

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SAINT JOHN OF DAMASCUS

BY

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B. SOMATOLOGY

CHAPTER I

CREATION AND PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN

Very important is the teaching of St. John Damascene about man. His anthropology covers a large section of the second book of the *De Fide Orthodoxa*¹.

God is the creator, overflowing goodness, His motivating cause, and the act of creation is an act of His intellect². Contrary to other theologians, St. John teaches, with Gregory of Nazianzus, that God first created the angels, the spiritual nature, then the world, the sensible nature, and lastly man, the spiritual-sensible nature³.

In the chapters on Angelology⁴ and Demonology⁵, St. John follows the authority of Gregory of Nazianzus and Pseudo-Dionysius. These two tracts are fairly well developed, and they touch upon such problems as the nature of an angel, his immateriality, motion in space, their species, the nine choirs of angels, guardian angels, fallen angels and their impenitance⁶.

After God had created the purely spiritual world, He called the purely material world into being. The views on the creation of the visible Cosmos are borrowed from Aristotle, Ptolemy and the Fathers,

1. *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, 12; PG, 94, (912A-980A).

2. *Ibid.* 2, 2(864Df.); see M. Jugie, «Jean Damascène», DTC 8.I (1947), 722-723: Creation).

3. *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, 3 (873AB); 2, 12 (920AB); 4, 13 (1136Cf.).

4. *Ibid.*, 2, 3(865B-873C); see M. Jugie, art. cit. DTC 8.I (1947), 723-24.

5. Angelologie and Demonology (= *Ibid.*, 2, 4 (873C-877C); see M. Jugie, *loc. cit.*).

6. See M. Jugie, *Theol. Dogm. Christ. Orient.*, 2 (Paris 1933), 549-67.

especially Basil, Severian of Cabala, and are interwoven with many Scriptural passages. St. John's Cosmogony⁷ includes a complete summary of ancient Astronomy⁸ and Geography⁹. He devotes a special chapter in *De Fide Orthodoxa* to each of the four elements of which the material Cosmos is constituted; Fire (Chapter 7), Air (Chapter 8), Water (Chapter 9), Earth (Chapter 10).

Before God created man, He established for him, who was destined to rule as king and master over the whole earth, a kingdom, namely paradise, planted in the Garden of Eden¹⁰.

Paradise, according to the Syro-Antiochian school, was considered to be a material locality below the earth, the Alexandrian school took it to be a spiritual entity, but St. John, reconciling these views, assumed paradise to be a spiritual-material place¹¹. He speaks of two paradises, one sensitive, παράδεισος αἰσθητός, a really royal house surpassing all conception of sensible fairness and beauty, for man only, excluding brute beasts¹², which was situated in the east and was higher than all the rest of the earth, πάσης τῆς γῆς ὑψηλότερος κείμενος¹³, and of another intellectual, the residence of mind or soul. For, while in his body Adam dwelt in the sensitive paradise, the most sacred and superbly beautiful place, spiritually he resided in a loftier and far more beautiful place. There he had the indwelling God as a dwelling place and wore Him as a glorious garment, Θεὸν ἔχων οἶκον τὸν ἐνοικον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔχων εὐκλεές περιβόλαιον¹⁴.

Man was created innocent, just, virtuous, free from pain and resplendent with every virtue¹⁵. In determining man's state of original justice, Gregory of Nazianzus is the chief authority, yet although his doctrine on the primitive state of man is very acceptable, it is, by no means, easy to unravel. It goes without saying, the fine distinctions

7. *De Fide Orth.* 2, 5-10 (880A-909D).

8. *Ibid.*, 2, 6-7 (880B-900A).

9. *Ibid.*, 2, 8-9 (900A-908A).

10. *Ibid.* 2, 11 (912A-917D); see M. Jugie, «Jean Damascène», *DTC* 8. 1 (1947), 726.

11. *De F. Orth.* 2. 12 (916BC).

12. Cf. Basil, Sermon on Paradise 2; PG, 30, 64.

13. *De F. Orth.* 2, 11; PG, 94, 912-913.

14. *Ibid.*, col. 916.

15. *Ibid.*, 2, 12; PG, 94, 921A; See M. Jugie, art. cit *DTC* 8. 1 (1947), 724-27: L'homme, sa nature, état primitif, péché originel; G. Bonfiglioli, *Lo stato primitivo e il peccato originale in San Giovanni Damasceno*, in *Sc C* (Milan 1939), 423-450; «La giustizia originale in San Giovanni Damasceno», *id id.*, (Milan 1939), 554-73.

made by modern theologians between the state of pure nature, the state of integral nature and the state of original justice are unknown to him. But what is present in his mind at all times is the historical nature of man as God had created it in the beginning. This notwithstanding, we are able to discover a triple distinction made by St. John, namely first, human nature in its integrity (innocent Adam, τὸ εἶναι), second, an element which is strictly supernatural, namely, participation in divine grace, divinization (θέωσις), and third, that which we call the preternatural gifts (τὸ εὖ εἶναι), conditioned by man's perseverance in God's friendship¹⁶.

Of equal significance is also his distinction between the κατ' εἰκόνα (according to God's image), that is the intellect and free will, τὸ νοερόν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον, and the καθ' ὁμοίωσιν (according to God's likeness), namely the resemblance or likeness of man with God in virtue is possible¹⁷.

The τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα and τὸ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν play a great role in the Damascenian theology as well as in the whole of Greek theology. Both these expressions are not all in all synonymous. The first principally designs the intelligence and free will. And in these mainly supreme abilities is a man God's image¹⁸. The second, τὸ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν refers to the spiritual perfection and the practice of virtues.

The primitive man was ornamented with every virtue, πάσῃ ἀρετῇ κατηγλαϊσμένον, ἐν ἀρεταῖς τέλειον; he was innocent and upright, ἀκακον, εὐθῆ¹⁹. These two elements reunited perform the primitive integrity of human nature. St. John Damascene constantly repeats that virtue, or virtues, are natural in man, and that God imprinted into innocent nature these tendencies towards good, or, in other words, our nature has been endowed by God with virtue²⁰.

Adam according to his pre-fallen nature (=τὸ εἶναι) participated in the life itself of God by grace. St. John Damascene very clearly treats the elevation of man to the supernatural level. Adam was divinized by his union with God, not by transformation in the essence of God, but through participation in its splendor and His illumination, τῇ πρὸς Θεὸν νεύσει Θεοῦμενον· Θεοῦμενον δὲ μετοχῇ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὴν θείαν

16. See M. Jugie, art. cit., DTC 8. 1 (1947), 725.

17. De F. Orth. 2, 12; PG, 94, 920B. Comp. Ibid., 3, 14 (1037C).

18. De duabus volunt., 30; PG, 95, 168B.

19. De F. Orth. 2, 12 (912A); 4, 4 (1108A).

20. Ibid., 2, 30 (972); 3, 14 (1045A).

μεθιστάμενον ούσιαν²¹. He was surrounded with the grace of God as a vestment, τὴν Θεοῦ περιβεβλημένος χάριν²², and he was in close relationship with His Spirit²³.

Certain privileges accompanied the gift of supernatural grace. God, actually, did not give to Adam, only the εἶναι, but He also granted the εὖ εἶναι, τὸ εἶναι δούς, καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι χαρισάμενος²⁴; the royal power on the earth, βασιλεὺς τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς²⁵. These privileges consisted of incorruptibility, ἀφθαρσία, impassibility, ἀπάθεια, and bodily immortality, ἀθανασία. Incorruptibility exempted Adam from bodily necessities, like famine, thirst, sleep; from sufferings and illness; from all that which is subject to the organic circulation, ρεῦσις, τομὴ²⁶. He was not, in other words, subject to the carnal generation that is a perversion of fall because of which Adam, having been mortal, could not enjoy his previous condition, and God made from him a female as a helpmate for him, of his own kind, to aid him in the establishment of the race after the fall by succession through the process of begetting. If Adam did not sin, God would find some other way to multiply the human species²⁷. Such a doctrine is developed by many other Greek Fathers, as Origen, Athenasius, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom.

The ἀπάθεια must be understood as the exemption of concupiscence, of all the trouble-making passions, anxiety, care, etc. Man on earthly paradise had to do nothing other than to praise God, and to enjoy like some one of the angels, in the enjoyment of that one most sweet fruit which is the contemplation of God, and by this he was nourished²⁸. Man, finally, would not ever die if he did not sin since death is a result of fall²⁹.

21. *Ibid.*, 2, 12 (924A).

22. *Ibid.*, 2, 11 (916C); 3, 30 (976).

23. *Ibid.*, 4, 13 (1137B).

24. *Ibid.*; 3, 1 (981A); In Sabbatum Sanctum, II; P.G., 96, 612; In Dormit., 2, 8; PG, 96, 733C.

25. De F. Orth. 2, 12 (921). Comp. *Ibid.*, 2, 30 (976).

26. In Sabb. Sanc., 27; PG, 96 628B; De F. Orth. 2, 12 (917CD).

27. De F. Orth. 2, 30 (976); 3, 24 (1208BD).

28. *Ibid.*, 2, 11 (913-916).

29. *Ibid.*, 2, 12, 30 (921, 977).

CHAPTER II

NATURE OF MAN IN GENERAL

Proceeding in his anthropology, St. John first characterizes man as τὸ πολυθρόύλλητον τοῦτον ζῶον³⁰, and defines him as follows: «Man is a rational mortal animal capable of intelligence and knowledge», Ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν³¹. In this definition of St. John Damascene there are all the necessary and substantial (οὐσιώδη) characteristics of a human being, which excludes at the same time any other kind of existence foreign to humanity, and they cannot absolutely be separated when we define man. It is impossible, for example, to define man as an intellectual being only, or only as a mortal or animal one. In the complete definition of man therefore all the substantial characteristics of a human being must be mentioned, namely sentiment, organic life and intellect, since man is an organical, sensual or emotional and intellectual being³². The general categories of humanity and the essential differences are, then, the elements of such a definition.

Besides this literary definition, St. Damascene gives another one interpreting the word «man», ἄνθρωπος, in an obviously allegorical sense as fire, πῦρ, because only fire, in comparison with the three other physical elements, earth, water, air, has the power to be spread and multiplied in various shapes. So «man» means fire (in Hebrew dialectos), and according to St. Damascene because God foreknew that from one human body would mankind be generated and multiplied on earth³³.

He then deals with the nature of man in general and his intellectual powers. Man consists of two natures, body and soul, and he represents a «small world», a miniature within the larger one, μικρόκοσμον; a link between the visible and invisible substances, φέρον ἐν ἑαυτῷ πάσης οὐσίας ὁρατῆς τε καὶ ἀοράτου σύνδεσμον³⁴; an eye-witness of the visible creation, and an initiate of the invisible creation; ³⁵ αὐ-

30. Hom. in Sabb. sanc. PG, 96, 608Cf.

31. Fons Scientiae, ch. 8 PG, 94, 552Df. Comp. 95, 244AB.

32. Ibid., ch. 5. PG, 94, 541AB.

33. Ined. Oration in 5th day of Creation in «Eccles. Phoros» 1914, pp. 127-8.

34. Hom. in Christ's Transfiguration. PG, 96, 573AB; Comp. De F. Orth. 2, 12; PG, 94, 1064C.

35. Ibid., 2, 12; De duabus in Christo volunt. PG, 95, 144BC.

σθητῆς τε καὶ νοητῆς κτίσεως; a sort of bond between the visible and invisible natures, οἷόν τινα σύνδεσμον τῆς ὁρατῆς τε καὶ ἀοράτου φύσεως³⁶.

