal: The struggle between God and man breaks out in everyone, together with the longing for reconciliation»³³.

But, though Santayana and Kazantzakis accept the god-like nature of man in general, they opposed each other very much. For Kazantzakis, rejecting Christ as a real God, «imagines a god of his own whose proper meaning is the instinct, the lower instinct»³⁴. And it is on this point that he indicates his great difference from Santayana. Possibly no other writer differs so much from Santayana than Kazantzakis in his conception of Christ; and especially on what the former says about Christ's relations with Mary Magdalene, from which he derives the title of his book. These relations which Renan before the Greek novelist had also touched upon, but in a milder tone, approach in the *Last Temptation* the point of impiety, if not of blasphemy; for the whole book is, according to a critic, «full of revilement»³⁵. In contrast to Kazantza-

33. Nikos Kazantzakis, *The Last Temptation of Christ*; translated from the Greek by P.A. Bien, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960, pp. 1-2. *Κάθε άνθρωπος είναι θεάνθρωπος, σάρκα και πνέμα· να γιατί το μυστήριο του Χριστού δεν είναι μονάχα μυστήριο μιάς ώριμμένης θρησκείας· είναι πανανθρώπινο· σε κάθε άνθρωπο ξεσπάει ή πάλη Θεού κι ανθρώπου και συνάμα ή λαχτάρα της φιλιωσης* (N. Καζαντζάκη, *Ο τελευταίος πειρασμός*, Αθήναι, Δίφρος, 1959, σ. 5).

34. Bas. Moustakis, «Nikos Kazantzakis» (Nίκος Καζαντζάκης) in *Religious and Moral Encyclopaedia*, Athens, Vol. 7 (1965), col. 150.

35. *Ibid.*, col. 149.

kis, Santayana, while also rejecting Christ's divinity, deeply respects His absolute chastity as if He were really God. Unfortunately he cannot find the strength to make what Kierkegaard characterizes as «the great leap into the absurd of faith»³⁶, into «the absolute paradox of the God-Man»³⁷.

Considering this, we can understand why Santayana's book on Christ was described by a reviewer as «the most devout book ever written by an unbeliever»³⁸.

36. S. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*; translated by W. Lowrie, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1954, p. 47.

37. S. Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity*, p. 85. Kierkegaard treats especially the «Absolute Paradox» in his *Philosophical Fragments*, pp. 24ff. and 39ff.

38. Anonymous, «George Santayana» in *Encyclopaedia Americana*, New York, Americana Corporation, 1960, Vol. 24, p. 283.

APPENDIX

G. SANTAYANA COMPARED TO THE TRICHOTOMISTS
ON THEIR DOCTRINE OF THE THREEFOLD NATURE OF MAN
AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PERSON OF CHRIST

Christ, being God, positively chose to assume a human body and a human psyche. Spirit could not otherwise have had a history (ICG, 253). Christ is a supreme spirit incarnate in a human creature (PS, 203).

This appendix, concerning Santayana's comparison with the trichotomists on their doctrine of the nature of man and of the person of Christ, refers to the main idea of our essay which is also the main subject of Santayana's book on Christ, that is, it refers to the idea of God in man as a symbolism of the life of spirit. In reality this idea has to do with the two natures of Christ, the divine and the human, which we have especially discussed in the third chapter (of the second part) which corresponds to the third chapter (of the first part) about the two natures of man, the nature of spirit and the nature of psyche.

Santayana talks of spirit and psyche in general as two components of man besides the third one, that of the body. In opposition to the common opinion that man consists of two parts, mind (spirit) and body (flesh), he accepts between them another part to which he gives the Greek name «psyche» ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) = soul). The American philosopher places the psyche as a mediating link between body and spirit in his endeavor to solve the classic problem of mind-body relation. Though he distinguishes apparently in man three different components, his view of the above problem is monistic. He tries to combine the three components into one unity, believing, like all the materialists, that not only the psyche, but also the spirit, though immaterial, derives from matter; it is a bodily function. In this sense, therefore, he differs from the real trichotomists who accept the division of man into three separate substances: the mortal body, the immortal spirit, and the mortal or immortal soul accordingly, as the latter approaches more the body or the spirit.

But independently from this difference, Santayana presents in general a great similarity with all those who accept the threefold nature of man, as for example, with his contemporary Greek theologian and philosopher Apostolos Makrakis (*Ἀπόστολος Μακράκης*)¹ who wrote special works on this subject of trichotomy² and who, for this reason, was considered a heretic by the Holy Synod of Greece³. So, comparing him with Makrakis will help us to understand better Santayana's doctrine of the nature of man, and even more that which is based on this doctrine: his interpretation of the idea of Christ. For it is in this interpretation in particular that he presents many similarities with other trichotomists, more distinguished than Makrakis, such as those of the early Church, and especially Valentine and Apollinaris who tried to understand the person of Christ according to their doctrine of trichotomy.

1. Santayana and Apostolos Makrakis and Their Doctrine of the Three Components of Man

To begin with Makrakis, he, like Santayana, accepts «that man in respect to his constitution or composition is tripartite, or triune, being made up to body, soul, and spirit»⁴. «As a result of the union of the soul with body and spirit», says Makrakis in his *Psychology*, «there are generated in the soul two natures, of which one is called the *carnal* and the other the *spiritual*»⁵. «Carnal life is due to the union of the flesh with the

1. Ap. Makrakis was born on the Greek island Siphnos (Kyclades) in 1830 and died in Athens on December 24, 1905. See about his life Minas Gr. Haritos, *The Story of the Great Teacher Apostolos Makrakis*, 2nd ed., Athens 1964; 832 pp. (in Greek).

2. Such works, for example, are the following: 1) *An Apology Concerning the Soul*; 310 pp. 2) *The Tricompositeness of Man proved by Fathers of the Church*; 284 pp. 3) *Logical Refutation of an Ironclad Refutation*; 196 pp. An answer to a critic who undertook to criticize Makrakis in an «Ironclad Refutation» or his doctrine concerning the threefold nature of man (See the Complete List of the Works of Apostolos Makrakis in *A New Philosophy and the Philosophical Sciences* by Ap. Makrakis; translated from the original Greek by Denver Cummings, New York, G. P. Putman's Sons, 1940, Vol. 1, p. xxi).

3. See Editor's Foreword to the above mentioned work of Ap. Makrakis, p. xix.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

soul, while spiritual life is due to the union of the soul with the spirit»⁶. «If the soul», he explains, «were united only with flesh and not also with spirit, it would possess only the carnal nature, and would not differ at all from the souls of irrational animals in which the spiritual nature does not inhere in the least»⁷.

Concerning the characteristics by which the carnal is distinguished from the spiritual, Makrakis says: «The primary and fundamental attribute of the *carnal* nature is the sensation derived from the flesh, while that of the *spiritual* nature is the consciousness derived from the spirit»⁸. Now, «as respects the time order of their [carnal and spiritual] birth in the soul», Makrakis says:

We see that the carnal nature precedes the spiritual one, because the union with the flesh also precedes that with the spirit. During the infantile age, the soul is unconscious of itself and of its own activities; it lives only by sensation, like the irrational animals. After a period of two or three years, however, the light of consciousness begins to dawn in it, increasing in the course of time; and thereafter the soul remembers that it exists in the world together with the body it bears. Nevertheless, after the rise of consciousness, the whole spiritual nature does not rise along with it, but comes on later and grows up gradually, awaiting, it would seem, the development of the flesh and of the carnal nature, the memory where of is kept and preserved by consciousness⁹.

Thus far Ap. Makrakis would agree to what Santayana says about the three components of man (spirit, psyche, and body) in general, and especially about the animal psyche and the rise of consciousness which, according to Santayana, is another name for spirit. Both philosophers would also agree to what they say about the opposition of the two natures. Makrakis says: «When both natures reappear in the soul they come into collision because they are by nature opposed to each other, and they struggle with one another, each in an effort to prevail over the other»¹⁰. Santayana finds also a conflict between matter and spirit or between the Will in the psyche and the Will in the spirit (RS, 80), a distraction of the spirit by the flesh (RS, 119, 130), accepting that in the righteous man «the unity of the organism [body and psyche] sub-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54; see also p. 55.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

tends the moral unity of the spirit» (RS, 16). Another similarity between them is also in what Makrakis says about the *conatus* or impulse in relation to the *moral sense* or the free choice between good and evil¹¹, and in what Santayana says about «the impulse of the psyche» in relation to «the spiritual distinction between good and evil» (RS, 16).

