Churches and International Migration
in the Light of Predominant Security Concerns

Antonios K. Papantoniou
Representative of the Church of Greece
Member of the ExCom of CCME

1. Address

First of all allow me to express my great pleasure at the opportunity to participate in this European Conference organised by CCME to celebrate its 40th anniversary. I am particularly happy to meet people again who have greatly contributed in the past to the development and good reputation of CCME, and right to today continue to be committed to the issues related to European and International migration. I feel very honoured to have the privilege to address such a distinguished and knowledgeable audience, although at the same time I feel rather uncomfortable making a presentation to such an audience and in such a limited span of time, on such a vast issue as the increasingly apparent connection of migration to security concerns in the frame of the EU and elsewhere.

Addressing as I am to a well informed audience, I do not need to spend time on detailed descriptions of the situation. I will presume that the issue is well known to all those present. For this reason I will present an overview from a specific perspective and put forward certain facts that might have slipped from our memories – judging by certain recent publications and scientific analyses.


2. Introduction

To begin with, seeing the foreigner as a menace, that is the migration-security nexus, is not a novel phenomenon. In most civilisations the foreigner was apprehended with suspicion, and attitudes towards foreigners, already in ancient Greece, constituted the touchstone for the distinction between democratic and authoritarian societies.

The old Athenian Democracy, for example, welcomed foreigners, was proud of its hospitality, and considered the foreigner and the asylum seeker as a sacred person. To offer hospitality was tantamount a religious duty, and the laws foresaw the punishment of citizens who violated the sacred duty of hospitality and asylum («δίκαι κακοξενίας», i.e. trials for bad hospitality).

Military and conservative Sparta on the contrary, followed a xenophobic policy of exclusion. The laws of Lykourgos not only suggested to Spartans not to come into contact with foreigners, but also foresaw the prohibition of entry of foreigners and their expulsion («ξενηλασία»). The reason was that foreigners were apprehended as a double menace for Sparta:

first, as a threat against the state, because by spying on the military and social organisation of Sparta, they could profit themselves, thus endangering the survival and independence of the Spartan state; and second, as a moral threat, as they were considered through their customs and their way of life to corrupt Spartan moral values and traditions and, consequently, to menace the cultural identity and the social organisation of Sparta.

To put it in modern language, the xenophobia and «ξενηλασία» of the Spartans originated from security concerns. The most interesting is that in Sparta we have the prelude of the actual distinction between «traditional security» that relates to the survival and sovereignty of the state and that has dominated the discussions of international relationships all through the Cold War Era, and «non-traditional security», that refers to people and culture rather than the nation-state, predominating in the frame of the «new world order».


3. The migration-security nexus in the EC/EU

In relation to the EC/EU, the migration-security nexus, but also the connection of entire geographical regions with security, has a long history, too. Indeed, the process of securitising migration was not initiated with the tragic events of the 11th of September and the fear of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, as many seem to assume. Neither, of course, did start at the beginning of the 1990s, when the fall of socialist regimes, the following internationalisation of migratory flows and the sudden increase in asylum seekers started to make European society panic.

Referring once again to the area from which I originate, I would like to remind you that the development of the EC/EU approach to security is linked to the Mediterranean region and goes back to the 1970s, when Europe started to perceive the Mediterranean as a very dangerous region due to the terrorism emanating from the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and on the other to the energy crisis (oil shock in November 1973), perceived by the industrial countries of the West as “a matter of national security”(1), given the great dependence of the EEC economy on oil imported from the Arab countries.

Since then EC/EU policies have set a primary goal of restricting and controlling migratory flows. From the 1970s until recently – and only reluctantly abandoned today – the target of the EU has been a «zero migration policy», and the continuing and reinforced control of the external borders, a presupposition for the abolition of internal border controls within the European Community (Schengen Agreement) required for the development of the Single Market. The appeal to terrorism during the decade of 1970; to organised crime during the decade of 1990; and again to terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism after the 11th of September, constitute the excuse needed to justify further tightening of the existing restrictive measures. In the history of the EU, migration has been increasingly presented as a security threat. In the process, terrorism, drug-dealing, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, illicit weapon trade, national and international Mafia, and other criminal elements have been linked to migration and border politics(2).