These two natures of man in no way can be identified, i. e. mind, νοῦς, cannot be identified with matter, since their origin and end is different - body is mortal, soul immortal, νοερά καὶ ἀθάνατος, λογική, αὐτεξούσιος, θελητική τε and ἐνεργητική³⁷. Therefore, the one who, comparing soul and body, would consider both of the same nature is, according to St. Damascene, s «foolish», ἀνόητος, man³⁸. Mankind, nevertheless, is of one and the same nature as species, εἶδος, not, as hypostasis, ὑπόστασις, since all men together are characterized by the same essential attributes - body and soul: «Ἐπειδὴ πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπιδέχονται λόγον τῆς φύσεως· πάντες γὰρ ἐκ ψυχῆς μετελήφασιν, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ σώματος κέκτηνται, καὶ τὸ κοινὸν εἶδος, τῶν πλείστων καὶ διαφόρων ὑποστάσεων μίαν φύσιν φαμέν. ἐκάστης δηλαδὴ ὑποστάσεως δύο φύσεις ἐχούσης, καὶ ἐν δυοῖν τελοῦσης ταῖς φύσεσι, ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ σώματος»³⁹.

In other words, when man as hypostasis *physiogenitae*, φυσιογενεῖται, he must always be considered as a two natured being — body and soul⁴⁰. Consequently, when people speak of one nature in man, they should speak not on account of the identity of the substantial quality of the body with that of the soul, but on account of the invariability of the individuals falling under the species, since the term «nature» in this case is being taken in the sense of «species»⁴¹. Because of this fact exactly man stands between mind and matter; μέσος νοῦ καὶ ὕλης⁴², and communicates with the visible as well as with the invisible or supernatural world being a «small world», μικρόκοσμος⁴³. The idea of «microcosmos» is one of St. Damascene's basic anthropological conceptions thoroughly developed⁴⁴.

Explaining such a relationship between body and soul St. John considers the spiritual nature of man, on the one hand, as a special honor and blessing of God to him, and his bodily one, on the other hand,

36. De F. Orth. 2, 12. Saying by Gregory of Nazianzus, Sermon 38.44; PG, 36, 321D.

37. Hom. in Sabb. sanc.; PG, 96, 612-13.

38. PG, 94, 1465D. Comp. 94, 1064C.

39. De F. Orth. 3, 3. PG, 94, 992AB.

40. PG, 94, 1465D.

41. De F. Orth. 3, 16.

42. PG, 96, 661CD.

43. De F. Orth. 2, 12. PG, 94, 925CD.

44. Ibid., 2, 12, PG, 94, 925-928; De duabus volunt., 15, PG. 95, 144BC.

as an instrument to realize his higher purpose, the spiritual perfection and divinization. We transfer here the integral passage so meaningful. «Ἐποίησεν...ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πνεῦμα καὶ σάρκα. πνεῦμα διὰ χάριν, σάρκα διὰ τὴν ἔπαρσιν... τὸ μὲν ἵνα μένη καὶ δοξάζῃ τὸν Εὐεργέτην, τὸ δέ, ἵνα πάσῃ, καὶ πάσῃ ὑπομιμνήσκηται, καὶ παιδεύηται τῷ μεγέθει φιλοτιμούμενον· ζῶον ἐνταῦθα οἰκονομούμενον, τοὔτέστιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ μεθιστάμενον, (τοὔτέστιν ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τῷ μέλλοντι. καὶ πέρας τοῦ μυστηρίου, τῆ πρὸς Θεὸν νεύσει θεοούμενον. θεοούμενον δὲ μετοχῆ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὴν θείαν μεθιστάμενον οὐσίαν⁴⁵.

By such an explanation St. Damascene affirms at the same time the purpose of human existence on earth, which lies in his divinization, not, however, by being transformed into the divine substance but by participation in the divine illumination.

So much about man in general. Let us now proceed to the study of St. John's conceptions on the nature of body.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF BODY

A body in general is first of all three-dimensional, that is, having height, breadth, and depth or thickness. Every body is composed of the four elements, but the bodies of living things are composed of the four humors, *χυμοί*⁴⁶. One should note that section, *τομή*, flux, *ρεῦσις*, and change are proper to the body alone⁴⁷. Change is that which is in quality, such as being heated, cooled, and so forth. Flux is an emptying out, for solids, liquids, and the breath are voided and then need to be replaced. Consequently, hunger and thirst are natural sensations, *φυσικὰ πάθη*. Section is the separation of the humors from one another and the division into matter and form, *ἡ τῶν χυμῶν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διαχωρισίς, καὶ ὁ εἰς εἶδος καὶ ὕλην μερισμός*⁴⁸.

Dealing with the human body particularly, St. Damascene physiologizes successfully and in many details about man: «...Man, he writes, is composed of four elements, namely blood, phlegm, bloude and

45. De F. Orth. 2, 12. PG, 94, 921. Comp. Gregory Nazianzen, Sermon 38,11. PG, 36, 324A.

46. De F. Orth. 12, 2, PG, 94, 925B.

47. Comp. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man I. PG, 40, 516C.

48. PG, 94, 928ABf.

black choler. The blood is found in the heart, where the spirit lives; the bloude choler in in the liver and stomach; the black choler in the spleen and psoa, ψόα; the phlegm, finally, is in the brain and ketis; κοίτη. Those who have pure blood are always happy, joyful, healthy, smiling and of a nice colorful face; those who have a bloude choler are nervous, daring, angry, harsh and of a strange color; those who have a black choler are indolent, faint-hearted, sickly, lazy and timid; those who have phlegm are sad, cold, forgetful, of a white face and they always want to sleep»⁴⁹.

Continuing he studies according to changes of these four elements in human organism, the psychology of each period of human life; namely of childhood, adolescence, maturity, and senility. «During childhood, he writes, blood is increasing until the age of fourteen; during adolescence the bloude choler is increasing until the age of twenty-eight; in maturity the black choler is increasing until the age of forty-two; during senility phlegm, is multiplying until the age of eighty. Thus, children, because of the increase of their blood, are earnest and moist, ὑγρά; youth, because of the bloude choler, is warm and dry: mature people, because of their black choler, are cold dry; people of old age finally, because of phlegm, are cold and humid»⁵⁰.

Moreover, St. John Damascene studies the particular members of the human body, especially the head, brain and marrow thinking that the soul and the ὁ βυθός τῶν νοημάτων is in the liver⁵¹. He - as a contemporary physiologist — also places each element of the human body in the proper place of organism⁵².

Of special importance is the following passage, where St. Damascene accepts the body of our pre-generator before falling as conditionally σχετικῶς, immortal, and therefore different from that after his fall, as to its composition and nature; «...Μέσον γὰρ ζωῆς καὶ θνητότητος ὢν τῷ σώματι, πρότερον ὢν ἐν παραδείσῳ τρυφῆς καὶ βασιλικῷ θαλάμῳ ἀναστρεφόμενος, θνητὸν ὕστερον καὶ παχὺ τὸ σῶμα ἐκτῆσατο, δυνάμενον ἀνισχεῖν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους»⁵³.

Regarding the nature and condition of the human body after the fall, he gives a complete and clear picture, as follows: «...Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἐπίκηρος, καὶ τὸ σαρκίαν ρευστὸν καὶ κενούμενον, καὶ ὥσπερ πνεύματος

49. Epistle to someone. PG, 95, 244.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Oration in Fic. PG, 96, 581BC.

53. Ibid., (581BC).

ἐνδεές· ἀναπνοῆς γὰρ ἄνευ ζῆν τῶν ἀμηχάνων, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν οὕτω χρεῶν ἀναπληροῦσθαι τὴν ἐνδειαν. Τρία γὰρ τὰ κενούμενα, ξηρόν, καὶ ὑγρόν καὶ πνεῦμα· ὧν ἐκάστου ἢ κατάλληλος ἀναπλήρωσις συνιστᾶν τὸ δε τὸ σ ὦ μα φυσικῶς πρὸς τοῦ κτίσαντος ὄρισται⁵⁴.

He also physiologizes extensively and at the same time philosophizes on the five senses, the organs of sense, and pleasures ἡδοναί⁵⁵ distinguishing them as spiritual, ψυχικαί, and corporal σωματικαί, as scientific or contemplative and esthetical⁵⁶. He then examines, in general, the phenomenon of grief, fear, and anger⁵⁷ with special attention to sense and the organs of sense⁵⁸ and he agrees with the contemporary philosophers and physiologists regarding his teaching that the brain is the seat of sense and nerves are the means of its communication with sense. Further, he deals with intellect, διανοητικόν, memory, μνημονευτικόν, mental and verbal reason, ἐνδιάθετος καὶ προφορικὸς λόγος⁵⁹, psychologizing according to the old school. So he comes to the ethology on ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον⁶⁰, περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν⁶¹, and τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν⁶².

54. Egomion to St. Chrysostom. PG. 96, 768BC.

55. PG, 94, 929.

56. Ibid. (932-33).

57. Ibid.

58. PG, 94, 933. Comp. Ined. Orat. in Second Day of Creation «Eccles. Pharos» 1914, p. 63.

59. PG. 94, 937.

60. Ibid., (952).

61. Ibid., (956).

62. Ibid., (961)

C. PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER IV

NATURE AND ORIGIN OF SOUL

St. John Damascene defines the nature of soul as follows: «Now, a soul is a living substance, simple and incorporeal, of its own nature invisible to bodily eyes, immortal, reasonable, λογική, intellectual, unshaped, activating an organic body in which it is able to cause life, growth, sensation, and reproduction. It does not have the mind, νοῦς, or spirit, πνεῦμα, as something distinct from itself, but as its purest and finest part, for, as the eye is to the body, so is the mind to the soul. In this part of human psychology, St. John depends noticeably on Maximus the Confessor (d. 622)⁶³, and appears to favor a dichotomy of man distinguishing a spiritual soul and a material body, and to reject the trichotomy of Plato who differentiates a rational soul, νοῦς, an animal soul, ψυχή, and a material body, σάρξ. On the other hand, in his whole psychology he is influenced by Nemesius of Emesa (d. ab. 450), and Maximus the Confessor (d. 662), too. It is free, endowed with will and the power to act, and subject to change, that is, subject to change of will by itself, ἐθελό-
~~τρεπτος~~, because it is also created. And all these it has received according to nature κατὰ φύσιν, through that grace of the Creator by which it has also received both its existence, τὸ εἶναι, and its being naturally as it is, καὶ (τὸ) φύσει οὕτως εἶναι⁶⁴.

Furthermore, he, penetrating in the soul's substance, defines it as an inhaling and exhaling of the air which is breatned in and out for the sustainment of the body, ὀλκὴν καὶ φορὰν τοῦ ἀέρος εἰσελκομένου καὶ προχουμένου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος σύστασιν⁶⁵, as a logical substance and incorporeal quality, which has in itself mind, sense, and reason, οὐσίαν λογικὴν καὶ ποιότητα ἀσώματον, ἔχουσιν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν, καὶ αἴσθησιν, καὶ

63. Maximus Confessor, De anima, PG, 91, 353-62.

64. De F. Orth. 2, 12. PG, 94, 924Bf. Cóm. Ibid., 95, 144 BC; 94, 1005 BC. 176Cf.

65. Ibid., 1, 7 (804-805).

λόγον⁶⁶, as a mind which stands midway between God and the flesh as being a companion of the flesh on the one hand and on the other an image of God, and which holds the middle place between purity of God and the grossness of the flesh, ὡς οὐσίαν ἰσταμένην «ἐν μεταίχμιῳ Θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς τῆς μὲν ὡς σύνοικος, τοῦ Θεοῦ δὲ ὡς εἰκὼν καὶ μεσιτεύουσα Θεοῦ καθαρότητι καὶ σαρκὸς παχύτητι⁶⁷. Regarding the time of the creation of soul St. Damascene rejects the Origen's prattle, φληνάφειαν, the pre-existence of each soul, being thus of the very orthodox and traditional opinion that each soul was created at the same time with its body from nothing, ex nihilo, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. οὐ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον⁶⁸.