2. Comparison with Tatian on Trichotomy

Makrakis, with whom Santayana presents many similarities in his view of the threefold nature of man, is not, of course, the first trichotomist. Trichotomy, as Vergilius Ferm remarks, «appears as a later doctrine in the Old Testament, in Stoic thought as was held by St. Paul»¹². But according to K. I. Dyovouniotis, formerly Professor of Theology in the Athens University, «the few passages of the Bible which look at first sight trichotomic are reduced to dichotomy, because in these passages the spiritual nature of man is characterized in a double sense, as soul and spirit, without one having to conclude from this that these two are different components. Spirit means the superior powers, and especially those in relation to God, while soul means the lower powers though in many places in the Bible spirit and soul mean the same thing»¹³. St. Augustine especially reduces the trichotomic type to the dichotomic, saying: *tria sunt quibus homo constat, spiritus, anima et corpus, quae rursus duo discuntur*¹⁴. So, from this kind of trichotomy we must distinguish the real trichotomy which appears in the period between St. Paul and Augustine in Tatian, Valentine, and Apollinaris.

The first of them, Tatian or Tatianus (*Tatianós*)¹⁵, accepts that

11. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

12. *Dictionary of Philosophy*; edited by D. D. Runes, p. 321.

13. K.I. Dyovouniotis, «The Threefold Nature of Man», *The Great Greek Encyclopedia*, Athens, «Pyrros», Vol. 23, p. 341 (in Greek). The something must be said about Stoic thought, as for example, in the case of Posidonius (c. 135-50 B.C.) of the Middle Stoa, in his teaching about the good daemon (God) who enters suddenly into man as a new component, besides those of the soul and the body. This daemon must be understood here not in an ontological sense, that is, as a substance different from that of the soul, but rather in an epistemological sense, that is, as a moral and spiritual situation established within man after his regeneration in a new life.

14. We take this passage from the above article of K. I. Dyovouniotis (p. 341).

15. Tatian, Christian apologist, missionary and heretic (Gnostic), was a Syrian born (c. 120 A.D.) in Mesopotamia.

δύο πνευμάτων διαφορὰς ἴσμεν ἡμεῖς, ὧν τὸ μὲν καλεῖται ψυχὴ· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς, Θεοῦ δὲ εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις. Ἐκάτερα δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπῆρχε[ν]... Χρὴ λοιπὸν ἡμᾶς ὅπερ ἔχοντες ἀπολώλεκαμεν, τοῦτο νῦν ἀναζητεῖν, ζευγνύναί τε τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἀγίῳ...¹⁶ (We consist of two different spirits of which the one is called soul, the other [spirit], higher than that of the soul, [is] in God's image and likeness, each of them existed in the first men [by their communion with God before their sin]... It is necessary for ourselves, then, to search that which we have lost [that is, the spirit which is the image of God and which we lost after the original sin] and to regain it by the marriage of the soul with the Holy Spirit). What Tatian means in the above passage by marriage with the Holy Spirit is the new spirit given to each human soul by the faith in Christ, the new state of grace which essentially is a regaining of that state of grace of Adam before his sin.

Referring to this parallelism between Adam and Christ, Santayana says:

According to the tradition followed by the Gospels, [the] obliquity of the flesh is due to previous evil choices made by the spirit, in Adam if not in ourselves. Christ comes to earth precisely to save us from the load of those evil choices; and then to restore us to the first state of nature, which was a state of grace and of perfect obedience of the body to the soul (ICG, 74).

In another one of his books, *The Realm of Spirit*, Santayana again states in connection with this parallelism between Adam and Christ that:

In Adam, in the human psyche, the spirit is secondary;... but in Christ, in the spirit that then enters into us, the opposite happens. There the centre is divine... (RS, 244). Christ may come and dwell within us, transfusing our human nature with divine light (RS, 208).

In characterizing Adam as a «human psyche» and Christ as a «divine spirit», Santayana has in mind the words of St. Paul rather than those of Tatian or of any other. St. Paul, for example, says the following in his First Epistle to Corinthians: «The first man Adam was made a living soul [εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν]; the last Adam was made a

16. Tatian, *Against the Greeks (Adversus Graecos)*, 12 and 15 (see *Patrologia Graeca*, edited by J.-P. Migne, Vol. 6, col. 829C, 837A. In the references to this work from now on we use the abbreviation PG).

quickenning spirit [*εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*]... The first man *is* of the earth, earthly [*ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός*]; the second man *is* the Lord from heaven [*ἐξ οὐρανοῦ; heavenly, ἐπουράνιος*]» (1 Corinth. 15:45,47). St. Paul's distinction here between the first Adam as a «diving soul» (*ψυχὴ ζῶσα*) and the last Adam (Christ) as a «quickenning spirit» (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*) concerns the two natures of Christ, the divine and the human, rather than the spirit and the soul as separate components of man, besides that of the body. Certainly, in this place of his epistle (1 Corinth. 15:44-48) St. Paul distinguishes three qualities: spiritual (*πνευματικός*), psychical (*ψυχικός*), and material or earthly (*χοϊκός*), but these three do not constitute a real trichotomy as in the case, for example, of Tatian though even in him not so obviously. For this reason, we can see better the real trichotomy in the comparison of Santayana not so much with Tatian as with another trichotomist, Valentine, whose doctrine of trichotomy is of great importance for us because of its application to the person of Christ in whom we are especially interested in our essay.

3. The Union of the Tripartite Nature of the Earthly Jesus with the Divine Soter in the Valentinian System

Valentine or Valentinus (*Θάλαεντινός*) who, like Tatian, appeared in the 2nd century¹⁷, must be regarded as one of the most gifted thinkers of his age¹⁸. Unfortunately only a few fragments of his works are preserved. And though other writers in their works talk of Valentine's teaching, his fundamental ideas can be reconstructed from these writers only with difficulty, as for example, from Irenaeus, Hippolytus and other Church Fathers¹⁹. As Wilhelm Bousset remarks,

17. Like Tatian a Gnostic, Valentine, the most prominent leader of the Gnostic movement, was born near the coast in Lower Egypt. He came to Rome (c. 135-160 A.D.) where he spread his doctrines. After he had been excommunicated as a heretic, he went to Cyprus, and died there (c. 160 A.D.). Maybe he died in Rome, for scholars are divided as to whether his stay in Cyprus preceded or followed that in Rome.

18. Willston Walker, *A History of the Christian Church*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918, p. 56.

19. Concerning the sources of Valentine's teaching we have to consider the six fragments of his writings incorporated by Clement of Alexandria into his *Stromata*. The best edition of and commentary on them is A. Hilgenfeld's *Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums*, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 292-370. As other sources we mention

«the authorities we have to consider deal for the most part with Valentinianism in its fully developed form and not with the original teaching of the master»²⁰.

a. *The Valentinian Teaching of the Three Elements of Man and Their Origin.* Concerning especially the teaching about man and his components, «it is significant», W. Bousset again remarks, «that Valentinus himself is credited with having written a treatise upon the three natures»²¹. Been fundamentally a trichotomist, he taught that man consists of soul (*ψυχή*), body (*σῶμα*), and spirit (*πνεῦμα*). The latter, the spirit, is the godlike nature²², «the nature of the *πνευματικόν*» which «is to be essentially in relationship with God (the *δμοούσιον τῷ Θεῷ*)»²³. The body, on the other hand, is «the ungodlike nature»²⁴, while the soul «stands midway betwixt the imperishable and the perishable»²⁵ because of «the mixture of the *ἕλη* [matter]»²⁶ in her, for «*ἕλη* is death itself, annihilation»²⁷ and such, for example, is the body which is from *ἕλη* only. Because of this place of the soul as the «middling» (*μεσότης*) between spirit and body, she is «the vehicle of the *πνευματικόν*, to enable the latter to enter into the temporal world, in which it must unfold itself to maturity»²⁸.

Santayana also places the soul, as material and immaterial, be-

also here Irenaeus, *Contra haereses*, book I and book II, ch. i-xi (PG 7, 437-757) and Hippolytus, *Philosophumena sive Omnium haeresium refutatio*, VI, 29ff. The latter (Hippolytus') work which was published completely, books I-IX, for the first time in Oxford, 1851, edited by Em. Müller, was considered in the beginning as one of Origen's works and as such was also included by J.-P. Migne in *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. 16, 3008-3454. About bibliography on Valentinus (texts and studies), see in general Johannes Quasten, *Patrologia*, Utrecht-Antwerp, Spectrum Publishers, 1962, p. 261.

20. Wilhelm Bousset, «Valentinus and the Valentinians» in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th ed., London-New York, Vol. 27 (1926), p. 852.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 854.