What is the new element today:

a. Migration, and most particularly illegal migration, is not simply considered as a potential danger, but is treated predominantly and almost exclusively as the danger par excellence, as the main source of all the modern crimes. It is also considered as the main threat to all that is valuable in modern society: our jobs, our economy, our welfare system, our culture and our identity.

b. Consequently, actions directed at the securitisation of migration and border politics are permitted to include anything, from increasing internal security measures and enforcing external Schengen border control, to setting up new security Institutions, such as Europol, SIS, SIS II, SCIFA+ etc. What is more, the related decisions are being taken by middle-ranking staff, behind closed doors, without the necessary transparency, and often outside the established European procedures; sometimes on the initiative of specific countries, without the consent of the rest, as it was the case initially with the Schengen Agreement about which has been observed that it appears more to be a «security convention» than a convention for the abolition of borders(3).


4. Evaluating the EC/EU Migration Policy

The title of this paragraph is misleading. Up to now there is no such thing as a common European policy. It exists only as desiderata. But the absence of policy is also a policy, and reveals that the member countries not only try to safeguard their right to control who is entering their territory – something that has also the symbolic value of pampering the wounded sovereignty of the nation-state – but also disagree among themselves over policies be followed, particularly concerning illegal migration and forced migration, which they combat in words but foster in practice.

From its side the EU, despite the few exceptions and the good intentions of the Commission, has proved to be unable to face the migratory phenomenon holistically. The measures taken by the EU are not only opportunistic and fragmentary in character, but also suffer from the naive, and to my opinion, neo-liberal view that trade can prevent wars and restrict refugee flows and migration. In fact, the programmes the EU has implemented up to now and continues to implement, as much in the non-member countries of the Mediterranean Region as in the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa (despite the differences among them and their different names

– MEDA, TACIS, PHARE etc.), have a common characteristic: almost all of them sprang from security concerns and have relied on economic instruments to defuse security challenges. The fact that this method of combining «Economy» with «Security»(4) has repeatedly proven ineffective, does not seem to influence the decision-makers. In the same way the ineffectiveness of the reinforcement of border controls does not lead to a change of policies: The very recently proposed policies of «managing migration» are not much different to the policies of «managing borders», that is «border control», since they aim at eradicating the spontaneous and illegal migration that is considered to be linked to crime and terrorism, and at putting in its place controlled migration, through which only selected individuals will enter Europe. These have to display the desired characteristics, for example, certain professional qualifications, and they will be checked for not having any of the undesired characteristics that could render them a potential threat. The recent proposal to establish and operate modern «concentration camps» outside Europe completes the good management through the tactic «Keep Them Out» (5), providing also the possibility of «remote control».

However, if the policies of securitisation and control of borders have not brought the desired effects, it does not mean they had no unintended consequences and side effects. In my opinion these policies:

• contributed to the slide from legal to illegal migration;

• offered fertile ground for the emergence of smugglers and traffickers;

• rendered migrants more fragile and susceptible to falling prey


to transnational organised crime;

• cultivated among many citizens of the receiving countries the attitude that migrants are criminals; and

• instigated feelings of fear, xenophobia and racism.


5. Conclusion

It is not easy for NGOs and Churches to deal with situations that are created by decisions taken behind closed doors. Nor is it easy to persuade politicians to adopt a pro-migrant oriented discourse and policies supporting migrants’ rights, since these will not increase their popularity among the electorate. Under the present conditions of globalisation, unemployment, job insecurity, increased criminality, identity crisis, restrictions of the welfare state, questioning of the sovereignty of the nation-state and exploitation of all of the above by the extreme right political parties, it is easier and wiser for politicians to promote a discourse that promises effects leading to the preservation and strengthening of existing power relations within society, and to follow a policy of closed borders, even if in effect one is forced to receive in an underground way more foreigners than it admits to needing, because it is neither a secret that every year EU receives around 500 000 so-called illegal migrants, nor are the economic benefits from employment of «illegal» migrants in the prospering underground economy overlooked.