According to these definitions of St. Damascene, soul is the «ε γ ό» διανοούμενον, θέλον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον ἐγὼ of the contemporary psychologists, in man, which represents an immaterial principle and spirit governing the whole of human existence. Its manifestations and activities are threefold: intellectual, willing, and sentimental. It acts and is expressed by material as well as immaterial powers, ὀργανικῶ κεκρημένη σώματι, to use the very expression of St. Damascene. Its level of life, nevertheless, is different from the life of body or nature. Soul itself is simple, inseparable and incomposite, while matter is dissolved in materia, by which it was composed. Soul is the source of bodily activities, whereas matter is passive and inactive by its own nature, subject to laws of machine. Soul is of free will and choice, self-governed, unshaped, and always indentical in all the ages of human life, childhood, adolescence, maturity and senility, being conscious and a reminder of itself. Natural life, on the contrary, is a continual change, alternation and transformation.

It is worthy, we think, of mentioning here St. John's conception of the incorporeal of soul. «Things that are incorporeal, invisible and without shape, he writes, we conceive of in two ways. Some are so by essence and some by grace τὰ μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ χάριν; some are so by nature and some by comparison with the grossness of matter. Thus, God is said to be incorporeal by nature, but the angels, evil spirits, and souls are said to be so by grace, χάριτι, and by comparison with the grossness of matter, ὡς πρὸς τὴν τῆς ὕλης παχύτητα⁶⁹. Now, he pro-

66. Fragmenta, Epilepis I. PG, 95, 229-232.

67. De F. Orth. 3, 18. PG, 94, 1073AB.

68. Hom. in Sabb. sac. - PG, 96, 608Cf. Comp. Ibid., 94, 921Af.

69. De F. Orth. 2, 12. PG, 94, 925AB.

ves the immortality of soul by three methods; 1) By the synthetic or demonstrative which proves the matter at hand by means of something intermediary: 2) the analytical and; 3) the mathematical, namely we take the thing asked for granted and thence arrive at something which is acknowledged to be true and from which the proposition is proved. Thus, according to the first method we have the syllogism: «Everything that is perpetually in motion is immortal; the soul is perpetually in motion. Therefore, the soul is immortal»⁷⁰. According to the mathematical method this syllogism: «I take for granted that which has been asked and I say: Since the soul is immortal, there is a reward for its bad and good actions. Now if there is such a reward, then there is that which is passed judgment upon and that which passes judgment. But, if there is that which is judged and that which judges, then there is a provider and a providence. And so we have arrived at providence, which is acknowledged by everyone. From this point on I put things together, *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, and say: Since there is a providence and a dispenser of justice, there are also rewards. And since there are rewards, there is that which is judged. But, if there is that which is judged, then the soul is immortal»⁷¹.

St. Damascene distinguishes the faculties of the soul into two kinds: the cognitive, *γνωστικά*, and the vital, *ζωτικά*. The cognitive faculties are mind, thought, opinion, *δόξα*, imagination, and sensation. Will and choice, on the other hand, are vital, or appetitive, faculties, *ὀρεκτικά*, *ἢ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις*⁷². Elsewhere he divides the faculties of the soul into those belonging to its rational part and those belonging to its irrational part, dealing extensively with their activities and expediency⁷³.

CHAPTER V

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY

One may insist on the opinion that St. John Damascene, especially in the chapter of the relationship between body and soul, the natural and spiritual world, is proved not only as an orthodox theo-

70. *Fons Scientiae*, ch. 64. PG, 94, 656AB.

71. *Ibid.*, ch. PG, 94, 672D.

72. *De F. Orth.* 2, 22. PG, 94, 941-44.

73. *Ibid.*, 2, 12. PG, 94, 928BCD.

gian but also as a great and deep philosopher, like the famous French philosopher Cambanis.

The union of the soul and body in man is considered by St. Damascene, as well as by all the Greek Fathers, as a union by composition, *κατὰ σύνθεσιν γενομένην*, that means a mutual association together—perichoresis, *περιχώρησις* —⁷⁴ of the parts without detriment to any of them, *τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν χωρὶς ἀφανισμοῦ περιχώρησιν*⁷⁵ namely without any confusion nor destruction of their natural idioms, *ιδιώματα*: the perishable and mortality of body, the immortality and imperishable, on the other hand, of soul; the visible of the body, and the invisible of the soul. Thus, even after this union the body is not immortal but corruptible, and the soul is not mortal but immortal. Neither is the body invisible, nor the soul visible to bodily eyes. On the contrary, the latter is rational and understanding and incorporeal, whereas the former is material and visible and irrational⁷⁶.

In spite of the fact that the body and soul do not have the same nature, since they are distinct in substance, *κατ' οὐσίαν ἀντιδιαρούμενα*⁷⁷, it is possible for them, nevertheless, to be closely connected and inseparably united, even after death, for the origin of their existence and hypostasis is always one and the same and the constitution in itself of each at its beginning of being is a hypostasis, *ὡς ... ἀεὶ μίαν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα ὑπάρξεώς τε καὶ ὑποστάσεως*⁷⁸. Moreover, even the characteristic differences of each one of them, those of the soul, which distinguish it from all other souls, and those of the body, which distinguish it from all other bodies, in no wise, according to St. Damascene, separate the soul from the body, but they much more unite and bind them together, at the same time marking of the one hypostasis composed of them from all other hypostasis of the same species⁷⁹.

Elsewhere, in order to emphasize the intensive connection and relationship between the soul and the body, St. Damascene uses natural pictures and examples. So writes: «The soul is united with the body, the entire soul with the entire body and not part for part. And

74. The notion originated with the Cappadocian Fathers. But it is to John Damascene that we owe the application of the term perichoresis to the intertrinitarian particularly relations.

75. *Fons Scientiae*, ch. 65. PG, 94, 661B.

76. *De F. Orth.* 3, 16, PG, 94, 1064AB; *Comp. Ibid.*, (609AB).

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Fons Scientiae*, ch. 66. PG, 94, 665AB.

79. *Ibid.*

it is not contained by the body, but rather contains it, just as heat does iron, and, although it is in the body, carries on its own proper activities, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ συνδέεται τῷ σώματι ὅλη ὅλω, καὶ οὐ μέρος μέρει· καὶ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περιέχει αὐτό, ὡσπερ πῦρ σίδηρον, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ οὔσα τὰς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας ἐνεργεῖ⁸⁰.

There is another passage also where St. Damescene considers the soul as that power which animates, enlivens and mobilizes the body, inactive and dead by its own nature and inseparable instrument of the soul. Thus, describing their relationship he compares the soul with a maker, and the activities of the body as a result of its inspirations and will, σώματος νοερῶς ἐμψυχωμένου τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, with close co-operation of both; ὁ νοῦς γὰρ προθεωρήσας τὸ ἐσόμενον, οὕτω διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐργάζεται. Τῆς ψυχῆς τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ ἡγεμονία· κέχρηται γὰρ καὶ ὡς ὀργάνῳ τῷ σώματι, ἄγουσα τοῦτο καὶ ἰθύνουσα. Soul, therefore, is the ruler and the main cause and source of all inspirations, of scientific discoveries, of virtue and heroism, of education and family training, the two light guider of the spirit and heart⁸¹. There is also another kind of relationship between the soul and the body, that which depends on virtues and spiritual perfection, since the latter is nothing other than a result of the close co-operation of the soul and body, κοινὰ δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ τούτων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναφορὰν, οἷον ψυχῆς προσχρωμένης σώματι⁸² Proper to the soul are religion and understanding, ἴδια δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ εὐσέβεια, καὶ ἡ νόησις. Although the virtues are referred to the soul, yet, in so far as the soul utilizes the body, they are common to both⁸³.

There is, finally, another such kind of relationship according to the five spiritual sensations also: mind, νοῦς, intellect, διάνοια, thought, δόξα, imagination, φαντασία, and sentiment, αἰσθησις⁸⁴. As a result of this relationship is the mutual influence. Thus, since the soul is passible, παθητή, it does feel pain and suffer with the body when the body is hurt, although it itself is not hurt, τοῦ σώματος τεμνομένου, αὐτὴ μὴ τεμνομένη, συναλγεῖ καὶ συμπάσχει τῷ σώματι⁸⁵. Elsewhere he emphatically says that the soul many times does pre-suffer and continually

80. De F. Orth. 1, 13. PG, 94, 853AB.

81. PG, 95, 85B. Comp. col. 145ABC.

82. De F. Orth. 2, 12. PG, 94, 928BC. Comp. 3, 15, PG, 94, 1048Cf., 145AB and De duabus in Christo volunt., 36, PG, 95, 176Cf.

83. Ibid., 2, 12, PG, 94, 928BC.

84. PG, 95, 85BC. Comp. col. 145ABC.

85. De F. Orth. 3, 26. PG, 94, 1093C.

suffer with the body, *προπάσχει πολλάκις τοῦ σώματος, συμπάσχει δὲ διηνεκῶς*⁸⁶.

Concluding the whole chapter we would like to remark the basic characteristics of the soul which, according to St. Damascene, are: Intellectual, νοητική, acute, ὀξύνους, penetrating, διαπεραστική, fertile, γόνιμος, inventive, ἐφευρετική, creative, δημιουργική, free, ἐλευθέρα, independent, ἀνεξάρτητος, autonomous, αὐτόνομος, impressing, ἀσυμπίσστος, untamed, ἀδάμαστος, power⁸⁷.

CHAPTER VI

FREEDOM OF WILL

It is actually true that in the problem of free will especially St. Damascene is shown much more successful and as a profound theologian and thinker in comparison with other Church Fathers.

Of course he always follows, step by step, the previous Patristic tradition but in many points, we think, on his teaching particularly on the moral freedom he inaugurates a personal way of study and solution of the problem.

First, he defines αὐτεξούσιον as the will of a reasonable soul, moving without hindrance towards whatever it wisheth, whether to virtue or to vice, the soul being thus constituted by the Creator, ψυχῆς λογικῆς θέλησιν, ἀκωλύτως κινουμένην πρὸς ὅπερ ἂν βούλοιοτο, εἴτε ἀρετὴν εἴτε κακίαν, οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενομένης⁸⁸; again as the sovereign motion of an intelligent soul, νοεραῶς ψυχῆς κίνησιν αὐτοκρατῆ⁸⁹.

Moreover, man is αὐτεξούσιος in the meaning that he is the master of his actions, κύριος πράξεων, since he is a rational being, and freedom is necessarily connected by nature with reason. Then, mind — the contemplative faculty — or reason — the active faculty — is the principal cause of our actions, ~~ποιεῖται δὲ τούτου τὴν ἀρεσὴν ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ οὐ τὸ εἶστιν ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεω~~⁹⁰. What is more, if man were not master of any action at all, his psychological power of deliberation would be superfluous⁹¹. Making, on the other hand, a clear distinction between

86. PG, 94, 1465CD.

87. PG, 96, 612Cf.

88. Barlaam and Joasaph, PG, 96, 996-97.

89. Ibid.

90. De F. Orth. 2, 27. PG, 94, 960.

91. Ibid., 25 (957C).

the terms προαίρεσις, βουλή, διάθεσις, he attaches; «Choice is desire accompanied by deliberation, or deliberation accompanied by desire for things that lie in our power; for in choosing we desire that which we have deliberately preferred. Deliberation is a motion towards enquiry about actions possible to us; a man deliberateth whether he ought to pursue an object or not. Then he judgeth which is the better, and so ariseth judgement. Then he is inclined towards it, and loveth that which was so judged by the deliberative faculty, and this is called resolution γνώμη, for if he judge a thing, and yet be not inclined toward the thing that he hath judged, and love it not, it is not called resolution. Then, after inclination towards it, there ariseth choise or rather selection ἐπιλογή. For choice is to choose one or other of two things in view, and to select this rather than that. And it is manifest that choise is deliberation plus discrimination βουλή ἐστὶ μετ' ἐπικρίσεως ἢ προαίρεσις, and this from the very etymology. For that which is the «object of choice» is the thing chosen before the other thing. And no man preferreth a thing without deliberation, nor maketh a choice without having conceived a preference. For, since we are not zealous to carry into action all that seemeth good to us, choice only ariseth and the deliberately preferred only becometh the chosen, when desire is added there to. Thus, we conclude that choice is desire accompanied by deliberation for things that lie in our power; in choosing we desire that which we have deliberately preferred. All deliberation aimeth at action and dependeth on action; and thus deliberation goeth before all choice, and choice before all action»⁹².