22. A. Neander, *General History of the Christian Religion and Church*; translated from the German by Joseph Torrey, Boston, Crocker and Brewster, London, Wiley and Putman, 1849, Vol I, p. 432.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 421.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 421.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 426.

tween the material body and the immaterial spirit. His opinion also coincides with that of Valentine as concerns the spirit, also. According to the latter, «the spirit is destined only for the life of intuition»²⁹, which intuition as capable as immediate apprehension of the truth³⁰ is higher than the other faculties of knowledge. «This higher faculty of immediate intuition» is, according to Valentine, «active»³¹. Santayana accepts the samething when he says that «the perfect function of spirit is pure intuition» (RS, 92), and that this intuition, according to its first characteristic, is «actuality, or existence» (RS, 94).

All these concern Valentine's teaching of the three components of man in general and its similarity with Santayana's teaching on the relation of the soul to the body and the spirit, and of the spirit to intuition. But Valentine in his trichotomy, proceeds further than Santayana. For he accepts that in accordance with the nature of man, who is represented at once as spiritual, psychical, and material, three classes of men arise: «the *pneumatici* [Gr. *πνευματικοί* from *πνεῦμα*, spirit], the *psychici* [Gr. *ψυχικοί* from *ψυχή*, soul], and the *hylici* [Gr. *ὕλικοι* from *ὕλη*, matter]»³². The first, the highest class of men, are «the true Christians, the true Gnostics; the nobles of the race. Beneath them stand the psychical natures, those who are destitute of the highest consecration of the spirit, though they occupy a better position than the purely carnal (the 'somatic' or 'hylic'). Corresponding with this threefold division we have the division of religions: Paganism, Judaism, Christianity — carnal, psychical, pneumatic»³³. According to this threefold division of religions then, «the Jews belong to the kingdom of the Demiurge, the pagans, to the kingdom of matter, or of Satan, and the Christians, to the people of the Supreme God»³⁴. But, let us see these three realms separately, that is, the realms of the Supreme God, the Demiurge, and Satan.

At the summit of the chain of being Valentine places the primal essence, which he calls the Bythos [Gr. *Βυθός*] (the abyss, where the

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 432.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 426.

32. W. Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 854; see also A. Neander, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-421; cmp. Irenaeus, *op. cit.*, I, vii, 5 (PG 7, 517Bff) and I, viii, 3 (PG 7, 525A).

33. David Duff, *The Early Church; A History of the Christianity in the First Six Centuries*, Edinburgh. T. and T. Clark, 1891, p. 183.

34. A. Neander, *op. cit.*, p. 427; see also pp. 421-422.

spirit is lost in contemplation)³⁵. This Bythos corresponds to Santayana's realm of essence which is prior to existence; in which existence «spirit, being an emanation of [the] flux, seems indeed a pilgrim wondering and almost lost in the wilderness of essence and in the dark treasure-house of truth» (RM, 76). The primal Essence of Valentine, the Bythos, is the original Being and ground of all being, the προπάτωρ and προαρχή³⁶, «the primal source of all existence, the fulness of all life»³⁷. From Bythos Valentine's aeons [Gr. αἰώνες] are generated, that is, «the world of eternities, the everlasting ideas which underlie this finite world of sense and its presupposition», and which «descend» to the more imperfect according to the distance from the original Being³⁸. These «Aeons have now a longing desire to unite themselves with the absolute and invisible, from whom they proceed, and live in the contemplation of Him». So, in one of them, «in the youngest of the female Aeons — σοφία [=wisdom] — this desire becomes a passion, and she enters into an alliance with the Supreme; but the offspring — the Earthly Wisdom [κάτω σοφία as distinguished from ἄνω σοφία or Divine Wisdom] — is an unripe, pitiful being, who in her turn has a son, the Demiurgus, the creator of a world which, so created, must necessarily be full of imperfection and misery»³⁹. In other words, «the Demiurge with his creation is but an imperfect representation of the divine glory»⁴⁰. This *Demiurge* or *Demiurgus* who in reality is the God of the Old Testament, but who has been assigned a name drawn from the philosophy of Plato, that of *Demiurgos* (Gr. Δημιουργός=Creator)⁴¹, «is to the

35. *Ibid.*, p. 417.

36. D. Duff, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-182. Valentine calls the primal essence «Father» (Πατήρ) who is the «unborn», the «real beginning of all beings», the «bythos» (Hippolytus, VI, 30; PG 16,3239A. Τοῦτον καί... Προπάτορα καὶ Βυθὸν καλοῦσιν (Irenaeus, I, i, 1; PG 7, 445A).

37. A. Neander, p. 418.

38. D. Duff, p. 181.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 182. Ὁ τελευταῖος καὶ νεώτατος... Αἰὼν, τοντέστιν ἡ Σοφία... ἔπαθε πάθος... Τὸ δὲ πάθος εἶναι ζήνησιν τοῦ Πατρὸς (Irenaeus, I, ii, 2; PG 7, 453A-B). From this Sophia (ἄνω Σοφία) was born the lower Sophia (κάτω Σοφία) ἦν καὶ Ἀχαμῶθ καλοῦσιν (*Ibid.*, I, iv, 1; PG 7, 480A) and from the lower Sophia was born the Demiurge (Δημιουργός) (*Ibid.*, I, v, 4 and vii, 1; PG 7, 497B, 512B).

40. A. Neander, pp. 423-424.

41. W. Bousset, p. 584. As for Plato see *Timaeus*, 28Aff. (*The Dialogues of Plato*; translated by B. Jowett, Vol. II, pp. 12ff. About Platonic, and also Pythagorean influence on Valentine, see in general Hippolytus, *op. cit.*, VI, 21ff. (PG 16, 3226Cff).

physical world what the Bythos is to the higher; — with this difference only: that he involuntarily acts as the instrument only of the latter», «believing that he acts independently... in realizing the highest ideas to the bounds of matter». «Moreover, the *Hyle* [Gr. ὕλη, Matter] has its representative principle, through which its activity is exerted; but a principle which, by its nature, is not formative and creative, but only destructive; namely *Satan*»⁴². If we compare here again Valentine with Santayana, we can say that the corresponding realm to the Hyle is Santayana's realm of matter though its representative principle in his system is that of the Demiurge or what he calls symbolically God as a formative and creative principle and not that of Valentine's Satan as a destructive principle. This difference between them derives from their different conception of matter. Matter for Valentine is the source of evil, while for Santayana it is the principle of all existence, the source of the life itself.

b. The Three Components of the Human Nature of Jesus and His Union with the Divine Soter. In our account of the mythological ontology of Valentine's aeons our purpose is not to compare him with Santayana's realms of being, but to explain better the origin of the three components of man or rather of the human nature of Christ; for even Christ, like every man, has by his humanity, according to Valentinianism, a threefold nature; he consists of spirit, soul, and body⁴³.

The first component, the spirit, descended as a heavenly seed, as a divine spark, from the Supreme God to the youngest celestial aeon, to the Sophia, came into the earthly Christ through the lower Sophia, the daughter of the upper Sophia. The lower Sophia, named also Achamoth (Ἀχαμῶθ) and Enthymesis (Ἐνθύμησις), had been cut off from the Pleroma of the aeons because of the passions derived from her mother's sinful passion for the Supreme. For this reason, the spiritual component, having been deformed in Achamoth, was formed after repentance and expiation of her passion⁴⁴. And as such this component was given to Christ⁴⁵.

The second component, the soul or psyche, came into him from

42. A. Neander, p. 421.

43. Irenaeus, I, vi, 1 (PG 7, 504B; cmp. I, vii, 3 (PG 7, 528A-B).

44. *Ibid.*, I, iv, 1 (PG 7, 480A).

45. *Ibid.*, I, vi, 1 (PG 7, 504B).

the son of Achamoth, the Demiurge⁴⁶, who is «a prophet of the Supreme God», «God's representative»⁴⁷, in the physical world, and who in his turn sent the prophets into the world. He also sent the last of them, «John the Baptist, the Demiurge's representative»⁴⁸, and he promised to send also «a psychical Messiah for the psychical natures, the ruler over a kingdom of this world»⁴⁹ and the Redeemer «who should release them from the dominion of the Hylic power»⁵⁰. The psychical natures (*Psychici* = *ψυχικοί*) who, as we have said, belong to the kingdom of Demiurge, correspond to the soul (*psyche* = *ψυχή*), this second component of man having descended from Demiurge. Thus, Demiurge sent the psychical Messiah into the world with this component in him, that is, as «the express image of the Demiurge, down from his heaven»⁵¹.

But what about the third component, that of the body, which characterizes those natures (*φύσεις πομπαικά*) which belong to the kingdom of Satan? Could Demiurge give such a material body to the Messiah who should bring redemption from the dominion of the Hylic (*δαίμων* = material) power? «Destined to bring about the annihilation of the material element, how could he indeed assume any part of it to himself?... and how could he be the Redeemer, if the principle of evil were present in his own nature? The Demiurge formed, then, for the psychical Messiah, a body composed of the finest ethereal elements of the heaven from which he was sent down into the world»⁵².