What can Churches do? Are they going to remain observers, accepting these developments in a fatalistic way? I believe not. Are they going to continue to address appeals to the politicians, reminding them of the Christian and cultural tradition of European society? I believe that this is not enough. What could they additionally do? In the following, I will formulate a proposition which could be discussed in the workshops. This proposition is based on the following reflection:

If we put faith in what several analysts of the notions of security and securitisation say, and particularly all those connected to the so-called «Copenhagen School», security is «not a reality prior to language»(6). Security is not an objective reality existing «out there», but a social construction and more precisely a speech act. Security is created because of, or through, language. What is being said, how it is being said, and what goes unspoken holds immense value in security analysis.

Securitisation is the practice whereby an issue – in our case immigration and particularly illegal immigration – becomes a security one, not necessarily because of the nature or the objective importance of the threat, but because the issue is presented as such.

On the basis of the above it is not possible to address security and securitisation, but only to analyse the process of securitisation and deconstructing the social construction of the migration-security nexus. According to the theoreticians on security, it is necessary to identify here:

.a. The «actors». The securitising actor must be in a position of authority, that is, be endowed with social capital(7). In the case of migration the actors are many: Government officials, political leaders, security personnel, intelligence agencies, European Union officials, mass media, pressure groups and last but not least, the academies and the experts. Society identifies threats by the way elites and experts categorise an issue. Since it is the elites in society who usually have access to voice their views, they are the ones responsible for the securitisation issues(8).

.b. The speech act. The speech act is a discourse about an issue presented as posing an «existential threat» to a designated object under discussion, a threat to survival. The speech act must follow the «grammar» of security. Some scholars believe that it is not only the «speech act» that initiates a securitisation process, but also specific practices, as for example massive expulsions of illegal migrants leading people to believe that there is a danger there the practices aim to annihilate. Societal threats are centred mainly on national identity, including race, ethnicity, culture, religion and language. Immigration is interpreted as a significant threat for the survival of a nation and the authenticity of the cultural identity of its citizens, as Weiner and Russell put it: «By introducing large numbers of people of diverse racial and cultural backgrounds to a society, international migration represents a potentially significant threat to notions of stable social and national identities, culture, and ways of life -perhaps even the most significant threat»(9). And another scholar adds: «phenomena that significantly alter the make-up, character, or identity of the nation's people without the consent of the mass majority must also be considered a threat to security. Just as a change from one system of government to another is considered by security scholars to constitute state "death", a significant change in the social characteristics or self-identity of a social entity creates a fundamentally new entity, and thus, the "death" of the old paradigm of social identity. It can represent the “death” of a nation»(10).

c. The third key element in the securitisation process is the audience and the role it plays. Securitisation is inter-subjective and social constructed. The speech actors must elicit a positive response from the audience and find acceptance. In order to achieve that, the author must take advantage of what the audience already fears. In order to win over the audience, it helps considerately if speech acts are accompanied by securitising practices.

Taking the above into consideration, and most particularly the fact that the securitisation of migration is, to a considerable extent, the product of political discourse and related practices, it is important for the Churches to take action to de-construct securitisation. The first step in that process is to study the securitising discourses. A counter discourse can be developed that will offer the public an alternative. If fears are a major factor, the church has other ways to quell those fears.

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NOTES

1. LIEBER, R. J. (1976), 15.

2. BUZAN, B., O. WAEVER, et al. (1998), 23-24; WIENER, A. (1999), 5-7.

3. WIENER, A. (1999), 6.

4. BICCHI, F. (2002), 2, 6, 7.

5. LORENTZEN, J. (2003), Headline.

6. WAEVER, O. (1995), 55.

7. LEONARD, S. (2004), 12.

8. RAMOS, J. (2001), 5.

9. WEINER, M. (1992/93), 91-126; WEINER (1995), 45-76; WEINER, M. and RUSSEL, S. S. (2001), RUDOLPH, C. (2002), 11.

10. RUDOLPH, C. (2002), 10.



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WEINER, M. and RUSSEL, S. S. (2001). Demography and National Security. New York, Bergham Books.

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