Then St. John goes on investigating the crucial problem of free will, that is to say, of what depends upon us, which from the beginning ever since was the object of so much discussion and controversy.

He is of the opinion that man is not absolutely free to choose and act good or evil, but such a freedom in man is conditional. At the same time he proves by seven strong arguments and refutations that man by his very nature is, actually, ἀτεξούσιος, and the cause of his own situation and acts, since he has reason, λόγος, and will power, βουλή. «...There are some things, he writes, that depend upon us. And let us proceed as follows. They say that everything that happens is caused either by God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance, or spontaneity. But essence and providence are the work of God, while the mo-

92. Loeb Class. Library, No. 34, Engl. trans. of Barlaam and Ioasaph by G.R. Woodward and H. Mattingly, p. 221,223.

vement of things which are always the same belongs to necessity. And to fate belongs the necessary fulfillment of what it has decreed, for fate also implies necessity. Generation, growth, corruption, plants, and animals belong to nature. The unusual and unexpected belong to chance... Finally, to spontaneity belongs what befalls inanimate things or brute beasts without the intervention of nature or art. All this they themselves maintain. Now, if man is not an effective principle of action, to which of these causes are we to attribute human action? 1) It is definitely wrong ever to ascribe immoral and unjust actions to God; 2) neither can they be ascribed to necessity, for they are not the actions of things which are always the same; 3) nor can they be ascribed to fate, for they declare that the things decreed by fate are not contingent but necessary; 4) nor to nature, for the works of nature are animals and plants; 5) nor to chance, for human actions are not unusual and unexpected; 6) nor yet to spontaneity, for they say that that is spontaneous which befalls inanimate things or brute beasts. Indeed, nothing remains but the fact that man himself as acting and doing is the principle of his own works and is free. 7) What is more, if man is not a principle of action, then his power of deliberation is superfluous, for to that use would he put his deliberation if he were not master of any action at all? All deliberations is on account of action, *πᾶσα γὰρ βουλή, πράξεως ἕνεκα*, and it would furthermore be absurd were the most excellent and noble of the faculties in man to prove useless. Besides, when a man deliberates, he does so on account of action, because all deliberation is on account of and for the sake of action⁹³.

«Free will, he elsewhere writes, is absolutely inherent in every rational nature, *πάση γὰρ λογικῇ φύσει πάντως ἐμπέφυκε τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα*. After all, of what good can rationality be to a nature that does not reason freely; Now, the Creator has implanted a natural *ἐνέσπειρε* appetite in brute beasts which constrains them to act for the preservation of their own nature. For, since they lack reason, they cannot lead; rather they are led by their natural appetite. Whence it is that the instinct to act arises simultaneously with the appetite, for they enjoy neither the use of reason nor that of counsel or reflection or judgement. For this reason they are neither praised and deemed good for practicing virtue nor punished for doing evil. The rational nature, however, has its natural appetite, which becomes aroused, but is guided and controlled by the reason in regard to what is for

the maintenance of the natural order. This, namely free will, is an advantage of the power of reason and we call it a natural motion in the reasoning faculty. Wherefore, the rational nature is both praised and deemed good for practicing virtue and punished for practicing vice»⁹⁴.

Elsewhere again: «Reason will be useless to us, for, if we have no control over any of our actions, then it is useless for us to make our own resolves, περιττῶς βουλευόμεθα. But reason has been given to us so that we may deliberate, which is why every being that is rational is also free πᾶν λογικὸν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον»⁹⁵. Moreover, when we speak of the natural will, θέλησις, we mean, according to our theologian, that it is not constrained but free αὐτεξουσιότης, for, if it is rational λογικὴ καὶ νοερά, it is also free. «... Κατὰ φύσιν ἄρα πρόσεστι τῇ λογικῇ καὶ νοερᾷ (ζωῇ) ἡ αὐτεξούσιος (κίνησις). αὐτεξουσιότης δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἡ θέλησις»⁹⁶. It cannot, however, be considered such a freedom of will τὸ αὐτεξούσιον in man as i m p e c c a b i l i t y, ἀναμαρτησία, since God made him sinless by nature φύσει ἀναμάρτητον, and endowed with freedom of will καὶ θελήσει αὐτεξούσιον». By being sinless, he remarks, I do not mean being incapable of sinning, for only the Divinity is incapable of sinning, but having the tendency to sin not in his nature but, rather, in his power of choice- that is to say, having the power to persevere and progress in good with the help of divine grace as well as having the power to turn from virtue and fall into vice, God permitting τοῦ Θεοῦ παραχωροῦντος because of the freedom of the will. For, that which is done by force is not an act of virtue οὐκ ἀρετὴ γὰρ τὸ βίᾳ γινόμενον»⁹⁷.

Nevertheless, in spite of this fact the freedom of the will constitutes a special honor and attributes an exceptional value to man, for, the one who blames the Creator because He did not make us impeccable is doing nothing other than to prefer the irrational nature from the rational and the inactive and ἀνόρητον from that of choice and active τῆς προαιρετικῆς καὶ ἐμπράκτου»⁹⁸.

Our theologian, then, proceeds systematically determining very clear the extent of the power and activity of free will in man. «Those things depend upon us, he says, which incur blame or praise and in respect to which one may be urged or bound by law and conscience. Pro-

94. Ibid., 3, 18, PG, 94, 1076B.

95. Ibid., 2, 7, PG, 94, 892-93ABC. Comp. Ibid. 27 (960-961 and 952-953).

96. Ibid., 3, 14, PG, 94, 1073AB.

97. Ibid., 2, 12, PG, 94, 924 AB.

98. Sacra Parallela, Title e', PG, 95, 1096BC.

perly speaking, all those things depend upon us which pertain to the soul and about which we deliberate. And it is about contingents $\pi\theta\alpha\nu\delta\epsilon$ that deliberation is exercised. A contingent is that which we can do itself, and of which we can also do the opposite... One should note, he continues, that the choice of things to be done always rests with us, but that their doing is often prevented by some disposition of Divine Providence⁹⁹. This latter thought is absolutely in accordance with his whole conception of a conditional free will in man. Furthermore, studying the relationship between the free will of man and God's providence St. John clearly declares that God foreknows man's thoughts and actions and the events of the future, but He does not predestine them all¹⁰⁰. However, when he says «all», he is referring to those things which do not depend upon us, because those which do depend upon us do not belong to providence, but to our own free will. One should, moreover, note that, while the choice of things that may be done rests with us, the accomplishment of the good ones is due to the co-operation of God, who in accordance with His foreknowledge justly co-operates with those who in right conscience choose good. The accomplishment of bad things, however, is due to abandonment by God, who, again in accordance with His foreknowledge, justly abandons us¹⁰¹. Furthermore, elucidating the problem of free will and divine providence our Father compares the pre-knowing and predestining God with a doctor, who foresees according to his medical and scientific skill the death of a sick man, but in no wise of course is he responsible for that death just because of such a forecast. In the same way we must understand God's foreknowledge in relation with our free will $\tau\delta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\epsilon\zeta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\ \eta\mu\omega\acute{\nu}\ \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\mu\alpha$, which is given to us in order not to be unhappy but to enjoy all the pure pleasures of God's creation¹⁰².

99. Infl. by Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, 37. PG, 40, 949ff. De F. Orth. 2, 26. PG, 94, 957AB.

100. De F. Orth. 2, 29. PG, 94, 968ABC. Ch. 30; Ibid., Infl. by St. John Chrysostom, Hom. I on the Obscurity of the Prophecies 4. PG, 56, 171.

101. De F. Orth. 2, 29. PG, 94, 968ABC. 969B. Comp. col. 853. 969. 972.

102. Dialogue against Manichaens-001-PG, 94, 1577BC. Comp. Ibid., (1544BC).

CHAPTER VII
FALL AND REDEMPTION

Man, by nature endowed with free will, was submitted to a trial and forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge¹⁰³. St. John gives three explanations on the tree of life; one literary (the fruit itself of this tree possessed a life-giving force) which he does not however accept, and two allegorical which please him: the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was nothing other than the decay from the divine contemplation; that material and enjoyable food which, while seeming to be sweet, actually makes the partaker to be a partaker of evil¹⁰⁴. — But the first man was deceived by the devil and came to fall. Sin was followed by punishment, man was excluded from the terrestrial and celestial paradise, was deprived of divine grace and divested of all preternatural gifts: incorruptibility, impassibility and immortality, and subjected to sensuality, concupiscence, labor, suffering and death¹⁰⁵.

Original sin and its results is another theme, so characterizing the conditions of original justice, which draws special attention and a study of St. John. He clearly affirms, like some of his preceding Fathers, the existence of an inherited sin in human nature as a result of Adam's transgression. It is nevertheless important to note that whenever St. Damascene presents the misfortunes of life as a result and inheritance of our progenitors' sin he does not speak of any properly moral dirt and guilt transmitted with life. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans — Chapter V, for example, he interprets its «the «έφ' ᾧ» of verse 12 in a causal sense. «δι' οὗ», and the «ἁμαρτωλοὶ» of verse 19 in the sense of «subjects to death because of the sin»¹⁰⁶. He also makes a clear distinction between the original sin and its penalties characterizing them as ἁμαρτία τοῦ προπάτορος, θάνατος καὶ φθορά, κατάρρα, κατάρσις. Here is a capital passage concerning the above; «... Ἠλευθέρωσε (ὁ Ἰ. Χριστός) τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ προπάτορος, τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς... γεννηθέντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἀδάμ, ὁμοιώθημεν αὐτῷ, κληρονομήσαντες τὴν κατάρρα καὶ τὴν φθοράν...»¹⁰⁷.

103. De F. Orth. 2, 30 (977A).

104. Ibid., 2, 11, PG, 94, 916-917.

105. Ibid., 3, 1 (981A).

106. In Epist. ad Roman., V, 12, 19; PG, 95, 477AB. 481AB.

107. De F. Orth. 4, 13 (1137BC); Comp. De duabus Volunt. 44; PG, 95, 185AB, and 28 (164).

But God, in His goodness and mercy, and in His justice, wisdom and power conceived a plan for the rehabilitation of the human race, namely the Incarnation, a work of divine wisdom and justice¹⁰⁸. This idea, St. John adopted from Gregory of Nyssa¹⁰⁹. God became man to renovate and fortify man's nature, to lead him to eternal life by the practice and teaching of virtue. God's descent *κατάβασις* to earth in the Incarnation was to result in man's ascent *ἀνάβασις* to God in heaven¹¹⁰.