With such a body, then, together with the *psyche* and the spirit of the man Jesus, the Soter was united. This Soter is the same with that Soter who was sent as a Redeemer to fallen Sophia by the celestial Christ, the latter being the son of the aeon-syzygy Nous (Mind) and Aletheia (Truth).

In the aeon-world of Valentiné we have a succession of syzygies, that is, of aeon-pairs. Even the Bythos, the original Being and the primal source of all existence, though he is sometimes represented as sexless, has a feminine partner whose name is Sige (Gr. *Σιγή*, Silence), that is, the hidden essence of God, the absolute *ἄγνωστον* (=unknown),

46. *Ibid.*

47. A. Neander, p. 424.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 429.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 426.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 429.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*

for he can be comprehended by no being⁵³, except only by the Mind⁵⁴, the immediate aeon after Bythos; because «from Bythos and Sige come forth *Noûs* (Mind), called also *Μονογενής* (Only-begotten), and with him *Ἀλήθεια* (Truth). Out of this celestial syzygy come the *Λόγος* and the *Ζωή* (the 'Word' and the 'Life')»⁵⁵.

But from Mind and Truth another syzygy also comes in order to protect the other aeons after the fall and the repentance of Sophia. This syzygy is «Christ and the Spirit (the latter been of feminine gendre in the semitic languages, Rucha)»⁵⁶. So, from *Noûs* we have a new derivation — «Christ, who is united with the Holy Spirit. Of this heavenly marriage Jesus is born»⁵⁷. «Christ and Jesus, then, appear in this system as two different beings. The latter appeared on earth, and His work was to redeem men, to bring them back to the realm of light»⁵⁸, distinguished from the darkness of the material world.

This distinction between Christ who is the derivation from Mind and Truth, and Jesus Soter who came from the heavenly-marriage of Christ and the Holy Spirit, is very important in order to understand the analogy between Santayana's ontology and the doctrine of the Trinity. As we have seen in the first chapter of the second part, the Son, according to Santayana, corresponds to the realm of essence (RS, 292), whose infinity «is determined to a particular complex or series of forms. This complex or series of forms exemplified in the universe composes the truth about it; and this is the side of reality approachable by the intellect. It is the Logos, comparable with the heaven of Platonic Ideas, with the God of Aristotle, and with *νοῦς*, the second hypostasis in the trinity of Plotinus» (RS, 293). In this sense, therefore, Christ, according to Santayana, is «the Logos or the truth» (RS, 293). Though in the Valentinian system Christ is different from *Noûs* (Mind) and Logos⁵⁹, he is related to them; for Christ, and also the Logos, come

53. *Ibid.*, p. 448; see also D. Duff, p. 182; cmp. Irenaeus, I, i, 1 (PG 7, 445 A-B) and Hippolytus, VI, 29 (PG 16, 3235C).

54. Irenaeus, I, ii, 1 (PG 7, 452B).

55. D. Duff, p. 182; cmp. Hippolytus, VI, 29 (PG 16, 3238A) and Irenaeus, I, i, 1 (PG 7, 445B-448A).

56. Pan. K. Christou, «Valentinus» (*Οὐδαιστῆς*) in *Religious and Moral Encyclopaedia*, Athens, Vol. 9 (1966), col. 986; see also Irenaeus, I, ii, 5 (PG 7, 461A) and Hippolytus, VI, 31 (PG 16, 3239C).

57. D. Duff, p. 182.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.

59. Irenaeus, I, ix, 2 (PG 7, 540B).

from *Noûs* and *Ἀλήθεια* (Truth). And a closer relation in the same system is that of Christ to Jesus.

Concerning especially this relation, it must be understood in connection with the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, to which the realm of spirit corresponds, according to Santayana (RS, 294ff). A question about this realm very naturally arises here: Since it corresponds to the Holy Spirit, how does its correspondence extend to Christ, too, for the second part of our essay considers spirit as symbolized by the person of Christ. But, how, then, is the realm of spirit which is symbolized by the Third Person (the Holy Spirit) also symbolized by the Second Person (the Son or Christ) for Christ as the Son of God is identified with the Second Person? In other words, since the real correspondence of the Son, as we said above, refers to the realm of essence, and of the Holy Spirit to the realm of spirit, how does the correspondence of the same Person (Son of God) refer at the same time to a different realm (that of the spirit), too? An answer to this question, according to Santayana, is that «the divine element especially incarnate in human existence is spirit»; «so spirit can *exist* only incarnate in the flux of matter [the Father] and form [the Son]» (RS, 297). In this sense, therefore, «Christ», as Santayana explains, «is a supreme spirit incarnate in a human creature» (RS, 203). This means that this creature is an incarnation not of the Second (the Logos), but of the Third Person (the Holy Spirit) of the Trinity.

What Santayana characterizes in the case of Christ as incarnation in a human creature is in the Valentinian system that of Jesus of Nazareth who appeared on earth and who in order to save man, that is, to become the «Soter» (*Σωτήρ*), was united with the Holy Spirit.

The relation of the Soter to Christ who is united in this system with the Holy Spirit, and his own union as a Redeemer with a spirit, too, i.e., with his bride Sophia⁶⁰, reflecting in this case the Holy Spir-

60. In reality the Soter is the Carpos (Fruit), of whom Hippolytus in his report on Valentinianism says the following: «The common Carpos of the Pleroma [of the aeons] composes a syzygy with the lower Sophia who is also called Holy Spirit, inferior to the first one [that is, to the other Holy Spirit which composes a syzygy with Christ]» (Hippolytus, VI, 36; PG 16, 3250C-D). This Carpos who constitutes a unity with Sophia or Holy Spirit, is the «second» Christ (*Ibid.*) and bears also the names Horos («Ὅρος») and Stauros (*Σταυρός*) (Irenaeus, I, ii, 4; PG 7, 460A). Thus Carpos by the names «Horos-Stauros was often in later days assimilated to that of the Christian Redeemer» (W. Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 854). However, Irenaeus in his own report on Valentinianism mentions also, among other names of Carpos or

it⁶¹, can prove that the Soter himself was incarnate in a man as a Spirit⁶². He is the Paracletus who was sent by Christ to the fallen Sophia⁶³, and who also descended to Jesus of Nazareth. That the Soter is an incarnate Spirit in a human creature is apparent at the baptism in the Jordan when this Soter, descended in the form of a dove, entered into union with Jesus of Nazareth whose name is connected with the historical redemption⁶⁴. So, by the name «Soter» added to the name «Jesus», Valentine distinguishes the divine and the historical Jesus or, as Santayana likes, the ideal Christ and the historical Jesus (ICG, 6; also 17), that is, the two different natures of God-man united in the same person. In other words, the name «Soter» concerns the divinity, that is the spirit, for spirit is «the divine nature», the pneumatic nature of Christ, while the name «Jesus» concerns his humanity, the psychical nature, that is, «his humanity, either in body or in soul» (ICG, 137); his «human psyche, as well as [his] human body» (ICG, 132); for «Christ, being God, positively chose to assume a human body and a human psyche. Spirit could not otherwise have had a history»⁶⁵.

The history of this Spirit began at the Soter's union with Jesus, with his body and psyche as well as his spirit; it started with the Soter's incarnation as a divine Spirit in a human creature. But the question which arises especially for Valentine's disciples concerns the exact time of this incarnation, of the union of Jesus Soter's two natures, the divine and the human.

According to the Anatolian branch of the Valentinian sect (Ax-

Carpistes, the name Lytotes (Gr. *Λυτρωτής* = Redeemer) (Irenaeus, I, iii, 1; PG 7, 465B) which stands for the name «Soter» (Savior).

61. Irenaeus, I, iv, 1 (PG 7, 480A-B).

62. The celestial Soter who in the Valentinian system is sometimes Christ and sometimes Horos-Stauros (W. Bousset, p. 854), is in some way identical with Jesus of Nazareth. He is, according to Hippolytus' report, Jesus Soter or the «third» Christ (Hippolytus, V, 36; PG 16, 3250D). As W. Bousset remarks, «the Soter, the bridegroom of Sophia, and the earthly Jesus answer to each other, as in some way identical» (W. Bousset, p. 855). And it is especially by his identity, as we shall see immediately below, that the Soter appears as a spirit incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth.

63. Irenaeus, I, iv, 5 (PG 7, 485B).

64. A. Neander, pp. 429-430, 431; see also Irenaeus, I, vii, 2 (PG 7, 513A); cmp. Hippolytus, VI, 35 (PG 16, 3250A) where the descended Soter in the form of a dove is characterized as a spirit. See also Hippolytus, VI, 51 (PG 16, 3282A) and Irenaeus, I, xv, 3 (PG 7, 620B-621A).