The treatise on Soteriology, that is, the mystery of the redemption, has not been fully developed by our author. But many individual details can be gathered from his works, as they are scattered here and there¹¹¹. Man is in need of a savior who would free him from sin and death, and who, by the holiness of his life, would simultaneously uplift the fallen human race¹¹². Redemption is to be accomplished according to the strict rules of justice¹¹³. Human nature itself was obliged to overcome its enemies of salvation. St. John, particularly, affirms that free will was the first in man, which will suffer because of the original sin, *πρωτοπαθής ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ θέλησις*¹¹⁴; that this sin caused the perdition of divine grace and the privileges of incorruptibility, impassibility and immortality which accompanied it¹¹⁵; that the *καθ' ὁμοίωσιν* attacked the integrity of human nature¹¹⁶. The *κατ' εἰκόνα* itself, however, remained in man even after his fall¹¹⁷. But it was also perverted more or less by the aversion from God and the conversion to creatures of which he so expressively and frequently speaks and which is an inheritance, as we have noted above, in our nature itself¹¹⁸.

Human nature became, actually, sick and so weak that in spite of the conservation of its «libero arbitrio» it could not be restored by itself¹¹⁹. On this basis, the Incarnation of the Son of God became a strict necessity. Death and the devil were destined to forfeit their prey by

108. *Ibid.* 984A.

109. *Orat. Catech.* 22. PG, 45, 60CD; 65BC.

110. *De F. Orth.* 3, 1 (984B).

111. See M. Jugie, art. cit. DTC 8,1 (1947), 736-37; Soteriology; J. Tieron, *Hist. of Dogma* 3 (St. Louis 1926), 486f.

112. *De F. Orth.* 3, 1 (984AC).

113. *Ibid.*, 984A.

114. *Ibid.*, 3, 14 (1041D).

115. *Ibid.*, 2, 28; 3, 1 (961, 981); In *Sabb. sac.*, 7-12, 27; PG, 96, 609-612, 628.

116. *De F. Orth.* 3, 14 (1045A).

117. PG, 95, 97Bf.

118. *De F. Orth.* 2, 30 (977CD).

119. In *ficum arefactum*, I. PG, 96, 576-577,

their attack upon an innocent person¹²⁰. Since it was sin that death had come into the world like some wild and savage beast to destroy the life of man, it was necessary for the one who was to effect a redemption to be sinless and not liable to the death which is due to sin. And it was further necessary for human nature to be strengthened and renewed, to be taught by experience, and to learn the way of virtue which turns back from destruction and leads to eternal life¹²¹.

Objectively, salvation was fully and adequately accomplished by the Savior Jesus Christ Who, as the representative of the human race and absolutely innocent, destroyed the tyranny of Satan, the corruption of death and the servitude of sin. He restored the communion with God and man and renovated the divine image and likeness in man¹²².

St. John, especially, emphasizes, on the one hand, that in the work of our salvation all the attributes of God, namely His goodness, justice, wisdom and power, were made manifest¹²³, and on the other, that all the mysteries of Jesus Christ contributed to such a work¹²⁴; but above all it is the cross and faith alone, which can definitely save us¹²⁵. Original sin caused our spiritual slavery; it submitted us to the malediction und punishment. The role of Christ-Redemptor is dual; He is the victim, and at the same time the pattern and offerer of His own sacrifice, *θῦμα καὶ θύτης*¹²⁶. He was our substitute and replacement, *τὸ ἡμέτερον ἀναδεχόμενος πρόσωπον*¹²⁷. He paid for us the debt due in order to deliver us from condemnation, *ἵνα τὸ καθ' ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποτίσας ὀφλημα*, ἐλευθερώσῃ ἡμᾶς τῆς κατακρίσεως¹²⁸. He assumed our own malediction¹²⁹, and became the propitiation, *ἱλαστήριον*, for our own sins¹³⁰. The sacrifice of the cross was, indeed, a real sacrifice being offered for us to the Father and not to the demon — for God forbade that the Lord's blood should have been offered to the tyrant¹³¹. Thus, the ju-

120. De F. Orth. 3, 1 (984A); 3, 18 (1072C); 3, 27 (1096C-1097A).

121. Ibid., 3, 1 (981).

122. Ibid., 4, 4 (1108BC).

123. Ibid., 3, 1 (984).

124. Ibid. Comp. 4, 13 (1137).

125. Ibid., 4, 11 (1128, 1129).

126. De Imag. Orat. 1, 21. PG, 94, 1253B.

127. De F. Orth. 3, 27 (1093, 1096; In Epist. II an Corinth., V, 22; In Epist. I ad Timoth., II, 26. PG, 95, 736, 737, 1004.

128. De duabus volunt., 44; PG, 95, 485AB; Ibid., 28 (464).

129. In Epist. ad Galat., III, 13, PG, 95, 796.

130. In Epist. ad Rom., III, 24, 25. PG, 95, 464, 465.

131. De F. Orth 3, 27 (1096C); Comp. Homil. in Sabb. Sanct. 25. 36. PG, 96, 624C, 640D.

ridical theory of the demon's rights, and the tradition, originated by Origen and St. Gregory of Nyssa that Christ offered His blood to Satan as a ransom, are rejected by St. John Damascene. On the other hand, with St. Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus, he teaches that Christ gave Himself as an offering to His Father on our behalf¹³². From St. Gregory of Nyssa, however, our theologian retained the theory of the abused human «potentiality», and the image of death and the demon deceived by Jesus Christ. The demon and death, having attempted to gulp down the bait of the body, are pierced by the hook of His divinity. Then, having tasted of the sinless and life-giving body, they are destroyed and give up all those whom they had swallowed down of old¹³³.

As a result of this sacrifice we are restored to liberty; we are made free from the malediction, and united with Jesus Christ¹³⁴. The benefits of such a sacrifice were distributed to all people, to the living as well as to the dead according to their faith. After Christ's expiration on the cross, in fact, the divinized soul of the Savior descended into Hell to preach and bring to those, who were pressed under the shade of death, the message of forgiveness and deliverance. Concerning of way and result of this preaching to those in Hell St. Damascene does not mention anything. He is contented to believe that, as on earth, the announcement of the Gospel is the cause of eternal salvation for the believers, whereas for the unbelievers it is the testimony of their infidelity, in the same analogies the preaching to hell had effected those who were imprisoned there. The faithful souls captivated in hell were delivered¹³⁵. The benefits of the redemptive sacrifice of Christ to living ones are innumerable¹³⁶.

St. Damascene does not omit to point out the forceful and pedagogic role of Christ's holy life. Jesus is, actually, the ideal of all virtues and the perfect holiness. He does not, however, exclude nor overlook the spiritual war against sin and the demon¹³⁷.

132. *Ibid.*, see also *De Imag. Orat.* 1, 24, PG, 94, 1253B.

133. *De F. Orth.* 3, 1 (984); 27 (1096, 1097). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Catecheses* 24; PG, 45, 65A.

134. *In Epist. ad Ephes.*, 1,1 PG, 95, 821.

135. *De F. Orth.* 3, 29 (1101); *De Imag.* 1, 21: PG, 94, 1253B.

136. *De F. Orth.* 4, 4 and 11 (1108-1109, 1128-1129).

137. *Ibid.*, 3, 1, 4, 4, 13 (984, 1108, 1109, 1137C); *Homil. in ficum aeref.*, 1, 2, PG, 96, 576-580.

CHAPTER VIII

PROVIDENCE AND PREDESTINATION

The problem of divine providence and predestination, is, of course, closely connected with the issue of free will previously discussed. St. Damascene, in a special manner, examines the difficulties of this problem in his polemical attitude and writing against the manicheans. His doctrine is sensibly different from the relative theological conceptions of the West. It is based on and closely related with the goodness of God.

Providence, Πρόνοια, is the «care which God takes for existing beings», or «the will of God by which all beings receive proper direction, ἡ ἀγαθὴ αὐτοῦ θέλησις¹³⁸. But St. John asserts also that¹³⁹, «what is within our power remains outside of His providence, and is a matter of our free will. God's knowledge is simple and all-embracing»¹⁴⁰. He knows all future events beforehand, «for in His counsel, God has predestined and infallibly determined all things, before they happen, just as an architect who wishes to build a house, prepares a plan and a blueprint in his mind in advance»¹⁴¹. The problem, how to reconcile God's infallible foreknowledge with the freedom of the creatures. St. John explains by saying that¹⁴², «God knows all things beforehand, but does not predestine all things; He knows beforehand the things, which are within our power, but He does not predestine them». This formula is often repeated, and is strongly reminiscent of Molina's *Scientia media*¹⁴³. A. D'Alés¹⁴⁴ observes that St. Thomas, in the doctrine of predestination, has combined Augustinian and Damascenian concepts. Consequently, it is we ourselves who take the initiative, not God; He forsee our acts, but does not predetermine them by a positive act of His will¹⁴⁵ as we have said. God adapts His providential plan for all

138. De F. Orth. 2, 29 (964A); See M. Jugie, art. cit. DTC 8,1. (1947), 727-30.

139. Ibid., 2, 29 (964C).

140. Ibid., 1, 14 (860C).

141. De Imag. Orat. 1, 10; PG, 94, 1240-41; see De F. Orth. 1,9 (837A); Dial. Contra Manich. 79, PG, 95, 1577.

142. De F. Orth. 2, 30 (972A).

143. See M. Jugie, art. in DTC 8,1 (1947), 719.

144. «Predestination» in DA p. 4 (1922), 227.

145. De F. Orth. 2, 29 (968A).

the world according to His Foreknowledge, *προνοεῖται ὁ Θεὸς κατὰ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν τῶν ἀπάντων*¹⁴⁶.

It is on the basis of this consideration that St. John's concept of predestination, *προορισμός*, is dependent on the merits or demerits of man which God has foreseen. In God, there are two wills, a first will which depends on Him called antecedent and benevolence or approval, *προηγούμενον θέλημα, καὶ εὐδοκία*, by which He wills all to be saved and to attain to His kingdom¹⁴⁷, and a second will which is determined by man, called consequent and permission, *ἐπόμενον θέλημα, καὶ παραχώρησις*, by which He allows the submission sinners to a medicinal and conditional chastisement, *παραχώρησις οἰκονομική*, or to the definitive and absolute one, *παραχώρησις ἀπογνωστική*¹⁴⁸. Predestination or reprobation is, consequently, «post prae-visa merita»¹⁴⁹.

Furthermore, predestination — *προορισμός* — does not mean, according to St. John Damascene, pre-election of the chosen and condemned. It is the eternal judgment, which God has declared for each man after consulting His foreknowledge, namely according to His forevision of merits and demerits, *προορισμός ἐστι κρίσις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐσομένοις*¹⁵⁰. God predestines according to His foreknowledge, *κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αὐτοῦ προορίζει*¹⁵¹.

St. Damascene entirely ignores the absolute predestination of St. Augustine as well as the definitive reprobation, negative or positive, which go before even the forevision of merits and demerits. He knew no other predestination than that which is conditional, preceding and uniting all men¹⁵². This «antecedental» and «universal» predestination is a pure result of the goodness of God, and absolutely gratuitous and free, since God antecedently wills all to be saved and to attain to His kingdom¹⁵³. For, He did not form us to be chastised, but, because

146. *Contra Manich.*, 78, PG, 94, 1576D.

147. Cf. I. Tim. 2, 4.

148. *De F. Orth.* 2, 29 (968. 969A).

149. See Garrigon-Lagrange, *Predestination*, trans. By B. Rose, St. Louis 1939, 57f. 269; 274: 285f.; See P. Synave, «Prédétermination non nécessitante et prédétermination nécessitante», in *RThon* 32 (1927), 74-79.

150. *Contra Manich.*, 78, PG, 94, 1577A.

151. *Ibid.*, 78, 78 (1572C. 1577A).