65. ICG, 253; cmp. A. Neander, pp. 428, 433.

ionicus and Ardesianes [not Vardesianes]), the incarnation of the Spirit in Jesus took place after the angel's words to the Virgin Mary: «The Holy Spirit shall come unto thee»⁶⁶. According to the Italic branch (Ptolemaeus and Herakleon), the event of incarnation happened many years after «the miraculous birth of Jesus» which «consisted in this.— that the psychical nature descended from the heaven of the Demiurge, together with the ethereal body which it brought with it from the same region, was inhered into the light of this world through Mary, only as a channel of conveyance»⁶⁷. So, Jesus born in this way in Bethlehem of Judea, lived in Nazareth until the thirtieth year of his age. For this reason, he was called a Nazarene (Matt. 2:23). The psychical Messiah⁶⁸, then, whom the Demiurge promised to his people and sent into the world is the same with Jesus of Nazareth. And it is this Jesus of Nazareth who, having only the psychical nature, was united at his baptism in the Jordan with the Spirit (the divine nature) that descended in the form of a dove when the Soter entered into union with him⁶⁹.

c. Other Similarities and Differences between Valentine and Santayana, Especially on Their Teaching about Christ's Passion. We must also consider Santayana's opinion concerning the Spirit which in the form of a dove descended upon Jesus at his baptism, for he talks of this event as one of the occasions of the «later discovery» of Jesus as the Son of God by the Evangelists. Referring to «the baptism of Jesus, when a voice was heard from heaven saying: *This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased*», he asks: «Could it have been at that moment that the Son of God was generated, a spirit identified with the man Jesus and, as it were, infused into him? Was he perhaps the new spirit given to each human soul upon regeneration?» (ICG, 56). But, what about the spirit that Christ committed into his Father's hands during his last moments by the words: *Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit* (Luke 23:46). Is this spirit the same or has this spirit any similarity with the spirit that Jesus of Nazareth received at his baptism by his union with the heavenly Soter?

The spirit that Christ left at his death is related to his human-

66. Luke 1: 35. See Hippolytus, VI, 35 (PG 16, 3217B-C).

67. A. Neander, p. 429.

68. The psychical Messiah, referred to Jesus of Nazareth, is distinguished from the pneumatic Messiah referred to Jesus Soter (*Ibid.*, p. 431).

69. Hippolytus, VI, 35 (PG 16, 3250A) and Irenaeus, I, vii, 2 (PG 7, 513A).

ity, while the Spirit that descended upon him at baptism has to do with his divinity; it is, according to the Italic branch of the Valentinian sect, the divinity itself, that is, the heavenly Soter. The word «spirit» (*πνεῦμα*) in Christ's saying on the Cross must not be understood in the sense of the vital principle and power, but in the sense of the rational and immortal soul. In other words, the spirit here is what the trichotomists understand by the third component of man, though in reality this component is the same as the soul (*ψυχή*) and not independent from her. Thus, Valentine's disciples, who belong to these trichotomists, too, remark that «by the words 'Father into thy hands I commit my spirit', the psychical Christ commended to the care of the Heavenly Father the *πνευματικὸν σπέρμα* [spiritual seed]»⁷⁰. From their point of view, therefore, Valentine's disciples are closer to the truth than Santayana who by the spirit in Christ's saying on the Cross understands the second component of man, that of the soul or the psyche. For he says: «This spirit is the human soul in Christ» (ICG, 136) because «he is delivering that human soul which he had assumed to his Father», «but not in the sense of losing his humanity either in body or in soul» (ICG, 137).

Though we can understand better in the light of Valentine's teaching of trichotomy Santayana's interpretation of the person of Christ, and especially that of Christ as a supreme spirit incarnate in a human creature, there is between them a basic difference. In opposition to Valentine who accepts that the whole man (body, soul, and spirit) was united with the divine Soter, Santayana accepts that the spirit in the humanity of Christ was replaced by his divine spirit; and thus his divinity was united only with a human body and a human psyche. For this reason, Jesus who died on the cross as a man, left at his death, according to Santayana, his mortal soul, and not his spirit, that is, his divinity, which could not die.

The difference between Santayana and Valentine exists in their conception not only of Christ's spirit (its place in the union of his divinity and humanity), but also of his body. Santayana who accepts a material body for Christ, sees a real, bodily passion on the Cross. Valentine who considers Christ's body as heavenly and aethereal, believes that «the psychical [and not the bodily] Christ suffered»⁷¹. This means,

70. A. Neander, p. 431.

71. Irenaeus, I, vii, 2 (PG 7, 516A).

as A. Neander explains, that «the Soter, at the passion, left the psychical Messiah to himself»⁷². For this reason, «this passion as it did not light on a material body, capable of suffering, but on a psychical one, could not be possibly regarded by him according to its full import»⁷³.

However, speaking of the Passion of Christ, we can also find, in spite of the above difference, an important similarity between Santayana and Valentine. This concerns suffering as a means of the purification of the soul. Like Santayana, as we have seen in the sixth chapter of the second part of this essay, Valentine, too, gives the same meaning to suffering, for the Cross in his system is considered as «a symbol of that might that purifies a nature from foreign elements»⁷⁴.

The Cross or Stauros (*Σταυρός*) which is also named Horos (the Limiter)⁷⁵, is in general a symbol or rather «a figure entirely peculiar to Valentinian Gnosticism»⁷⁶. The two names (Stauros-Horos) of this figure derive from his essential activities. His name is Stauros because he consolidates and supports; his name is Horos because he separates and fixes⁷⁷. His peculiar task is to separate the fallen aeon Sophia from the upper world of aeons, and also to purify her from her passions and support her (*καθαίρωθαι καὶ ἐστηρίχθαι τὴν Σοφίαν*)⁷⁸. For this reason, he is her Redeemer (*Ἀντρωτής*) and identified with Christ. He is the Christ who is extended to the Stauros⁷⁹. Thus, except the two already known Christs⁸⁰, there is also in a later Valentinian system another Christ, that is, three Christs in total: the first Christ who was born from the Mind and the Truth, the second Christ, the Horos-Stauros or Carpos, who is the common fruit of the Pleroma of aeons, and the third Christ, Jesus Soter who was born of Mary⁸¹.

72. A. Neander, p. 430.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*, p. 431.

75. Stauros or Horos bears several other names, too, as for example, Horothetes, Carpos, Carpistes, Lytrotos, Synlytrotos, etc. (Irenaeus, I, ii, 4; PG 7, 460A and I, iii 1; PG 7, 465B).

76. W. Bousset, p. 854.

77. Irenaeus, I, iii, 5 (PG 7, 476A).

78. *Ibid.*, I, ii, 4 (PG 7, 460A); see also I, iii, 3 (PG 7, 473A).

79. *Ibid.*, I, vii, 2 (PG 7, 516A); see also I, iv, 1 (PG 7, 480A).

80. *Ibid.*, I, iii, 1 (PG 7, 468A).

81. Hippolytus, VI, 36 (PG 16, 3250C-D).

4. Apollinaris' Teaching on the Replacement of the Spirit in Christ's Humanity by the Divine Logos

Valentine's teaching of the Soter is obscure⁸² because in the accounts of the Church Fathers his [Valentinus'] own system and views are almost entirely obscured by the accounts of those of his disciples⁸³. For this reason, we can not be so sure about the place of Christ's rational soul, his divine spirit, in the union with his humanity. From this point of view the teaching of another trichotomist, Apollinaris or Apollinarius (*Ἀπολλινάριος*)⁸⁴ is more clear and concrete. He, like every trichotomist of his time, adopted the division of the human nature into three parts: the rational soul or spirit (*ψυχὴ λογικὴ, νοῦς, πνεῦμα*) which as the highest in man constitutes the essence of man's nature; the animal soul or irrational soul (*ψυχὴ ἄλογος*) which is the principle of animal life, the vital principle, or universal soul; and the body (*σῶμα*) which is connected with the spirit by that soul, the latter been the intermediate principle between them. «The body, by itself considered, has no faculty of desire; but this soul, which is united with it, is the source and fountain of the desires that struggle against reason»⁸⁵.

Now, Apollinaris' doctrine of the trichotomy of man in its application to the person of Christ concerns the unity of the two natures (the divine and the human) in him as God-man (*Θεάνθρωπος*). According to the Church Fathers, Christ was perfect God and perfect man. He was not, therefore, the Christ of the Arians⁸⁶ who conceded in him «neither the essential deity nor the perfect humanity», thinking that «in Christ the Logos — the first creature of the Supreme God — took the place of the human *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* [‘spirit’]»⁸⁷. Apollinaris,

82. Bas. K. Stefanidis, *History of the Church from the Beginning till Today*, Athens, «Aster», Al. and E. Papadimitriou, 1948, p. 57.