152. *De F. Orth.* 2, 29 (964); 2, 25 (956-957).

153. Cf. I. Tim. 2, 4.

He is good, that we might share in His goodness. Yet, because He is just, He does wish to punish sinners¹⁵⁴.

St. John proves the reality of divine providence by two principal arguments: 1) By the goodness and wisdom of God¹⁵⁵, and 2) by the immortality of soul, which will, after death, be judged according to its good or evil acts¹⁵⁶. In so far as God alone is good by nature He provides, because one who does not provide is not good. Even men and brute beasts naturally provide for their own offspring, and the one that does not will incur blame. Then, in so far as He is wise He provides for existing things in the very best way¹⁵⁷. Consequently, bearing these things in mind we should admire, praise, and unconditionally accept all the works of providence. And should these appear to be unjust, to a number of people, it is because of the fact that God's providence is beyond knowledge and beyond comprehension, and because to Him alone are our thoughts and actions and the events of the future known. As His substance and His will are incomprehensible, in the same way His providence, too. God revealed and permitted only that which is necessary for our benefit and salvation¹⁵⁸.

From all that has been said it is obvious, we think, that free will is not generally prevented by God's foreknowledge since He foreknows the things that depend upon us, but He does not predestine them because neither does He will evil to be done nor does He force virtue. And so, predestination is the result of the divine command made with foreknowledge. Those things which do not depend upon us, however, He predestines in accordance with His foreknowledge¹⁵⁹. For, through His foreknowledge, He has already decided all things beforehand in accordance with His goodness and justice¹⁶⁰.

Man, therefore, is free by his very nature to choose and practice good or evil, even though without God's co-operation and assistance we are powerless either to will good or to do it¹⁶¹. Moreover, it depends upon ourselves whether we are to persevere in virtue and be guided by

154. *Ibid.*, 2, 29 (964C).

155. *Ibid.*

156. *Dial.*, 68; PG, 94, 672-673.

157. Cf. Nemesius. *On the Nature of Man*, 44; PG, 40, 813.

158. *De F. Orth.* 2, 29 (964C, 968B); *Contra Manich.*, 74, 77 (1572-73, 1576).

159. *Infl. by Acts St. Maximus*—PG, 90, 137.

160. *De F. Orth.* 2, 29; PG, 94, 964C.

161. *Ibid.*, 2, 30, PG, 94, 969f.

God Who invites us to practice it; or whether we are to abandon virtue, which is to become attached to vice and be guided by the Devil, who without forcing us, is inviting us to practice vice.

Ending the chapter it must be noted that in the analysis of the doctrine of divine providence, St. John faithfully follows the school of Nemesius, about one third of whose treatise has found its way into the *De Fide Orthodoxa*.

CHAPTER IX

GRACE AND SALVATION

We have already developed the Damascenian thought concerning man's freedom to choose and do good or evil. This freedom is indispensable, gratuitous and foreign to any prejudiced grace offered by God to all, since He sincerely wills that all men be saved and consciously know His truth¹⁶². Consequently, salvation depends mostly on man. Man is free to accept or refuse the divine offering. Our author does not, however, incline towards Pelagianism. On the contrary, he recognizes the radical incapacity and weakness of human nature to achieve salvation by itself only¹⁶³. He also declares the absolute necessity of divine grace to operate good and realize salvation. But let us explain here that he never considered, like all Greek Fathers, such a necessity in the same way as it was later developed in the West. He ignores namely the absolute effectiveness of grace by itself in the sense of St. Augustine; in other words, he ignores the absolute predestination and pre-election — *ante praevisa merita* — and the negative and positive pre-reprobation — *ante praevisa peccata*. In this way, we must understand his spirit when he writes; «Salvation does not come from men, and virtue is not rooted in human forces, «Οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἡ σωτηρία· οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως ἡ ἀρετή¹⁶⁴; «Without God we are unable to do or to possess any good», οὐ δυνάμεθα ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν οὐδέν, ἢ ἔχειν ἀγαθόν¹⁶⁵. And elsewhere: «ἀλωτὰ γὰρ ἐπιμελεία καὶ πόνος γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἅπαντα, καὶ πρὸ πάντων καὶ μετὰ πάντα, τῇ τοῦ διδόντος Θεοῦ χάριτι¹⁶⁶. In order to triumph over carnal concupiscence, divine grace is, espe-

162. John 8, 32.

163. Homily in ficum aref., I. PG, 96, 576-577.

164. Ibid., 3 (581C).

165. De Imag. Orat. 3, 31; PG., 94, 1349C.

166. Dialect., I, (532A. De F. Orth. IV, 17 (4176C).

cially, necessary. «God encourages the law of our spirit in order to overcome the law of our carnal members. This encouragement we may obtain through prayer; but it is the Holy Spirit who hears us praying. Without patience and prayer — which are activities of grace in us — it is impossible to accomplish the commandments of the Lord, ἀδύνατον εἶ μὴ δι' ὑπομονῆς καὶ προσευχῆς τὰς ἐντολάς τοῦ Κυρίου κατεργάσασθαι¹⁶⁷. Elsewhere he repeats the same doctrine saying that the two great means of salvation at our disposal are to be strong by love and prayer through humility avoiding the occasions of sin¹⁶⁸.

He frequently insists on the necessity of the concomitant grace in operating our salvation. So, salvation is a result of the evidence of our free choice and co-operation, on the one hand, and of divine concurrence, on the other. Even before his fall Adam needed divine grace in order to progress in good.¹⁶⁹ He nevertheless believes that good and evil depend principally on our free will, and for those who, with good conscience elect good, the concurrence of God is also necessary in order to realize the good choice¹⁷⁰. «To be good depends on God and us. God gives us existence and virtues. Our role is to safeguard both these goods. Consequently, we ourselves are responsible in losing them; «Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ Θεοῦ μόνου· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἡμῶν¹⁷¹. Of course, God offers us τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι and the εἶναι but the latter depends basically on us; we may lose or refute it; τὸ μὲν εἶναι οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν λαβεῖν· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν»¹⁷². The most complete formula and prescription of his teaching on «active» grace is the following; «It must be known that virtue is given to human nature by God, and He Himself is the source and the cause of all goods. Without His support and co-operation we cannot will or do good. But it depends on us to remain in virtue and to follow God, Who urges us in such a purpose; it depends still on us to be removed from God and virtue, and to follow the demon, who provokes us to sin but without violating us¹⁷³. It is, therefore, impossible according to St. Damascene, as for all Greek Fathers, for an effective grace to exist independently

167. De F. Orth., 4, 22 (1200-1201).

168. Contra Manich. 86 (1584).

169. De F. Orth 2, 12 (924AB).

170. Ibid., 2, 29 (968A). Comp. Laudat. S. Joan. Chrysostomi, 4, 5, PG, 96, 765D, 768AB; De Imag. Orat. 3, 33; PG, 94, 1352B.

171. Contra Manich. 70, PG 94, 1569AB.

172. Ibid., 72 (1572A).

173. De F. Orth. 2, 30 (972-973). Comp. De duabus volunt., 19, PG, 95, 149B.

from human free will. We ourselves, by our own free will and choice, are the artisans of our eternal destination. Our participation in salvation, even very limited¹⁷⁴ lies in tendering promptly our hand in order to receive the gifts of God which He amorously distributes to us, π ᾶ σ ι β ρ ὀ ς τ ᾶ ἄ γ α θ ᾶ ὁ ποθῶν λαμβάνει¹⁷⁵. The one who does not want to receive them is the cause of his own condemnation, ὁ μὴ θέλων λαβεῖν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ αἷτιος¹⁷⁶. He also urges without any contradiction: «Let us try to do good and become good in order to be listed in the number of those who are recognized as good and predestined for eternal life»¹⁷⁷. It depends, actually, on us to be registered by the divine foreknowledge in the list of the chosen, τὸ προγινῶναι ἃ μέλλομεν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ἡμῶν¹⁷⁸.

It is obvious now why St. John Damascene insists also on the necessity of good works for the salvation of man. Having been justified and regenerated through Baptism we must preserve this condition by good works. Faith without good works is a dead faith; the true faith is recognized by works¹⁷⁹. Faith, however, comes first¹⁸⁰.

In the difficult problem of grace and free will, St. John appears to favor the view of the Molinists.

CHAPTER X

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Of special interest and originality is the theologico-philosophical teaching of St. Damascene about the origin and nature of evil. Evil itself does not exist. It is not a substance nor hypostasis but it is a voluntary privation of good, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθόν, ὑπαρξίς, καὶ ὑπάρξεως αἷτιον. τὸ δὲ κακόν, ἀγαθοῦ, ἦτοι ὀ π ᾶ ρ ῥ ῥ ε ω ς σ τ ῆ ρ η σ ι ς¹⁸¹. St. Augustine and St. Thomas are of the same opinion. It is παρῦπόστασις and συμβεβηκόσ¹⁸²;

174. Com. on epist. ad Romanos, VIII, 25; PG, 95, 508C.

175. Contra Manich., 74, PG, 94, 1573A.

176. Ibid., 70, 1568D.

177. Ibid., 80, 1580B.

178. Ibid., 79, 1577B.

179. De F. Orth. 4,9 (1121C). Comp. Homil. in ficum aref., 6, PG. 96, 585-588.

180. Laudatio Joannis Chrysostr., 5, PG, 96, 768B. Comp. Comment. in epist. ad Philipp., 4, 8. PG. 95, 880.

181. De F. Orth. I, 12; PG. 94, 848B.

182. Dial. Contra Manich. 64, PG, 94, 1560BG. De Imag. Orat. 2, col. 1285GD.

ἀποβολή καὶ στέρησις ἐκ οὐσίων τῶν ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τῇ λογικῇ φύσει δεδωρημένων ὡσπερ πενία πλούτου ἀποβολή¹⁸³. It is, moreover, nothing other than the absence of good, precisely, like darkness is the absence of light¹⁸⁴, φυγή καὶ ἀναίρεσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ¹⁸⁵. Since our nature has been endowed by God with virtue only, from the beginning¹⁸⁶, and virtue is natural and implanted in all men by the Creator, φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἐμφυτευθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ¹⁸⁷ good ἀγαθὸν called so παρὰ τὸ ἄγαν θεῖον πάντα πρὸς αὐτὸ¹⁸⁸ or virtue ἀρετὴ constitutes the best order and the normal condition of human nature, τάξις, ἀρίστη, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον διασώζουσα, while evil represents disorder, ἡ τῆς τάξεως λύσις, εἶγουν ἀταξία¹⁸⁹. «...The virtues are natural, writes our Theologian, and they also are naturally imherent, ἐνυπάρχουσιν, in all men, even though all of us do not act naturally, τὰ τῆς φύσεως. For, because of the fall, we went from what is according to nature, ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, to what is against it, εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν. But the Lord brought us back to what is according to nature — for this is what is meant by «according to his image and likeness»¹⁹⁰. «Now, asceticism and the labors connected with it were not intended for the acquisition of virtue, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐπικτησασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὡς ἔξωθεν ἐπέισακτον οὔσαν as of something to be introduced from outside, but for the expulsion, of evil which has been introduced and is against nature..., ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἐπέισακτον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κακίαν ἀποβαλέσθαι — just as the steel's rust, which is not natural but due to neglect, we remove with hard toil to bring out the natural brightness of the steel»¹⁹¹. From this standpoint virtue or good, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, is naturally desirable, φύσει ἐστὶν ἐραστὸν καὶ ἐφετόν· οὐ φυσικῶς πάντα ἐφίεται. On the contrary, evil is a desire against nature, ἡ παρὰ φύσιν ἐφεις, τουτέστιν, ὅταν ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὸ φύσει ἐφετόν ἐφιέμεθα¹⁹²; it is also an abuse of our natural powers, and of the law of God, τὸ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸν νόμον (τοῦ Θεοῦ) κεχρηῆσθαι, ταῖς φυσικαῖς δυνάμεσιν. δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἡμέτερον ἐπιτήδευμα;¹⁹³ τὸ τῷ μὴ ὄντι (κακὸν) ὡς ὄντι (ἀγαθὸν) χρή-

183. Ibid., 14; PG, 94, 1517ABf.

184. De F. Orth. 2, 30; PG, 94, 973A; 2, 4 (876AB).

185. De S. Ieunias A' PG, 95, 65AB.

186. De F. Orth. 2, 30; PG, 94, 972Af.

187. PG, 96, 1037Cf.; Comp. De F. Orth. 3, 20; PG, 94, 1081B; 3, 14 (1045A)

188. Dial. c. Manich., 64, PG, 94, 1560B.

189. Contra Manich., 47; PG, 94, 1548D.

190. Gen. I, 26.

191. De F. Orth. 3, 14, P.G 94, 1045AB.

192. Dial. c. Manich., 64, PG, 94, 1560BC.

193. Ibid., 14, (1520).

σασθαι. τὸ μὴ παρέχειν ἐκάστῳ τὰ ἴδια. ἴδια ἐκάστῳ τὰ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ ὀριζόμενα¹⁹⁴.