83. W. Bousset, p. 853.

84. Apollinaris «the Younger» appeared about two centuries after Tatian and Valentine. He died in 390 A. D. He was anathematized by the first canon of the Second Ecumenical Council (381 A.D.). Apollinaris who was bishop of Laodicea (*Λαοδικεία*) in Syria, must be distinguished from the bishop of Hierapolis (*Ἱεράπολις*) who bore the same name.

85. A. Neander, Vol. II, p. 430; about Apollinaris' doctrine of trichotomy see also D. Duff, pp. 505-506.

86. As known, the teaching of Arius was condemned as heretical by the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea (325 A.D.).

87. D. Duff, p. 504.

though he rejected the doctrine of Arius about Christ as a creature of God, believing that he was no creature, but co-eternal and co-essential with the Father, agreed, on the other hand, with Arius that the Logos took the place of the human *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* (spirit) and that this Logos, the celestial mind (*νοῦς ἐπουράνιος*), was united in Christ with the human body and the human soul (*ἀντί τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ*)⁸⁸. In other words, he accepted Christ as perfect God, but not as perfect man (*οὐ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον*), believing that «two perfect beings can not become one [*δύο τέλεια ἐν γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται*]⁸⁹. So, in his eagerness to combat Arianism he went so far as to deny the existence of a rational human soul in Christ's human nature, preparing in this way what was later to be called Monophysitism (*Μονοφυσιτισμός*)⁹⁰.

One of the main reasons that forced Apollinaris to arrive at such a conclusion about the two natures of Christ is that the idea of a perfect, complete man, involves the idea of sin. «Where there is a perfect man, there there is sin [*ὅπου τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖ ἁμαρτία*]⁹¹. As D. Duff interprets Apollinaris' thought, «sin has its seat in the *νοῦς* and if Christ had this constituent of human nature as all other men have it, He must have been a sinner, and consequently could not be the Saviour of sinners»⁹². In view of this, another interpreter of the Apollinarian sect, A. Neander, concludes: «In order therefore to redeem mankind from the dominion of sin, it was necessary that an immutable divine Spirit, the Logos himself, should enter into union with these two parts [the animal soul and the body] of human nature»⁹³. So, «Christ, like every other man, consisted of three parts, of spirit,

88. Saint Athanasius, *De incarnatione Domini Nostri Jesus Christi, contra Apollinarium*, I, 2 (PG 26, 1096B); cmp. II, 3 (PG 26, 1136C-1137A).

89. *Ibid.*, I, 2 (PG 26, 1096B).

90. The Apollinarian type of thought persisted in what was later the Monophysite school, whose followers maintain that there was but a single nature in Christ or that the human and the divine in Jesus Christ constituted but one composite nature.

91. Saint Athanasius, *op. cit.*, I, 2 (PG 26, 1096B).

92. D. Duff, p. 505.

93. A. Neander, Vol. II, p. 430. An answer to this argument of Apollinaris as concerns the sinful human nature is that of Athanasius who, referring to the state of grace of the first man before the original sin, alleges, in opposition to Apollinaris, that «freedom from sin was man's *original* nature; it was only by reason of the corruption of that original nature that sin had obtained such dominion over it. Christ elevated it once more to its original freedom» (A. Neander, Vol. II, p. 433).

soul, and body; but with the difference, that, in his case, the place of the weak and mutable human spirit was filled by an immutable divine Spirit: for this reason, Christ is also the God-man [*Θεάνθρωπος* and not *ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος*, Divine man]; a name which could not otherwise be ascribed to him»⁹⁴.

In the light of this doctrine of Apollinaris as concerns the two natures of Christ from the point of view of the trichotomy, we can understand better Santayana's symbolic interpretation of the spirit and psyche, these two components of man which correspond to the divine and human nature of Christ. According to Apollinaris, the human *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* (spirit) was filled by an immutable divine Spirit (Christ the Logos). Santayana, interpreting the person of Christ not literally but symbolically, finds this correspondence able to justify the characterization of the spirit in man as «divine». On the other hand, the doctrine of Apollinaris that the human nature of Christ, consisted only of animal soul and body, can also explain more distinctly Santayana's characterization of the psyche as «human». The distinction between «divine» and «human» in Santayana as concerns man could not be so obvious if he did not distinguish the human soul in general into two parts, the spirit and the psyche, which besides the third one, that of the body, constitute the so-called theory of trichotomy. And it is in this theory especially that Santayana resembles Apollinaris who, like Santayana, accepts man as consisting of three parts: rational soul (or what Santayana simply calls «spirit»), irrational or animal soul (corresponded to what Santayana calls «psyche»), and body.

Concerning the secondary similarities between Apollinaris and Santayana on this doctrine of trichotomy, the most important are these: We said that both, the one literally the other symbolically, understand the humanity of Christ as consisting of soul (or psyche) and body, for Santayana, like Apollinaris, talks also of Christ's «humanity, either in body or in soul» (ICG, 137). Now, in respect to these two components of the human nature, Apollinaris accepts that the body, considered in itself, has no faculty of desire, but the soul, which is united with it, is the source and fountain of the desires. So, the moral struggle within man is not between soul and body, but between soul and spirit. Santayana accepts the something when he talks of a «conflict between Will in the spirit and Will in the rest of the psyche and of the world»

94. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 431.

(RS, 80). As we remember, we also found concerning this conflict the same similarity in comparing Santayana with Ap. Makrakis.

Another similarity between Apollinaris and Santayana is also the seat of sin. Though the former accepts that the source and the fountain of the desires that struggle against reason (spirit) is the animal soul, he finds that the domination of the sinful desires comes about because the mutable spirit is too weak to subject to itself this resisting soul⁹⁵. So, the seat of sin, according to Apollinaris, is the *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* (spirit). For this reason, as we have seen, he replaces the weak spirit of man by the divine Spirit in Christ, for otherwise Christ would be a sinner and therefore not the Savior of sinners. Santayana, like Apollinaris and unlike Valentine who accepts that the seat of sin is in the *ἄλη* (matter) and therefore in the flesh, finds it in the spirit when he characterizes the *devil* as the «enemy of spirit that is internal to spirit» (RS, 165). This devil in Santayana, as we have seen, is a symbolic figure for pride of power and knowledge. As such, therefore, the devil «is a rebellion of spirit against the sources of spirit» (RS, 166). For this reason, Santayana finds as characteristic types of this devilishness Calibar or Iago, Lucifer or Mephistopheles (RS, 166).

5. The Main Differences between Santayana and the Trichotomists (The True Nature of Christ's Humanity and Its Value in Respect to His Divinity and to the Origin of the Spirit in General)

In our comparison of Santayana with the trichotomists, besides the main similarity between them as concerns their doctrine of the three components of man and its application to the person of Christ, we also found a lot of other similarities of secondary value. But this does not mean, of course, that there is no difference between them. On the contrary, there are remarkable differences.

Already in our treatment of the trichotomists we had the opportunity to indicate some differences, as for example, in the case of Valentine's teaching on Christ's Passion. Now, let us see some other differences. One of them, for example, is that all the trichotomists emphasize the sinfulness of the human nature though the seat of sin, as we

95. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 430.

have seen, is different in Apollinaris and Valentine, the former accepting it in the spirit while the latter in matter or the flesh. This acceptance led Valentine to imagine in his mythological ontology a heavenly and aethereal body for Christ, or in the case of Apollinaris, who in his endeavor to give a logical explanation, attached to the divinity of Christ a mutilated humanity, that is, a humanity consisting of body and animal soul only, without its most essential part, that of the spirit. In other words, both thought that Christ was not a perfect and complete man, for otherwise he would be a sinner, though the *original* nature of man, according to Athanasius (in his work against Apollinaris), does not lie in the corruption of that original nature by the dominion of sin over it, but in its freedom from sin such as it was before the original sin in the state of grace.

In contrast to the Neo-Platonists, and especially to the Gnostics, such as Valentine for example, who believed that matter is the origin of sin, Santayana says the following as concerns the «type of human nature adopted by Christ» (ICG, 73):

As a preliminary we must banish the fanatical notion that matter is something evil or wholly negative or a mere impediment to the spirit. A divine person who assumes a human soul and body and enacts an earthly life of his free accord (his will being intrinsically identical with that of his Father), cannot hate or despise matter. Like his Father, who found matter an indispensable medium for the creation, he does not come to destroy matter but to reanimate it: not to separate the souls of men from their bodies but to endow them, when redeemed, with those bodies renewed and rendered perfectly obedient to their souls (ICG, 73-74). The body is to be accepted and preserved. Christ was willing to become an infant, a lisping child, a questioning boy, a young man working at a manual trade, and then driven by the spirit into the desert. He was tender towards the body, cured all its diseases, brought it to life again, fed it in multitudes by repeated miracles, and when he had taken the dead young girl by the hand and raised her from her sleep his first word was: *Give her something to eat*. He was the Word made flesh, and accepted the flesh for himself in all its humble accidents (ICG, 75). [He was] the Word made flesh in all flesh (ICG, 73). That nevertheless his humanity is obvious and profoundly real—more perfect, in fact, than that of other men — comes from the fact that mankind at large is not, according to the view of the Gospels, the criterion of humanity. Man, as he is, is a fallen creature, a distorted and self-contradictory being. It is not Christ that is not a complete man, but the common man that is half beast (ICG, 72; cp. 75).