Consequently, when we persevere in what is according to nature we are in a state of virtue, but when we abandon what is according to nature, that is to say, virtue, we come to what is contrary to nature and become attached to vice and evil¹⁹⁵.

Furthermore, our Father, penetrating the nature and origin of evil, maintains that evil presupposes good, connected always with some considered good, νομιζόμενον ἀγαθὸν since, as he profoundly writes: «Πάντων καὶ τῶν κακῶν, ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα καὶ ὅσα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πράττομεν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποθοῦντες· οὐδεὶς γὰρ εἰς τὸ κακὸν ἀποβλέπων, ποιεῖ ἄπερ ποιεῖ»¹⁹⁶.

St. Damascene absolutely refutes the manichean dualism in his great Discourse with the manicheans¹⁹⁷ of which a summary is given in book IV of his *De Fide Orthodoxa*¹⁹⁸. He makes an allusion to the so called, by philosophers, «metaphysical evil», common in all creatures since they are all imperfect¹⁹⁹. But he constantly speaks of moral evil, of sin, which he defines as a voluntary deviation and a lapse from what is agreeable with nature to what is against it;²⁰⁰ for, sin is not natural and it was not implanted in us by the Creator. On the contrary, it grew up in our will from the oversowing of the Devil, freely and not prevailing over us by force, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐπισποράς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ προαιρέσει ἐκουσίως συνισταμένη, οὐ βία ἡμῶν κρατοῦσα²⁰¹. It is a discovery of the devil; an invention of the free will of the Devil. Then, is the Devil evil? No, essentially and naturally, St. John answers. As the Devil was made he was not evil, but good, because he was created as a shining and most bright angel by the Creator, and free because rational. And the freely departed from his natural virtue, fell into the darkness of evil, and was removed far from Good, the only Good and the only Giver of life and light. For, from Him every good has its goodness, and in proportion as one is removed from Him in will — not, of course, in place — one becomes evil²⁰². Physical evil and misfortunes

194. *Ibid.*, 60 (1552D).

195. *De F. Orth.* 2, 30 (969f.).

196. *Dial. c. Manich.*, 64, 1560BC.

197. Especially, PG, 94, 1508BCD.

198. Ch. 10-21; PG, 94, 1191-1198.

199. *Dial. c. Manich.*, PG, 94, 1562C.

200. *De F. Orth.* 4, 20 (1196C).

201. *Ibid.*, 3, 20 (1081BC).

202. *Ibid.*, 4, 20 (1196D). *Comp. PG*, 96, 908AB.

are the consequences of sin. Their real cause is sin since it is sin that provokes punishment. It is the sin of Adam which caused the misfortunes and pain of man's life²⁰³. In other words, the cause of punishment is not God, but the sinner himself who compels God — just and good — to punish him and who is also worthy of a proper penalty according to his wicked will²⁰⁴. Moreover, physical evil is nothing other than an apparent and eminent benefit. Punishment itself is good, *καλὸν ἢ κόλασις*²⁰⁵. The trial, pain, and sufferings of this life are, for the just, a source of conversion and salvation. God knows how to draw much more benefit from them²⁰⁶.

But why does God permit moral evil? Why did He create human beings if He foreknew their fall?

To such difficult questions actually St. Damascene also gives a — more or less — satisfactory dual answer: 1) God created human beings in spite of foreknowing their deviation and fall because of His infinite mercy and goodness first of all²⁰⁷; also because He is not the cause of evil but of man's free will²⁰⁸. 2) Because He nevertheless knows how to produce good from evil, and how to make it the servant of salvation and spiritual perfection²⁰⁹. Besides, because His will, for which God wished the creation of man, is more than good, *ἀγαθὸν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὑπεράγαθον, καὶ τὸ τούτου θέλημα*²¹⁰, and the sinner is always under the manifestation of the goodness of God, who continues after the act of creation to benefit him by His merciful and wise providence²¹¹. Thus, He often permits even the just man to meet with misfortunes so that the virtue hidden in him may be made known to others, as in the case of Job²¹². ~~At other times, He permits something iniquitous to be done so that through this apparently iniquitous action some great and excellent thing may be brought about, as was the salvation of men by the Cross.~~

203. *Ibid.*, 3, 20 (1081Bf.).

204. *Dial. c. Manich.*, 37, 79, 81-82; *PG*, 94, 1544C. 1577. 1580-81. 1573BC.

205. *Ibid.*, 49 (1549B). *Comp. col.* 1548, 1581. *De F. Orth.* 4, 19 (1193).

206. *Ibid.*; *Comp. De F. Orth.* 2, 29 (965).

207. *De F. Orth.* 2, 29 (968B). *Comp.* 4, 21 (1084Bf.).

208. *Ibid.*; also 3, 20 (1081Bf.); 4, 21 (1084B).

209. *Ibid.*, 2, 29 (968AB); *Comp.* 4, 19 (1193).

210. *Ibid.*, 4, 22 (1197C).

211. *Ibid.*, 2, 29; 4, 21 (965. 1197); *Contra Mz nich.*, 32-34, 69 (1540. 1568).

212. *Cf. Job.* 1, 12; *cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man*, 44, *PG.* 40, 812A.

In still another way, He permits the devout man to suffer evil either so that he may not depart from his right conscience or so that he may not fall into presumption from the strength and grace that have been given him, as in the case of Paul²¹³. Someone may be abandoned for a while for the correction of others so that by observing his state they may be instructed, as in the case of Lazarus and the rich man²¹⁴. For, we are naturally humbled when we see the sufferings of others. Someone may also be abandoned not because of his own sins or his parents' but for the glory of another, as was the man born blind for the glory of the Son of Man²¹⁵. Again, someone may be permitted to suffer as an object of emulation for others so that because of the greatness of the glory of the one that suffered they may, without hesitation, accept suffering in hope of future glory and with a desire for the good things to come, as in the case of the martyrs. A person may even be allowed at times to fall into an immoral action for the correction of another and worse affliction. For example, a certain person is conceited about his virtues and righteousness, and God permits him to fall into fornication so that by his fall he may become conscious of his own weakness, be humbled, and, drawing nigh, confess to the Lord²¹⁶. Furthermore, during the present life there is an economy, *οικονομία*, a government, *κυβέρνησις*, and an ineffable providence, *πρόνοια ἄρρητος*, of God urging sinners to conversion and repentance²¹⁷. Parts of such an ineffable providence are the so-called, by St. John, «abandonment by dispensation and for our instruction and salvation», *ἐγκατάλειψις οικονομική καὶ παιδευτική*, and the «absolute abandonment», *ἐγκατάλειψις τελεία καὶ ἀπογνωστική*. That abandonment is by dispensation and for our instruction which happens for the correction, salvation, and glory, of the one who experiences it, or which happens either to give others an object for emulation and imitation, or even for the glory of God. On the other hand, there is absolute abandonment, when God has done everything for a man's salvation, yet the man of his own accord remains obdurate and uncured, or rather, incorrigible, and is then given over to absolute perdition, like Judas; ἡ δὲ τελεία ἐγκατάλειψις, ὅτε τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα τὰ πρὸς

213. Cf. 2 Cor. 12, 7.

214. Cf. Luke 16, 19ff.; Nemesius, loc. cit.

215. Cf. John 9, 3; Nemesius, loc. cit.

216. De F. Orth. 2, 20 (965ABC); It must be noted that all these kinds of divine permission are supplied, obviously, from Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, 44, PG, 40, 812Aff.

217. Contra Manich., 75, PG, 94, 1573B.

σωτηρίαν πεποιηκότος, ἀνεπαίσθητος, καὶ ἀνιάτρευτος, μ ἄ λ λ ο ν δ ἔ ἀ-
νίατος, ἐξ οἰκείας προθέσεως διαμείνη ὁ ἄνθρωπος· τότε
παράδίδοται εἰς τελείαν ἀπώλειαν, ὡς ὁ Ἰούδας...»²¹⁸.

As we come to a close we should sum up the Damascenian thought and teaching concerning this difficult problem. Evil is no more than a negation of good²¹⁹, and a lapse from what is natural to what is unnatural, for there is nothing that is naturally evil. Now, as they were made, all things that God made were very good²²⁰. So, if they remain as they were created, then they are very good. But, if they freely withdraw from the natural and pass to the unnatural, then they become evil. All things, then, by nature serve and obey the Creator. So, whenever any creature freely rebels and becomes disobedient to Him Who made him, he has brought the evil upon himself. For evil is not some sort of a substance, nor yet a property of a substance, but an accident, that is to say, a deviation from the natural into the unnatural, which is just what sin is²²¹. Moreover, the real cause of sin is not our body, since the dead body never can sin, but our soul and free will. Τὸ σῶμα νεκρὸν κείμενον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς²²². And elsewhere: Αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ἁμαρτία, οὐ φυσική ἐστίν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ ἡμῖν ἐνσπαρεῖσα ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐπισποραῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ προαιρέσει ἐκουσίως συνισταμένη οὐ βία ἡμῶν κρατοῦσα»²²³.

CHARACTERIZATION

St. John Damascene is the last great Church Father of the (early Patristic) East, the classic dogmatician of the Greek Church²²⁴. He endeavored to present a clear and systematic survey of a great dogmatic tradition which could embody the theology of seven centuries. His work thus contains a sort of a «Library of Church Fathers» consisting

218. De F. Orth. 2, 29 (968AB) (969A).

219. Cf. Basil, That God Is Not Author of Evils; PG, 31, 341B.

220. Cf. Gen. I, 31.

221. De F. Orth. 4, 20 (1196); Comp. Contra Manich., 14 (1517); also De Imag. Orat. 2 (1285GD).

222. Contra Manich., 29 (1533CD).

223. De F. Orth. 3, 20 (1081BC).

224. See J. Langen, John von Damaskus, Gotha 1879, 6-14; O. Bardenhewer, Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur 5 (Freiburg I. Br. 1932), 51f.

of a short and concise outline of the immense wealth of theological material²²⁵. Macarius, Metropolitan of Ancyra, puts it correctly when he states²²⁶: «When I mention the Damascene, I have mentioned the names of all doctors and theologians, for he is the mouth and interpreter of them all».

His favorite authority was Gregory of Nazianzus, especially for the doctrine on the Trinity, but he has made very extensive use of a great variety of Greek Fathers: Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, Nemesius of Emesa, Epiphanius, Cyril of Alexandria, Cyril of Jerusalem, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Eulogius of Alexandria, Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus the Confessor, etc. Of the Western Fathers, he quotes only from Pope Leo the Great and Ambrose²²⁷.

St. Damascene borrowed also from an anonymous work, *De Sacrosancta Trinitate*²²⁸, dealing with God and Christology, and listed among the works of Cyril of Alexandria. The latter treatise is, in the opinion of O. Bardenhewer²²⁹ an important source of the *De Fide Orthodoxa* rather than an extract of it. In addition, F. Diekamp²³⁰ has shown that the Damascene made exten-

225. See D. Stiefenhofer, in his German trans. of the *De Fide Orthodoxa*, BKV 44 (2nd ed. Kempten-Munich 1923), VIIIff.

226. See *Contra Barlaam* 35. PG, 94, 129f-Prolegomena 4.

227. See D. Stiefenhofer, op. cit. XXVI; see C. Chevalier, *La Mariologie de Saint Jean Damascène*, in *OrChrAn* 109 (Rome 1936), 40ff., gives a tentative list of Fathers quoted by St. John; he remarks that such a list is necessarily incomplete; when in the first Greek and Latin edition of the *De Fide Orthodoxa* (Basel 1546). J. Chlichtovens (d. 1543), intended to mark on the margin of this edition, the respective passages of Fathers to which St. John makes allusion, it proved to be an impossible task; D. Stiefenhofer, in his German translation of the *De Fide Orthodoxa*, BKV 44 (2nd ed. Kempten-Munich 1923) has marked the so-called borrowed quotations in italicized print, indicating their respective origin in the footnotes. C. Chevalier, op. cit. (Rome 1936), 43, points out the almost total absence of references from heretical authors whose heresies St. John refutes. Undoubtedly, he knew the writings of Nestorius, Eutyches, Theodor of Mopsuestia, etc., but he has reference only to Origen's *De Principiis*; nor is there any mention made of the works of the Semi-Arian Bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, most of which must have been still available to St. John.

228. PG, 77, 1119-74.

229. O. Bardenhewer, op. cit., pp. 47-48; See J. De Guibert, *Une source de saint Jean Damascène*, in *RechSR* 3 (1912), 356-68.

230. F. Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi*; Münster i. W. 1907; see M. Grabmass, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode I* (Freiburg I, Br. 1909), 115f.

sive use of a dogmatic Florilegium or Catena (Σειρά), such as grew to be popular in the East by the seventh and eighth centuries. Its title is: *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi*, the author of which, in all probability, is Anastasius Sinaïta (630-700)²³¹. In his Commentaries of the Epistles of St. Paul²³² and Sacred Parallela²³³, St. John does not of course present any personal contribution. But it is with reference to his chief dogmatic work, the *De Fide Orthodoxa*, as well as in view of his homiletical and polemical writings, that the opinions of O. Bardenhewer²³⁴ and M. Jugie²³⁵ are growing to become the accepted views.

St. John's theology is not, moreover, a mere compilation but bears the stamp of originality and of his own personal genius. He is said, for this reason, to be the «first and last theologian» of the Greek Church²³⁶; «a forerunner of scholasticism and the first scholastic»²³⁷. He could not escape the necessity of representing the traditional views of the past, and he has shown a remarkable talent in arranging the immense wealth of theological truth in a briefly condensed *Summa*, as unique as it is original, because the *De Fide Orthodoxa* covers a

231. See F. Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum ...* (Münster i. W. 1907), LXXXVII.

232. PG. 95, 441-1034; note that this exegetical *Summa* of the Epistles of St. Paul is paralleled by the dogmatic *Summa* of the *De Fide Orthodoxa*, and by the ascetical and mystical *Summa* of the *Sacra Parallela*.

233. See PG, 95, 1039-1588; 96, 9-442.

234. See O. Bardenhewer, *Gesch. d. altkirchl. Lit.* 5 (Freiburg I. Br. 1932), 51f. «It would be eminently erroneous to conclude that his faithful adherence to tradition and to the authority of the Greek Fathers has detracted from his originality and independence. St. John is, in reality, a very capable systematizer».

235. See M. Jugie, «Jean Damascène», *D T C* 8. 1 (1947), 708; he says of the *De Fide Orthodoxa*: «qui n'est pas une compilation, mais une resumé bien personnel de l'enseignement des Pères grecs sur les principaux dogmes chrétiens, dénotant un travail intense d'assimilation et un effort génial pour condenser en une langue ferme, claire et précise les vérités révélées;» see also J.F. De Groot, *Conspectus Historial Dogmatum ab aetate PP. apostolicorum usque ad saec. XII*, 2 (Rome 1931), 354ff.

236. See Rauschen-Wittig, *Patrologie* (Freiburg I. Br. 1921), 312; B. Steidle, *Patrologia* (Freiburg I. Br. 1937), 218f.; B. Altaner, *Patrologia* (trans. by A. Ferrua, 3rd ed. Turin 1944), 368f.

237. See O. Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, p. 51; F. G. Holweck, *A Biographic Dict. of the Saints*, St. Luis 1924, 536; F. H. J. Grundlehner, *Johannes Damascenus*; *Academisch Proefschrift*, Utrecht 1876, 257.

wide sweep of dogma, philosophy, ethics, apologetics, exegesis, patristics and history. M. Jugie knows of no work of any Byzantine theologian that could equal or compare with the *De Fide Orthodoxa* of John Damascene²³⁸. In the view of J. Lupton²³⁹, it is in some respects one of the most important works that have come down to us from christian antiquity; for it is the first complete Body of Divinity that we possess, and as such had an influence that cannot easily be measured on the theology of the West». De Régnon²⁴⁰ does not exaggerate when he asserts «that the day will come when, in order to cement the union between East and West, the Church will place into our schools the *Fons Scientiae* of John Damascene alongside with the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas», an opinion fully accepted by M. Jugie, the renowned orientalist²⁴¹. In the opinion of A. Harnack «the work of John Damascene has become a foundation for medieval theology»²⁴². Of the same opinion is J. Bach²⁴³, J. Langen²⁴⁴ and V. Ermoni²⁴⁵ have extensively treated the subject of the Damascene's influence on medieval scholasticism. But the opinion that John Damascene was «the first, or one of the first, of the long line of Aristotelians»²⁴⁶ is not tenable.

In a monograph on Leontius of Byzantium, F. Loofs supports the view that Leontius is the first among the Greek Fathers to employ Aristotelianism for the exposition of Christian dogma, in contradistinction to earlier Christian writers who were mainly under the influence of the Neo-Platonic school²⁴⁷. But against Loofs's thesis, J. P.

238. M. Jugie, *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium* 2 (Paris 1933), 6.

239. J. Lupton, *St. John of Damascus*, London 1882, 70.

240. Th. de Régnon, *Etudes de théologie positive sur la sainte Trinité*, 4 (Paris 1898), 54.

241. M. Jugie, «Jean Damascène», *DTC* 8. 1 (1947), 551.

242. A. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* (4th ed. Tübingen 1909), 260.

243. J. Bach, *Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters von christologischen Standpunkt I* (Vienna 1873), 49f.

244. J. J. Langen, *Johannes von Damaskus; eine patristischen Monographie* (Gotha 1879), 9ff.

245. V. Ermoni, *St. Jean Damascène, (La Pensée Chrétienne)*, Paris 1904, 141ff.

246. See A. Fortescue, *The Greek Fathers* (London 1908), 202.

247. F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche, Texte und Untersuchungen* 3.1. and 2 (Leipzig 1887), 60.

Junglas attempts to prove that the distinction of the Fathers into Platonists and Aristotelians is acceptable only in a very general sense; in reality, matters are far more complicated than they appear at first sight²⁴⁸. J. Langen²⁴⁹ points out that in his *Dialectica*, Damascene has copied both from Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*. In fact, the Damascene himself classifies his method as *eclectic* when he repeatedly insists on the inadvisability of following the «outsiders», ἔξω σοφοί, that is, the pagan philosophers, counselling us to act as an experienced money changer who knows how to sift genuine from counterfeit gold²⁵⁰. St. John decidedly disapproves of the idea of honoring Aristotle as a «Thirteenth Apostle»²⁵¹. The definitions and concepts of pagan philosophers in the works of St. John find application only in so far as they are better able to convey the meaning of Christian truth²⁵². We are constantly reminded that it is the authority of the Fathers which is decisive in the doctrine propounded, as well as in the choice of terminology, especially in the selection and use of such terms as essence or substance, οὐσία, person, πρόσωπον, ὑπόστασις, consubstantial, ὁμοούσιος, etc. These technical terms were coined by the Fathers and Councils, in order to give expression to things which are conveyed by Scripture in a terminology that is less technical²⁵³. The Damascene, therefore, cannot be designated as an Aristotelian in the strict sense of the word because, according to his own words, he does not intend to teach any doctrine that is new, but only that which the Fathers previously have taught and elaborated²⁵⁴.

~~St. John's teaching, consequently, appears to be Neo-Platonic or Aristotelian according to the view of the individual Church-Father whose opinion he adopts in a particular case. Thus, his «theology» — Θεολογία — or doctrine on God, is heavily~~

248. J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz; Studien zu seinen Schriften, Quellen und Auschnungen, Forschungen zur Christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte 7.3* (Paterborn 1908), 66.

249. J. Langen, *Joh. v. Damask. (Gotha 1879)*, 46.

250. See *De F. Orth.* 4, 17 (1177B); *Contra Jacobitas* (ed. by F. Diekamp), *ThQ* 83 (1901), 597.

251. *Contra Jacobitas* 10; PG, 94, 1441A.

252. See J. Bilz, *Trinitätslehre* (Paterborn 1909), 2f.; J. Langen, *Joh. v. Dam. (Gotha 1879)*, 48.

253. See *De Imag. Orat.* 3, 11. PG, 94, 1333BC.

254. See *Fons Scientiae*, PG, 94, 525A-Prologus

tinged with Neo-Platonic thought, because he follows closely the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius, and the same holds true with reference to his exposition of Anthropology which is, to the greatest extent, lifted out verbatim from Nemesius, *De natura hominis*. As to the Damascene's doctrine on the Trinity, Aristotle seems to be the stronger influence, but likewise, with reservations. In general conclusion, it can be safely maintained that the philosophy of our author, like that of the Cappadocian Fathers, Leontius of Byzantium etc., has absorbed a variety of Neo-Platonic thought and combined it with many Aristotelian elements.

It is very difficult, finally, if not nearly impossible, to appraise the influence which St. John Damascene has exercised over Byzantine theology. First of all, that theology is still imperfectly known, since most of its material is, up to the present, left unedited. Then, the Byzantine theologians are accustomed to borrowing from earlier sources without naming them. There is no doubt that this influence must have been considerable. We need but refer to the case of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople (d. 897), whose theology — with the exception of a few questions — but a recapitulation and reproduction of the thought and, not infrequently, of the texts of St. John. This was pointed out by Cardinal J. Hergenröther in the third volume on Photius²⁵⁵. Yet even though the influence of St. John's *Summa*, the *De Fide Orthodoxa*, was prominent upon Byzantine theology, yet it was never similar to that which Peter Lombard's *Libri IV Sententiarum* or Thomas' *Summa Theologica* exerted upon the West. For, the Damascene is not the originator of a theological system, he has not found any commentators, he has always remained a great Father of the Church.

255. J. Gard. Hergenröther, *Photius, Patr. von Konst. 3* (Regensburg 1869), 357-652 passim; M. Jugie, art. cit. *DTC* 8. 1 (1947), 748; see J. Slipey, *Die Trinitätslehre des Patriarchen Photius*, *ZKTh* 44 (1920), 538-62; 45 (1921), 66-95; 370-404.