What Santayana means, according to this last passage, «complete man» is man before he became «a fallen creature», or as he explains elsewhere, man in «his pristine condition» and «his truly *normal* life» (ICG, 229) when «immediately after his creation Adam had been raised to a supernatural state of grace and endowed with immortality, for body as well as soul. It was only in punishment for sin that he fell back into an animal condition, subject to death, like the animals» (ICG, 228-229) so that «the life we call natural is diseased» (ICG, 229). In view of this distinction between the state of grace and the situation that followed after the original sin, Santayana further remarks on the kind of humanity that Christ adopted:

It was no part of the extant creation, much less the whole of it, that Christ assumed when he became man. He did not inherit the sin of Adam. Even his mother, according to the Church, had been free from it. He assumed only a lost, an ideal, a non-natural humanity, such as myth pictured in Adam, or rather such as the saints hoped to possess in heaven (ICG, 78).

By characterizing the picture of Adam as a «myth», it is evident that Santayana does not believe in the doctrine of the Church about the state of grace before the original sin, that is, in man's pristine condition and his truly *normal* life, when man was a complete man, such as Christ adopted when he became man. He does not believe in such a kind of humanity assumed by Christ because «this circumstance might seem to destroy half the force of the assertion that Christ was a true man; for his humanity could be only extraordinarily limited and corrected. And so we find it described in the Gospels. Everything about him is miraculous, not merely that he works miracles, as many other prophets or healers were reputed to do, but that his birth and his gifts are miraculous, that he moves at will into an invisible sphere» (ICG, 71-72).

From what we said in general about the humanity of Christ, as Santayana understands it, we can see that on this subject he differs not only from the heretics (trichotomists) but also from the Church Fathers such as Athanasius, for example, who especially represented in his times the orthodox belief of the Church and who alleged against Apollinaris the opinion that Christ was a perfect man in the sense that he adopted for his humanity «man's *original* nature» or man's «truly *normal* life» such as man was in the state of grace, that is, free from sin. Santayana rejects this opinion of Athanasius and of the Church in general as

he also rejects, on the other hand, the opinion of the heretics: of Apollinaris, for example, who believed that Christ was not a perfect man. Santayana accepts that Christ was a true, perfect and complete man, but not in the sense in which the Church understands man in the state of grace before the original sin. In opposition to this belief, he understands the true humanity of Christ in the sense in which the human nature is now, such as it was from the beginning, from the appearance of the first man on the earth. Christ, therefore, was «the Word made flesh in all flesh» (ICG, 73) and in becoming flesh, he «accepted flesh for himself in all its humble accidents» (ICG, 75).

This sympathy of Santayana for the flesh or the body with all its humble accidents derives from his naturalism. For it is this naturalism that makes him put the stress in his interpretation of Christ on his humanity rather than on his divinity. In this sense, therefore, we can find another considerable difference between Santayana and the trichotomists. Apollinaris, for example, in contrast to Santayana puts his emphasis on the divinity of Christ which, according to him, is perfect and not as the humanity of Christ which is imperfect. And it is especially this emphasis of the Apollinarian type of thought that persisted in what was later the Monophysite school, according to which, as its name itself indicates, there is only one (Gr. *μία μόνον*) nature (Gr. *φύσις*) in Christ, the divine, which with the human constituted one composite nature. What we said of Apollinaris is also valid for Valentine who, by his acceptance of a heavenly or aethereal body for Christ, puts his emphasis on the divine nature of Christ. The same thing can be said about all the Gnostics in general, for Valentine himself was a prominent leader of the Gnostic movement; and therefore, about Tatian who, like Valentine, was a Gnostic, too. Referring to this Gnostic idea of Christ, Santayana says:

Whatever, then, we may think of the Gnostic idea of Christ, or any theory that tends to deny his humanity, such theories certainly contradict that idea in its initial form, as we find it reflected in the Gospels. Saint Paul himself, whose Christ is Jesus only, as if were, by accident, nevertheless means to preach nothing but Christ crucified and such a Christ must have had a material human body and a genuine human soul to die that death. The religion of the Cross was bound, at all costs, to maintain the humanity of its founder (ICG, 68).

Santayana, like St. Paul, emphasizes the humanity of Christ, as it is especially expressed in his Passion (ICG, 133, 134, 136). On this

point, therefore, he differs from the Gnostics, from Valentine, for example, who, as we said, believing that Christ's Passion has to do not with a material body, but with a psychical one, could not regard it according to its full import. For this reason, Santayana pits the example of St. Paul against the Gnostic idea or any theory that tends to deny the humanity of Christ. However, if Santayana says of St. Paul that his «Christ is Jesus only», we must not conclude from this that St. Paul's emphasis is limited to Christ's humanity only. For Santayana himself also says elsewhere something quite different when speaking of «Saint Paul, who had seen Christ as the Christ, never as the human nature» (ICG, 27). St. Paul's emphasis, therefore, is equally put on both the divinity and the humanity of Christ. But what is true for St. Paul is not true for Santayana, because the latter's emphasis is on the humanity of Christ so that he differs not only from the heretics whose stress is on the divinity, but also from St. Paul, whose stress is both on the divinity and the humanity.

This difference of Santayana can also explain the method he uses in his interpretation of the idea of Christ, on which he also differs from the trichotomists, Valentine and Apollinaris, for example, who by their emphasis on the divinity of Christ accept that Christ is the Son of God, a divine being in the real sense of the word. For this reason, their interpretation of the person of Christ is real or literal. Santayana, on the other hand, sees Christ as God in a symbolic sense only. From the literal point of view the case for him is quite different. Here God stands only as a name for the spirit of Christ. He is simply the human spirit which, with the psyche and the body, composes the whole man, the complete man. In this sense, therefore, every human spirit is divine, the god-like component of man, or «God in man», as Santayana characterizes the spirit in general in his book on Christ.

From what we have said above, we can understand that Santayana rejects in reality the divinity of Christ. He does not believe in him as a real God. And not only in Christ as the Son of God, but neither in God himself. God for him is «a mythological name» (RM, 171, PP, I, 128-129), a symbolic name (RM, 205) for matter which is «the principle of existence» (RM, v), «the matrix and the source of everything» (RM, xi). Matter, therefore, is the source and the origin of the spirit, too. Considering that the spirit is the most essential of the three components of man, we can see that especially, as concerns the origin

of spirit, there exists the most important difference between Santayana and the trichotomists in general, a difference which has to do with the theory of trichotomy itself. But let us see this difference in more detail.

According to Santayana, «spirit is not a seed, it is not a potentiality, it is not a power» (RS, 12). «The real potentiality of the spirit is in matter» (RS, 37). So, though he accepts that the spirit is «immaterial», he finds, on the other hand, that «in its origin it springs from matter» (RS, 49). «Spirit is thus entirely dependent on matter for its existence and distribution» (RS, 79; also 65). In opposition to Santayana, all the trichotomists accept that the origin or cause of spirit springs from the Spirit of God. This is the opinion, for example, of one of them, Ap. Makrakis⁹⁶ who says that, for this reason, «the spiritual nature is as superior to the carnal nature as the imperishable and blissful Spirit of God, from which the spiritual nature springs up, is superior to the mortal and beastly flesh»⁹⁷. The question, therefore, of origin or cause of spirit is solved for Makrakis by «a logical law»:

According to this [law] an effect necessarily has an analogous cause, and is never considered superior to the latter. It is impossible for consciousness and the rational and free nature of the soul, which is inseparable from consciousness, to be due to a cause that is by nature unintelligent and irrational, and extraneously moved, such as the body is. By admitting, therefore, a cause analogous to the effect, we admit an incorporeal spirit, rational and free and delightful, which, upon entering the soul in much the same way as light from the sun enters the eye, imparts to the soul its own nature⁹⁸.

This difference between Makrakis and Santayana as concerns the origin or cause of spirit derives from their different ideology, the former being a Christian philosopher, the latter a materialist. But independently from this we found in general that both agree in their teaching of the tripartite nature of man, though this trichotomy in Santayana, as we said in the beginning of this Appendix, is not real as it is in the official trichotomists, precisely because of his difference from them in their conception of the origin of spirit. However, what we said especially of Makrakis is also valid for all the other trichotomists (Tetian, Valentine, Apollinaris) in their comparison with Santayana.

96. Ap. Makrakis, *A New Original Philosophical System*, pp. 54, 55, 94.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Η ΖΩΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ G. SANTAYANA ΚΑΙ Η ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΙΔΕΑΝ ΤΟΥ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ

Π Ε Ρ Ι Λ Η Ψ Ι Σ

Ὁ ἰσπανοαμερικανὸς φιλόσοφος George Santayana (1863-1952) ἐκλαμβάνει τὸ πνεῦμα «κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀφ' ἑτέρου εἰς τὴν ὑπαρξίν του, εἰς τὰ διάφορα δηλαδή δείγματα του. Εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν του ἡ κλίσις τοῦ πνεύματος εἶναι ἡ κλίσις πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν. Εἰς τὰ δείγματα του, ὅπωςδήποτε, ἡ κλίσις τοῦ πνεύματος εἶναι διάφορος εἰς ἐκάστην ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν». Συμφώνως λοιπὸν πρὸς τὴν διττὴν ταύτην μετοχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὴν πραγματικὴν ζωὴν, εἰς ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπον δηλαδή, καὶ εἰς τὴν ιδανικὴν ζωὴν, τὴν ὁποίαν ἐκφράζει ἰδιαίτερος ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, διαίρεται καὶ τὸ θέμα τοῦ παρόντος βιβλίου εἰς δύο μέρη:

Εἰς τὸ Πρῶτον Μέρος, ἔνθα γίνεται λόγος περὶ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ πνεύματος, ἐφαρμόζεται ἡ κατὰ γράμμα ἐρμηνεία, καθ' ἣν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τοῦ βιβλίου ἐκλαμβάνει τὰ γεγονότα ὡς πραγματικὰ γεγονότα, τονίζων ἰδιαίτερος τὴν πραγματικότητα τοῦ πνεύματος. Εἰς τὸ Δεύτερον Μέρος, περὶ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀκολουθῶν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τὴν συμβολικὴν ἐρμηνείαν, δίδει ἰδιαιτέραν ἔμφασιν εἰς τὴν ιδανικὴν ζωὴν τοῦ πνεύματος κατὰ τὸ πρότυπον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Ὁ παραλληλισμὸς οὗτος τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ πνεύματος (Μέρος Α') πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Μέρος Β') ἐπισημαίνει κατὰ τινὰ τρόπον τὴν ἀφηγηματικὴν ἢ μᾶλλον τὴν «βιογραφικὴν» μορφήν τοῦ ὅλου βιβλίου, τὸ ὁποῖον θὰ ἠδύνατο διὰ τοῦτο νὰ λάβῃ ὑπότιτλον «Ἡ βιογραφία τοῦ πνεύματος» ἢ ὅ,τι ὁ Santayana χαρακτηρίζει ὡς «φυσικὴν ἱστορίαν τοῦ πνεύματος». Ἀνάλογος δὲ πρὸς τὴν μορφήν εἶναι καὶ ἡ διάταξις τῆς ὕλης οὕτως ὥστε τὰ ἑπτὰ κεφάλαια τοῦ Πρώτου Μέρους νὰ ἀντιστοιχοῦν πρὸς τὰ ἑπτὰ κεφάλαια τοῦ Δευτέρου Μέρους, κατὰ τὸν ἀκόλουθον τρόπον:

Τὸ πρῶτον (εἰσαγωγικὸν) κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Α', τὸ κεφάλαιον περὶ τῆς θέσεως τοῦ πνεύματος μεταξὺ τῶν ἄλλων «βασιλείων τοῦ ὄντος», ἀντιστοιχεῖ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον (εἰσαγωγικὸν ἐπίσης) κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Β', τὸ κεφάλαιον δηλαδή περὶ τῆς θέσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὡς δευτέρου προσώπου τῆς Ἀγ. Τριάδος, δεδομένου ὅτι ὁ ἴδιος ὁ Santayana προβαίνει εἰς σύγκρισιν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένων «βασιλείων τοῦ ὄντος» πρὸς τὰ τρία πρόσωπα τοῦ Τριαδικοῦ δόγματος.

Τὸ δεύτερον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Α', τὸ ἔχον ὡς θέμα τὴν γέννησιν τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ τὴν ἐξάρτησιν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς πηγῆς του, ἀντιστοιχεῖ πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Β', τὸ ἀναφερόμενον εἰς τὴν γέννησιν καὶ τὴν ἐξάρτησιν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς αὐτοῦ.

Τὸ τρίτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Α', τὸ περὶ διακρίσεως μεταξὺ πνεύματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τῆς τελευταίας ἀποτελούσης διὰ τῆς συνδέσεώς της πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἰδιαιτέραν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, παράλληλον πρὸς ἐκείνην τοῦ πνεύματος, ἔχει ἀντίστοιχον αὐτοῦ τὸ τρίτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Β', τὸ πραγματευόμενον περὶ τῶν δύο φύσεων τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τῆς θείας καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης.

Τὸ τέταρτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Α', ἔνθα γίνεται λόγος περὶ τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης βουλήσεως εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τῆς βουλήσεως εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, εὐρίσκεται ἐν ἀντιστοιχίᾳ πρὸς τὸ τέταρτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Β', ἔνθα ὁ λόγος περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης βουλήσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Τὸ πέμπτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Α', περὶ ἐνοράσεως ὡς ὑπερβατικοῦ σταδίου ἢ ἄλλματος τῆς γνωστικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ περὶ τῆς μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων πνευμάτων ἐνώσεως αὐτοῦ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης ἢ φιλανθρωπίας, ἀντιστοιχεῖ πρὸς τὸ πέμπτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Β', περὶ τῶν παραβολῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὡς διδασκαλίας τῆς θείας σοφίας καὶ τῶν θαυμάτων Αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐκφράσεως ἀγάπης πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Τὸ ἕκτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Α', τὸ ἔχον ὡς περιεχόμενον τὸν περισπασμὸν τοῦ πνεύματος, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὸν διὰ τοῦ πόνου ὡς πρώτης μορφῆς περισπασμοῦ, καθὼς ἐπίσης καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀπελευθέρωσιν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκ τοῦ περισπασμοῦ τούτου, εἶναι ἀντίστοιχον πρὸς τὸ ἕκτον κεφάλαιον τοῦ Μέρους Β', τὸ στρεφόμενον περὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὡς λύτρωσιν τοῦ πνεύματος μέσῳ τοῦ πόνου καὶ τῶν διαφόρων παθημάτων γενικώτερον.

Τέλος, ἀντιστοιχία ὑπάρχει ἐπίσης καὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἐβδόμου κεφαλαίου τοῦ Μέρους Α', περὶ ὑψίστης εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ τοῦ ἐβδόμου κεφαλαίου τοῦ Μέρους Β', περὶ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς τοῦ ὑψίστου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἰδεώδους τοῦ πνεύματος.

Ἐκ τῆς ἀνωτέρω ἀντιστοιχίας τῶν κεφαλαίων καθίσταται ἐμφανῆς ὁ συμβολισμὸς τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ πνεύματος (Μέρος Α') διὰ τῆς μορφῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Μέρος Β'). Ὁ συμβολισμὸς οὗτος εἶναι ἕ,τι κυρίως ἀποτελεῖ «τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ — εἰς — τὸν — ἄνθρωπον», δηλαδὴ τὴν ἐνωσιν τῶν δύο φύσεων αὐτοῦ, τοῦ «θείου πνεύματος» καὶ τῆς «ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς». Βεβαίως ἢ διάκρισις μεταξὺ πνεύματος καὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ ὅποια συνιστᾶ, ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ τρισύνθετον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἶναι διὰ τὸν Santayana φαινομενικὴ καὶ οὐχὶ οὐσιαστικὴ, ὡς ἀποδέχονται αὐτὴν οἱ γνήσιοι τριχοτομισταί. Ἡ συσχέτισις ὅμως τῆς διακρίσεως αὐτῆς πρὸς τὰς δύο φύσεις τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὑποβοηθεῖ ὀπωσδήποτε εἰς τὴν καλυτέραν κατανοήσιν τῆς ἀντιλήψεως τοῦ Santayana περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ — εἰς — τὸν — ἄνθρωπον. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκρίθη σκόπιμος ἢ προσάρτησις ἐνὸς Παραρτήματος εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ βιβλίου, διὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ Santayana πρὸς τοὺς τριχοτομιστάς.